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     ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON TAX EVASION 
 
BY 
 
EDWARD BATTE SENNOGA 
 
August 2006 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. James R. Alm 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
  Essay one develops and tests a revenue-maximizing tax structure model. This 
model represents one of the first attempts to evaluate and compare the responsiveness of 
various tax instruments to tax evasion within a tax revenue maximization framework. We 
use data from both the OECD and East African countries and estimation is via a 
seemingly unrelated regression model. The GDP share of agricultural income is used as 
an instrument to correct for the simultaneity between tax revenue shares and tax evasion. 
Our findings indicate that tax evasion increases the tax authority’s reliance on 
consumption taxes vis-à-vis taxes on income, suggesting that diverse tax instruments 
respond differently to tax evasion, and as such the choice of a revenue-maximizing tax 
structure is influenced by the amount of revenue lost through tax evasion.  
Essay two analyzes the incidence of tax evasion in both the formal and informal 
sectors of the economy using a computable general equilibrium model. This essay 
incorporates the element of uncertainty in an individual’s decision to evade so as to 
account for the uncertainty of returns to the tax evader. We also allow for varying degrees 
of competition or entry across sectors in the economy to examine how much of the tax 
 xvi
advantage is retained by the initial evaders and how much is shifted via factor and 
commodity price changes. Our simulation results show that the evading households’ post-
evasion welfare is only 0.68-3.40 percent higher than the post-tax welfare if it had fully 
complied with taxes. The simulation results further reveal that the evading household 
keeps 77.1-83.2 percent of this initial increase in welfare, while 16.8-22.9 percent of this 
initial gain is competed away as a result of increased competition and entry into the 
informal sector. The compliant households’ welfare increases by 58.8-101.7 percent with 
increased competition in the informal sector. Therefore, if we construe the changes in 
consumer welfare as an overall indicator of the gains and/or losses from tax evasion, then 
the evading household only benefits marginally and this advantage diminishes with 
increased entry or competition in the informal sector.  
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Essay One: Tax Evasion and Tax Structure 
Introduction 
The question of how tax evasion affects the structure of taxes has not been closely 
examined in the public finance literature. While traditional economic models are 
generally able to explain the choice of a tax structure as an endogenous outcome of 
constrained maximizing behavior of political agents (maximizing behavior in which 
agents choose tax structure to minimize the political costs or the expected loss in votes 
associated with raising a budget of given size), they are less equipped to answer questions 
regarding the effect of tax evasion on the structure of taxes. Further, tax evasion alters the 
effective tax rates and as such affects the efficiency, equity, and revenue yield of any 
given tax instrument. This therefore suggests that any meaningful analysis of the 
attributes of “a good tax system” and consequently the choice of a revenue-maximizing 
tax system should account for this reality.  
Additionally, tax evasion has wide ranging implications especially regarding its 
effect on tax revenues, excess burden, and the numerous out-of-pocket costs that are 
typically associated with tax evasion. Government’s responses to the revenue short-fall 
created by tax evasion, such as raising revenues from other sources, reducing the supply 
of public services, and/or borrowing, could also lead to excess burdens. Related to this is 
the indirect effect of tax evasion on economic institutions. For instance, when 
entrepreneurs or any other private individuals are faced with burdensome bureaucracy, 
extreme levels of corruption, and a deficient legal system, agents may respond by 
diverting their activities to the shadow or underground economy. This leads to lower tax 
revenues, additionally compromising the quality of the public administration as well as 
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the quality and quantity of public goods and services. This string of occurrences further 
reduces the motivation of businesses and entrepreneurs to operate in the aboveground 
sector of the economy.    
Kesselman (1989) argues that workers may find it almost effortless to evade taxes 
by moving to sectors of the economy where tax evasion is relatively easier, say, due to 
cash receipts, no source withholding of tax, and/or no tax information reporting. On the 
other hand, firms may have an added incentive to fully comply with tax provisions 
especially if they obtain tax offsets or deductions for the wages and salaries paid. 
 The tax evasion question is therefore of paramount significance in the design of any tax 
system. Since we typically consider the ability of taxpayers to adjust to income taxes as 
being greater than for indirect taxes (especially broad-based consumption taxes), tax 
policy design can greatly be augmented by a formal analysis of the impact of tax evasion 
on tax structure. This essay explores the effect of tax evasion on tax structure by 
examining the responsiveness of tax revenues from different tax instruments to changes 
in the level of tax evasion using data from both the OECD and East African countries. 
The seemingly unrelated regression estimation procedure is utilized to exploit the cross-
equation correlation inherent in tax share equations. Our estimation methodology is 
plagued by the potential simultaneity between tax revenue shares and tax evasion. We 
propose the GDP share of income from the agriculture sector as an instrument to correct 
for this simultaneity bias. 
Significant Previous Research 
            Peacock and Shaw (1982) utilize a two sector model (consumption and 
autonomous expenditure sectors) to analyze the impact of tax evasion on tax revenues. 
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They conclude that tax revenue loss from evasion activity will be zero if the marginal 
propensity to consume (mpc) out of tax evading income is equal to one irrespective of the 
value of the mpc in the non-evading sector(s). On a priori grounds, it seems reasonable to 
assume the mpc of tax evaders is higher than that of the compliant tax payers since the 
acquisition of financial assets or durable real assets is more readily susceptible to 
detection by the fiscal authorities. This result is intuitive. The tax agency suffers a loss in 
its share of the income tax base. On the other hand, the tax agency participates in the 
growth of the tax base by the taxable part of the increased tax base because the evaders 
produce a positive income effect. The net loss is thus equal to zero. 
Ricketts (1984) extends the Peacock and Shaw (1982) analysis from a simple 
Keynesian model to an IS-LM model and links tax evasion with the monetary sector. The 
general conclusion is that the Peacock and Shaw (1982) conclusions hold only under 
certain conditions. Specifically, the expansionary consequences for expenditures of tax 
evasion and the possible expansionary influence on real output may be counter-balanced 
by restrictive monetary consequences. Thus the changes in the propensity to evade taxes 
may in principle have complex macroeconomic implications. Ricketts (1984) also argues 
that a rise in tax evasion will not necessarily lead to an increase in domestic output. 
Additionally, a rise in tax evasion still normally leads to a decrease in tax revenue, as in 
Peacock and Shaw (1982). 
Hettich and Winer (1984) develop and test a model in which the composition of 
revenues and the structure of specific taxes arise endogenously as a result of constrained 
maximizing behavior by political agents. They assume that the political agents choose tax 
structure so as to minimize the political costs or the expected net loss in votes associated 
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with raising a budget of given size. Hettich and Winer (1984) argue that, though political 
costs associated with various tax sources cannot be observed directly, it is possible to 
identify exogenous factors influencing such costs and to observe their impact on tax 
structure. Such determinants of political cost are discussed, and several hypotheses 
concerning the nature of political cost functions are developed and applied to an 
explanation of the differences among U.S. states in their reliance on income taxation. 
They conclude that the tax structure that minimizes political cost will be determined by 
the characteristics of many different groups of tax payers, and in particular by the 
sensitivity of their political opposition to changes in particular aspects of the tax system. 
Further, their empirical application emphasizes differences in political constraints across 
jurisdictions in the belief that much can be learned about the choice of policy instruments 
by studying structural adjustments in response to varying constraints. 
Hettich and Winer (1988) further develop this approach by deriving the essential 
elements of tax systems as an outcome of rational behavior in a model where government 
maximizes expected support and where opposition to taxation depends on the loss in full 
income. They assume that the government’s objective in designing a tax structure is to 
maximize expected support, which can be interpreted in a “narrow” and “broad” manner. 
In the “narrow” version, it is argued that individual support for the government depends 
on both the benefits from public goods (and the loss in income resulting from taxation) 
and on the characteristics, such as the cost of voting, age, and the taste for civic duty, all 
of which determine how a particular individual’s net economic benefit from the fiscal 
system is translated into a probability of voting for the government. In the “broad” 
interpretation of the term support, effective support depends not only on the likelihood 
  
5
 
that an individual will vote favorably in the next election but also on the individual’s 
relative political influence. The government then maximizes the weighted sum of 
expected votes where weights depend on voter characteristics like interest group 
membership and strength and on individual attributes such as personal wealth. Voters 
base their decision on whether to support the government on how they are affected by 
benefits and taxes, and are not influenced by how others are treated.  Hettich and Winer’s 
(1988) analysis treats the level of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence 
of administration costs with that of political and economic factors. Tax structure is shown 
to be a system of related components in equilibrium. The upshot of this analysis is that 
the politically optimal tax structure requires a choice of tax rates that equalizes marginal 
political costs per dollar of additional revenue across all tax payers. Hettich and Winer 
(1988) argue that this tax structure will finance a total expenditure such that the marginal 
political benefit of another dollar of expenditure is equal to the common marginal 
political cost per dollar of additional revenue. Hettich and Winer (1988) extend this 
framework to the analysis of taxation of many activities, arguing that the taxation of 
many activities is a natural outcome of expected support maximization. In this latter case, 
the politically optimal tax structure requires marginal political opposition per dollar of tax 
revenue to be equalized across taxable activities for each taxpayer, and to be equalized 
across taxpayers for each activity. 
Lai and Chang (1988) extend the Peacock and Shaw (1982) and Ricketts (1984) 
models by incorporating the effect of tax evasion on labor supply. They argue that in 
response to an increase in tax evasion labor supply will be stimulated and hence 
constitute an additional expansionary channel on domestic output. Consequently, tax 
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evasion may be positively related to the total tax collections. Stated differently, if the tax 
evasion-induced labor supply effect is taken into account, an increase in the degree of tax 
evasion may increase total tax revenue, rather than lessen it. 
Von Zameck (1989) utilizes the Peacock and Shaw (1982) model as a starting 
point to analyze tax evasion within a macroeconomic framework by introducing an 
indirect tax (in addition to just the direct tax considered by earlier models) as a 
simultaneous determinant of tax collections. Using a uniform marginal propensity to 
consume (c) for both declared and undeclared income, his analysis reveals that overall tax 
yield is diminished if c is less than 1 and is not affected if c = 1. He also shows that the 
overall tax revenue may increase, provided that the marginal propensity to consume is 
unity. In other words, provided that the marginal propensity to consume out of 
undeclared income is unity, tax evasion will not only have no adverse effects on overall 
collections, as in the Peacock and Shaw (1982) model, but will also tend to enhance tax 
revenues. Thus, tax evasion pays a dividend because the behavior of the private agent in 
respect to the additional income obtained by evading taxes can be characterized as some 
form of “deficit spending.” However, if evaders in their decisions to consume make no 
distinction between declared and undeclared income, then tax evasion is generally 
accompanied by a fiscal loss, as would be expected via conventional wisdom. 
Gordon and Nielsen (1997) examine the relative vulnerability of consumption and 
income taxes to tax evasion by measuring the relative amounts of evasion under the two 
taxes in Denmark using aggregate Danish tax and accounting data from 1992. They argue 
that, though a value-added and a cash-flow income tax have similar behavioral and 
distributional consequences in the absence of tax evasion, the available means of tax 
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evasion under each tax can be very different. Under a value added tax (VAT), evasion 
occurs via cross-border shopping, while under an income tax it can occur through shifting 
taxable income abroad. Their analysis is based on comparing the observed labor income 
tax base with the figure that would be forecast based on the economy’s aggregate cash-
flow constraint given observed consumption expenditures under the VAT and observed 
accounting figures for asset accumulation. Gordon and Nielsen (1997) argue that, while 
accurate accounting data on income and consumption would precisely satisfy this 
accounting identity, the figures on income and consumption reported for tax purposes 
will each be too small as a result of evasion. If evasion of the income tax is relatively 
larger, the observed earnings reported for tax purposes will be smaller relative to the 
value forecast based on observed expenditures reported for tax purposes and accounting 
information on asset accumulation. It is this difference that yields a measure of the 
relative amounts of evasion under the consumption and income taxes. Their data for 1992 
suggest that evasion rates under the consumption and the income taxes were relatively 
modest, with just 0.8 percent of consumption taxes evaded through cross-border shopping 
compared to nearly 4 percent of labor income lost due to shifting incomes abroad. 
Gordon and Nielsen (1997) also develop a theoretical framework to examine the choice 
of income versus VAT rates that would minimize the excess burden resulting from 
evasion activities. Based on this theory and the computed evasion rates, they find that the 
forecast evasion costs could be reduced by increasing the VAT rate relative to the income 
tax rate. They conclude that in the presence of tax evasion a country could still make use 
of both taxes in order to minimize the efficiency costs of evasion activity, relying 
relatively more on whichever tax is harder to evade or the consumption tax in this case.  
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 Nielsen, Schou, and Sobygaard (2002) also utilize a national income accounts 
identity for Denmark to show that income is more vulnerable to tax evasion than 
consumption. They argue that there is an exact relationship between the tax bases for 
labor income tax and a consumption tax even where both income and consumption taxes 
are subject to tax avoidance and evasion. In their national accounts identity, capital and 
consumption income are related by the relationship FIGCYY rw ∆+++=+ , where wY  
is wage income, rY  is capital income, C  is private consumption, G  is government 
consumption, I is investment, and F∆ is the change in the net foreign debt. When 
investment is subtracted from both sides in the equation, the left-hand side yields an 
income tax base, while the right-hand side becomes the consumption tax base (that is, the 
sum of private and public consumption) plus a correction term for the change in the net 
foreign debt. When both sides of the equation FGCIYY rw ∆++=−+  are calculated 
independently of each other (assuming that there are no errors and omissions in the 
underlying data), the two numbers will be identical in the absence of tax evasion. They 
argue that any observed differences between the two figures are an indication of the 
difference between tax evasion of income on the one hand and tax evasion of 
consumption on the other. Such a difference could stem from simple labor income tax 
evasion, say, through erroneous reporting or non-reporting of income earned. It could 
also arise from individuals storing assets in foreign banks and not revealing information 
about income from such sources to domestic authorities.  
Their calculations from this indirect method for the period 1995-1997 reveal that 
an amount of income in the order of 20 to 40 billion Danish kroner (between 1.8 and 3.6 
percent of GDP) could not be accounted for. This is attributed to two different kinds of 
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phenomena: first, a difference between the errors and omissions in the data on each side 
of the general equation, and second, a difference in tax evasion for each tax base. Though 
they hasten to add that these figures should be interpreted cautiously in light of the 
underlying data problems, their findings suggest that income is especially vulnerable to 
tax evasion in Denmark as compared to consumption. 
In summary, it is evident from the previous literature that tax evasion will 
normally lead to a reduction in tax revenues. Further, several authors have made 
arguments in favor of (broad-based) commodity taxation vis-à-vis income taxation. 
National income accounts analyses have also revealed higher evasion rates for taxes on 
income relative to taxes on consumption. The tax structure literature on the other hand 
argues that the composition of revenues and the structure of specific taxes arise 
endogenously as a result of constrained maximizing behavior by political agents. It is 
against this background, coupled with the lack of substantial empirical evidence on the 
responsiveness of different tax instruments to tax evasion that this essay tries to examine 
the question of whether tax evasion ought to influence the choice or composition of the 
tax mix. This essay uses a novel approach to analyze the effects of tax evasion on the 
different tax instruments.  
Analytical Framework 
Tax Evasion Model  
  Suppose that an economic agent, say, a business enterprise or an individual, has 
total income y. After comparing the expected benefit from and cost of tax evasion, this 
economic agent may make an economic decision regarding the amount of income to 
report to the tax authority. If the expected net benefit of tax evasion is positive, a rational 
  
10
 
economic agent will have an incentive to engage in tax evasion. The optimal amount of 
evasion can be computed and will occur when the expected net benefit from tax evasion 
is zero. Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972), we construct a simple model of such 
behavior.  
 Denote the reported income by x. With no tax evasion, x=y; otherwise, x is strictly 
less than y, and the difference y-x represents the underreported income. The benefit of 
underreported income is the tax savings on this portion of income. If the marginal tax rate 
is t, the marginal benefit of evasion is also t, and thus the total benefit of evading taxes on 
income y-x is given by t(y-x). If the economic agent is caught evading taxes, not only 
must he/she pay the evaded tax, but a fine f is also applied per unit of evaded income (y-
x).1 Consequently, with detection, the net income of the agent can be written as y-tx-
(t+f)(y-x). In other words, the agent has income y on which tax was paid based on 
reported income x. When caught evading the tax, however, both the marginal tax rate t 
and the marginal fine rate f must be paid on underreported income y-x. The benefit from 
tax evasion is t(y-x), and, if caught, the cost of evasion is (t+f)(y-x). For simplicity, 
assume that both f and t are constant.  
Other considerations can also be included in analysis of the benefit/cost decision 
to evade. For instance, Sandmo (2004) argues that daily observations indicate that 
individuals refrain from “socially unacceptable” acts like tax evasion, shoplifting, and 
polluting the environment due to the social stigma attached to such acts. The disutility, 
say, from tax evasion will ultimately affect the optimal amount of tax evasion, and as 
                                                 
1 According to American and Israeli law, the fine is imposed on the amount of evaded taxes. This essay 
follows the more general Allingham and Sandmo (1972) approach where the marginal fine is imposed on a 
unit of evaded income since our sample consists of a mix of countries, including both developed and 
developing countries, in which the marginal fine is imposed on a unit of evaded income.    
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such should be a part of the individuals expected utility function. Similarly, this 
“disutility” could take the form of evasion costs especially since tax evaders incur costs 
in their bid to conceal their earnings or in the creation of opportunities to evade taxes.  
Assuming that the probability of detection and prosecution for tax evasion is 
independent of the amount of taxes evaded and is denoted byπ 2, the economic agent will 
choose an amount of reported income x so as to maximize expected utility as follows: 
[1] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1 hBZUWUUE −+−= ππ  
where txyW −= , ( )xytxyZ −−−= φ , ( )ft +=φ , and ( )hB  is a measure of the 
“disutility” from and/or costs of tax evasion and ( )xyh −= . We assume that the 
disutility from tax evasion is strictly increasing in the amount of taxes evaded so that 
( ) 0>′ hB and ( ) 0>′′ hB . Assuming that the economic agent wishes to maximize expected 
utility by choosing the amount of income x to report to the tax authority, the first-order 
condition for an interior solution can be written as follows: 
[2] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 =′+′−−′−− hBZUtWUt πφπ  
Similarly, the second-order condition3 is: 
[3] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 22 <′′−′′−+′′−= hBZUtWUtD πφπ  
The condition for some amount of income underreporting to be optimal can be formally 
obtained by taking the derivative of expected utility at x=0 and x=y to obtain 
[4] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )yByUftyUtxUE x ′+−′−−′−−=∂∂ = φπφπ 11| 0  
[5] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0111| BtyUttyUtxUE yx ′+−′−−−′−−=∂∂ = πφπ  
                                                 
2 While it may be more realistic to assume that the probability of detection rises with the amount of 
underreporting, we make the simplifying assumption of a constant probability in this model. This is 
especially true considering that tax authorities in most countries do not yet have mechanisms in place that 
are likely to cause  the probability of detection to be responsive to underreporting.  
3 The second-order condition is satisfied by assuming a concave utility function. 
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Under the assumption that expected marginal utility is decreasing in x, optimality of the 
interior solution requires that the derivatives in equations [4] and [5] must be positive and 
negative, respectively. This will be the case if and only if: 
[6] ( )( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−′
′−+>−′
′+ φππφπφ 111 yU
yUt
yU
yB  
[7] ( )( )( ) ttyU
B <−′
′+
1
0πφ . 
Equation [6] indicates that it will always be optimal to move from a state of no tax 
evasion (x=0) to one with a positive level of evasion as long as the expected penalty plus 
the negative value accruing from evasion is less than the marginal tax rate.4 Equation [7] 
shows that the economic agent will report less than his “true” income, since it is only 
then that the expected penalty plus the negative value ensuing from evasion is less than 
the marginal tax rate. These two conditions therefore suggest that the negative value 
attached to evasion acts as an additional tax to deter evasion, and, subsequently, a 
positive expected gain is in itself simply not sufficient for the economic agent to evade 
taxes.  
 A comparative static of interest is the effect of the marginal tax rate on the 
amount of income reported by the economic agent. As mentioned above, an increase in 
the marginal tax rate increases the gain from evasion on the margin (if the agent is not 
detected), and as such it is realistic to expect a negative relationship between the marginal 
tax rate and the amount of income reported. Differentiating equation [2] with respect to t 
yields; 
                                                 
4 The term in brackets on the right hand side of equation [6] is less than 1, and, as such, the marginal tax 
rate t is greater than sum of the two terms on the left hand side. 
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[8] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ZUWU
D
ZUtWUtx
Dt
x ′+′−+′′−−′′−−=∂
∂ πππφπ 11111  
As in Allingham and Sandmo (1972), we define: 
 [9] ( ) ( )( )WU
WUWRA ′
′′−=   
and  
[10] ( ) ( )( )ZU
ZUZRA ′
′′−=  
as measures of absolute risk aversion. Using equation [3] in [8] and applying the equality 
in [2], we obtain: 
[11] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ZUWU
D
ZRWRWUxt
Dt
x
AA ′+′−+−′−=∂
∂ πππ 1111  
The first term on the right hand side can be positive, zero or negative depending on 
whether the absolute risk aversion is increasing, constant or decreasing while the second 
term is clearly negative. Decreasing risk aversion would imply that ( ) ( )[ ]ZRWR AA −  is 
positive consequently indicating that an increase in the marginal tax rate has an 
ambiguous effect on the amount of reported income. The first term can be interpreted as 
the (positive) income effect which indicates that higher taxes make the tax payer poorer 
and therefore less willing to take risks and, subsequently reducing the amount of 
unreported or evaded income. The negative substitution effect (second term in equation 
[11]) increases the gain from evasion at the margin and consequently leads to an increase 
in the amount evaded or a decrease in the amount of income reported. Though it is 
tempting to assume decreasing absolute aversion, we generally cannot sign the 
relationship between the marginal tax rate and reported income without making further 
assumptions. The goal of this section is to verify that there is indeed a relationship 
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between the amount of income reported and the marginal tax rate rather than to establish 
the sign of this relationship. The existence, and not so much the sign of such a 
relationship, influences the choice of our estimation technique, especially as it suggests 
reverse causality in our estimating equations in the next section.  
To summarize, the analytical section states the sufficient conditions for a revenue-
maximizing amount of evasion and also demonstrates that, though the sign of the 
relationship between the marginal tax rate and the amount of income evaded depends on 
assumptions about an individual’s attitude towards risk, it is clear that such a relationship 
indeed exists. This result motivates our estimation procedure as presented in the sections 
that follow.  
Theoretical framework of tax structure 
  The theoretical framework in this essay is based on the premise that taxes have to 
be collected at some cost (administrative costs) to the tax authority and/or the 
government. We argue that since some taxes are relatively easier to evade than others, it 
is rational to expect that different taxes will be associated with quite dissimilar 
administrative costs. Thus, we assume that the objective of the tax authority will be to 
collect as much tax revenues as possible5 while minimizing the costs of collecting these 
taxes by opting for tax instruments that are relatively harder to evade. It is important to 
note that other objectives of the tax authority are also possible, but as long as revenues 
are part of the governments’ objective function, our basic framework still holds. 
                                                 
5 Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996) consider a framework composed of a social planner and two sets of agents-
the tax administrators and the taxpayers. The social planner encompasses the legislative branch, the 
spending branch, and the judicial system. The tax administrator acts as an agent on behalf of the social 
planner while the taxpayers pay taxes. In this framework, the only objective of the social planner is to raise 
a given amount of revenue while keeping the social cost of raising tax revenue (excess burdens, 
administrative costs, and compliance costs) at a minimum level. Provision of public goods and any other 
services provided together with the motives of the social planner such as the maximization of a social 
welfare function and rent seeking are not considered.  
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Assume that the government’s tax technology T is specified as follows: 
[12] ( )θ,,CXTT = , 
where: 
T  = Total (potential) tax revenue,  
X  = Tax base,  
C  = Characteristics of the economy that determine tax capacity, and 
θ = { }nθθθ ,...,, 21 is a vector of tax instruments.6 
It is assumed that 0≥∂∂ XT , 0≥∂∂ CT  and 0≥∂∂ iT θ . Note that the potential change 
in tax revenue isT , but, due to taxpayers’ responses (say, through tax evasion), the 
government only collects Z amount of revenue. The amount of revenue Z is also a 
function of variables X, C, and θ  as defined above. We can thus divide the potential tax 
T  into two components as follows: 
[13] ( ) ZZTT +−= , 
where Z  dollars of tax are collected and ZT −  “leaks” out of the tax net. At the 
individual tax payer level, the amount of evaded taxes ZT −  is determined by comparing 
the benefits and costs of the tax evasion gamble, as discussed earlier. Thus, as the 
expected benefits from evasion increase relative to the costs, the amount of evaded taxes 
( )ZT − also increases. The implementation of the vector of tax instruments and the 
collection of tax revenues are costly. Denote the direct cost incurred by the government 
(per taxpayer) in implementing the vector of tax instruments θ  by ( )θA .  The net tax 
revenue ( )R  that the tax authority obtains from the representative taxpayer is therefore 
( ) ( ) ( )θθθ ACXTCXR −= ,,,, . The goal of the government is to adopt or choose a vector 
                                                 
6 To simplify the computation, we assume that tax rates are captured in the vector of tax instruments. 
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of tax instruments θ  so as to collect a particular amount of net tax revenue ( )R , given 
some characteristics of the economy such as the stage of development, sectoral 
composition of income produced, the level of corruption, the size of the foreign trade 
sector, the extent of tax evasion, and the direct cost of adopting the vector of tax 
instruments. Stated differently, the government’s objective is to choose θ  so as to collect 
as much tax revenues as possible, while minimizing the costs of doing so. This choice 
problem reduces to the standard revenue maximization problem: 
[15] ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( ){ }θθθθθ ACXZCXZCXTMax −+− ,,,,,,   
Assuming continuous, determinate functions and the presence of non-zero derivatives, 
the lagrangean function can be written as follows: 
[16] ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )θθθθ ACXZCXZCXT −+−= ,,,,,,l ,   
The first order conditions with respect to iθ , for i = 1, …, n are as follows: 
[17] ( ) ( )
iiii
AZZT
θ
θ
θθθ ∂
∂−∂
∂+∂
−∂=∂
∂l . 
Setting equation [17] equal to zero and re-arranging gives: 
[18] ( ) ( ) ( ) i
ii
AZTAZ ϕθθθθ −′≡⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
−∂−′=∂
∂ , 
where ( ) ( )
i
AA θ
θθ ∂
∂=′  and =iϕ  ( )⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
∂
−∂
i
ZT
θ or the amount that “leaks” out of the system. 
Equation [18] indicates that a revenue-maximizing tax structure requires the government 
to choose tax instruments that equalize a dollar of additional revenue from increased 
reliance on a given tax instrument iθ  and the marginal direct costs, net of the revenue 
that “leaks” out of the tax system, across all tax instruments in use. In our framework, 
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implementing a revenue-maximizing tax structure requires that the government adjusts 
tax instruments until the marginal effect on revenue from increased reliance on iθ  is 
equivalent to the marginal effect on the direct costs, net of the amount of revenue lost via 
tax evasion, for all tax instruments in use. This therefore suggests that the choice of a 
revenue-maximizing tax structure is closely related to the amount of tax revenue that 
escapes the tax net via tax evasion. 
One way to represent the solution to the first order conditions in equation [18], 
assuming that a solution exists, is by a system of equations that can be written as follows: 
[19] ( )ikii cccgZ ϕ,,...,, 21= , for i = 1, …, n. 
Or equivalently: 
 ( )12111 ,,...,, ϕkcccgZ =  
. 
. 
. ( )nknn cccgZ ϕ,,...,, 21= ,  
 
where iZ  represents the tax revenue actually collected from tax instrument iθ  and 
kccc ,...,, 21 are the different characteristics of the economy as described above. We argue 
that the direct costs of implementing the tax instruments are captured by the 
characteristics of the economy.7 These are n equations in n unknowns and their solution, 
when it exists, is a system of equations as shown in [19].  In the presence of tax evasion, 
the potential amount of revenue iT  from a given tax instrument exceeds the amount of tax 
revenues actually collected iZ  or ( )ii ZT > and as such the amount that leaks out of the 
                                                 
7 For instance, it is practical to assume that a tax authority in a country with a higher GDP share of 
manufacturing or mining income will incur relatively lower direct costs in the implementation of income 
taxes compared to, say, a tax authority in a country whose population is mostly engaged in subsistence 
agriculture.  
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tax system iϕ  will be positive. This indicates therefore that tax evasion lowers tax 
revenues collected from that particular tax instrument. However, when the potential 
amount of revenue iT  equals the amount of tax revenues actually collected iZ  
or ( )ii ZT = , as would be the case in the absence of tax evasion, iϕ  will be equivalent to 
zero, suggesting that tax evasion has no impact on tax revenues collected from that 
particular tax instrument. 
            Two observations can be made from equation [18]. First, the amount of tax 
revenue that “leaks” out of the system ( )iϕ  varies with the tax instrument used. This 
implies therefore that the amount of tax revenue that escapes the tax net differs across tax 
instruments. Second, the amount of tax revenue that “leaks” out of the system ( )iϕ  either 
varies inversely or exhibits no variation with the amount of tax dollars actually 
collected ( )iZ . This therefore suggests that an increase in the amount of tax revenue that 
eludes the tax net through tax evasion will, everything else constant, either reduce the 
reliance on a given tax instrument or have no effect on the use of that particular tax 
instrument.  
Equations [11] and [18] also indicate potential simultaneity or reverse causality in 
the causal relationship between taxes collected (or tax rates) and the amount of tax 
revenues that leak out of the tax system through evasion. Specifically, an increase in 
evasion iϕ  would be expected to reduce the amount of taxes collected and subsequently 
affect the effective average tax rates, all else constant. Equation [18] shows that a change 
in the amount of taxes collected iZ θ∂∂ also influences iϕ . This reverse causality 
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problem is resolved empirically by appealing to instrumental variables via a two stage 
least squares estimation procedure as described below. 
            To summarize, the theoretical framework reveals that tax evasion not only has a 
negative and/or zero effect on the amount of tax revenues actually collected from a given 
tax instrument, but also affects diverse tax instruments differently. This essay therefore 
estimates the effect of tax evasion on various tax instruments so as to quantify the 
responsiveness of the different tax instruments to changes in the amount of tax revenue 
that escapes the tax net via evasion. In other words, this essay tries to study the effect of 
tax evasion on the structure of taxes by identifying the sensitivity of tax revenues from 
different tax instruments to tax evasion.   
Empirical Framework 
Estimation Methodology  
 This essay applies the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model to exploit the 
information in the cross-equation error covariances to yield efficient estimators and 
potentially more powerful test statistics. Though coefficients of individual equations in 
SUR models can be consistently estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS), efficient 
estimation requires joint estimation of the entire system of equations. If the same 
parameters appear in more than one of the regression equations, the entire system of 
equations would be subject to cross-equation restrictions. In the presence of such 
restrictions, efficient estimates will only be obtained when all equations are estimated as 
a system, rather than individually. Further, even in the absence of cross-equation 
restrictions, it is likely that the unobserved features of the economic environments of the 
different countries would be related at each point in time, thus necessitating the 
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estimation of all equations as a system. The goal of this study is to examine the effects of 
tax evasion on tax structure. This indicates that a proper empirical framework would 
require estimation of all GDP tax share equations as a system, rather than individually.  
An estimation concern here is the potential endogenous relationship between the 
dependent variable (GDP tax share) and one of the regressors (tax evasion). Tax evasion 
literature argues that under certain conditions, higher tax rates (and consequently higher 
tax revenues) increase the incentive to evade.8 Further, the tax authority may be forced to 
hike tax rates in response to increased tax evasion levels. To correct for this endogeniety, 
we use instrumental variables to estimate the effect of tax evasion on the share of tax 
revenues in GDP. The next section discusses results from the Hausman test used to 
investigate the presence or absence of endogeniety in the relationship between tax 
evasion and GDP tax shares.  
Another estimation concern is the timing of the tax evasion/tax structure 
interaction. It is reasonable to expect that the present period tax structure is determined 
by the amount of revenue lost via evasion in the previous period, suggesting that there 
could be a lag between noticing a change in tax evasion and a change in tax structure. 
One way of modeling the evasion/tax structure interaction is to use lagged values of our 
measure of tax evasion. However, our tax evasion data for OECD and East African 
countries is only available for a period of six and eleven years, respectively, suggesting 
that using lagged values in our estimation will substantially reduce the degrees of 
freedom. For instance, the OECD sample has twenty one (21) countries, and as such, 
using lagged values for this set of countries reduces the number of observations from 126 
to 105. Similarly, the East African sample has a total of 33 observations, and this number 
                                                 
8 See Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974), and Sandmo (2004). 
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falls to 30 when we use the lagged value of our tax evasion measure. Nonetheless, our 
measure of tax evasion accounts for the evasion/tax structure interaction as discussed 
below. 
The dynamic multiple indicators-multiple causes (DYMIMIC) method used to 
compute the GDP share of the shadow economy, which is our proxy for tax evasion, for 
the East African countries (see Appendix A) accounts for the effects that previous period 
causes have on present period indicators of the GDP share of the shadow economy. The 
DYMIMIC approach therefore controls for lags in the tax evasion/tax structure response 
for the East African countries. 
Additionally, the GDP share of the shadow economy data are computed for a 
range of two years rather than just for a single year. For instance, OECD shadow 
economy data are available for the years 1989/90, 1991/92, 1994/95, 1997/98, 
1999/2000, and 2001/2002, while the East African shadow economy data are available 
for the period 1991/1992 through 2001/2002 (see Appendix B, Tables B5 and B6). Our 
tax revenue data corresponds to the most recent year in this two-year range, for example, 
given shadow economy data for the period 1989/90, the matching tax revenue data will 
be for the year 1990. This is done to control for the fact that the structure of taxes 
responds to tax evasion with a lag.    
The SUR Model 
 The SUR model can be specified as follows; 
[20] εβ += Xy  
where y  is an (Nx1) vector of observations on the dependent variable (where nt=N), 
while X  is an (Nxk) matrix of observations on k endogenous and exogenous explanatory 
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variables.  The (Nx1) continuously distributed random vector [ ]′′′′= Mεεεε ,...,, 21 has mean 
vector zero and covariance NNGG I ×× ⊗Σ , where G is the number of equations or in this 
case the number of GDP tax share equations. We can therefore define an NGxNG matrix 
Ω  as follows;  
NGNGNNGG IE ××× Ω=⊗Σ=′εε . 
As mentioned above, matrix X contains both endogenous and exogenous variables, so it 
follows (Wooldridge, 2001) that 01lim ≠⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ′εX
N
p  but 01lim =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ′εZ
N
p , where Z is an 
Nxl matrix of instrumental variables. A necessary condition for identification, also known 
as the order condition, requires that we must have at least as many instrumental variables 
as we have explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2001). This is essentially equivalent to 
requiring that the number of columns in matrix Z be greater or equal to the number of 
columns in matrix X (or kl ≥ ). 
 Our estimation strategy is essentially a three step procedure. In the first step, we 
regress X on Z to obtain the predicted value of X or Xˆ . In step two, we regress y on Xˆ to 
obtain the predicted residuals εˆ , which are then used to form the estimator Σˆ  and 
finally Ωˆ , where εε ′=Σ × ˆˆˆ GG , and NNGGNGNG I ××× ⊗Σ=Ω ˆˆ . The feasible generalized method 
of moments (FGMM) estimator is ultimately computed as: 
[21] ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′Ω′′∗⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′Ω′′= −−− yZZZZXXZZZZXFGMM 111 ˆˆβˆ . 
Finally, the third step yields a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of the 
disturbances; [22] ( ) ( ) 11ˆˆvar −− ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′Ω′′= XZZZZXFGMMβ . 
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 In summary, the first two steps yield the two stage least squares estimates and an 
estimator Σˆ  while the last step involves applying the SUR estimator to obtain a 
consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of disturbances found in the previous step. 
The FGMM estimators are consistent and asymptotically efficient.9 Estimation of share 
equations necessitates imposing cross-equation restrictions. Imposing cross-equation 
restrictions, we have: 
[ ]
.1
,1
,0sin
,11
11
1
−
=
−⋅⋅⋅−−=
=⇒
=
=+⇒=
∑
∑
∑∑
jkjk
jk
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j
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ce
Xy
βββ
β
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µβ
 
In view of the fact that we are estimating share equations, we have to impose adding up 
constraints. The adding up constraint requires that∑ = 1jy , which is satisfied provided 
that ∑ = 1jkβ  and∑ = 0jβ . This is in effect equivalent to estimating only NG-1 
equations. The estimation results are presented and discussed in the next section. We now 
turn to a description of the data and explanatory variables. 
Data 
 Tax revenue data used in this essay are obtained from OECD Revenue Statistics 
and the Government Financial Statistics CD-ROMs. Shadow economy data are obtained 
from   Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2002). Other data come from the 
World Development Indicators CD-ROM. Data on the East African countries are 
                                                 
9Davidson and Mackinnon (2004) present an excellent discussion of FGMM estimators. 
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obtained from various issues of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) country reports 
and the United Nations National Accounts Publication (UN, 2005).  
We consider two samples, from OECD countries and from East African countries. 
Tables B1 and B2 present the descriptive statistics for the East African and OECD 
countries, respectively. Simple correlations for the East African data are shown in Table 
B3, while Table B4 shows the simple correlations for the OECD data. Our East African 
sample includes a panel of three (3) countries; Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania (see 
Appendix B, Table B5) over the period 1991/1992 through 2001/2002. Thus, each 
country has a total of 11 observations where available. The OECD sample comprises a 
panel of twenty one (21) countries (see Appendix B, Table B6). In this sample, shadow 
economy data are available for the years 1989/90, 1991/92, 1994/95, 1997/98, 
1999/2000, and 2001/2002, and, as such, each country has a total of six observations 
where available.  
The OECD and East African samples are considered separately because different 
methodologies are used to quantify the share of the shadow economy in GDP, which is 
our proxy for tax evasion.10 The OECD shadow economy data are primarily from the 
Currency Demand, estimates while the East African countries’ shadow economy data are 
primarily from the DYMIMIC method; see Appendix A for details on these two measures 
of the shadow economy. Lumping together data compiled by these different 
methodologies might introduce some bias in our results. The other, though more subtle, 
concern is that these two samples comprise countries with very different characteristics. 
For instance, different levels of economic growth and development, different tax systems, 
and different social norms are all factors that may tend to have quite varied effects on any 
                                                 
10 Section IV.4 discusses our choice of the share of the shadow economy in GDP as a proxy for tax evasion. 
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causal relationship between tax evasion and tax revenues if this diverse set of countries is 
analyzed together. Stated differently, there is a possibility of introducing cross-region and 
cross-methodology variation (Friedman, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 2000). 
Explanatory Variables 
  As mentioned earlier, our key independent variable is tax evasion and is 
measured here as the share of the size of the shadow economy in GDP. Below we discuss 
the rationale for using the share of the shadow economy as proxy for tax evasion. Bahl 
(1971) argues that tax capacity is a function of three major factors, namely the stage of 
development, the sectoral composition of the income produced, and the size of the 
foreign trade sector. These factors are measured here, respectively, by GDP per capita, 
mining share of income, and the export share. Other regressors considered to have an 
impact on tax revenue shares and/or tax ratios include tax evasion and corruption in 
government. Consider each of these factors in turn. 
 Tax evasion. As mentioned earlier, we use the share of the shadow economy in 
GDP to proxy for tax evasion. Though the share of the shadow economy in GDP 
measures that portion of a country’s parallel economy, we find it a suitable proxy for tax 
evasion due to the following reasons. First, to the best of our knowledge, no estimates of 
the amount of tax revenues evaded are readily available for our set of countries. Tax 
evasion estimates for the United States that are publicly available from the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) comprise both the amount of taxes evaded and the estimated 
penalties, including any accrued interest. As such, an accurate derivation of the amount of 
taxes evaded from the data provided by the IRS is virtually impossible, even for the 
United States. Second, the share of the shadow economy in GDP used here quantifies 
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economic activity that lies outside the tax net, and consequently escapes taxation. Thus, 
the share of the shadow economy in GDP measures an economy parallel to the 
aboveground economy which engages in both legal and illegal production on which no 
taxes are imposed. Though it is true that this measure fails to capture the amount of taxes 
evaded in the aboveground economy, it is used as an indicator of the amount of taxes 
evaded in this essay due to lack of a better measure of tax evasion.  
Further, we use measures of tax evasion computed by Schneider (2002) because 
the effect of tax evasion on tax structure is more accurately depicted overtime than at a 
given point in time. In other words, a panel data analysis of the effect of tax evasion on 
tax structure yields more consistent and efficient estimates compared to a cross-section 
analysis. To the best of our knowledge, only Schneider (2002) computes measures of the 
share of the shadow economy in GDP for both OECD and East African countries over 
time.   
The tax evasion literature indicates that tax evasion and/or tax avoidance have a 
negative impact on tax revenues. We argue here that some taxes are much more prone to 
tax evasion than others, stated differently, there seems to be a differential response of tax 
revenues to tax evasion. This is especially true in the case of taxes on wage income 
versus taxes on business or capital income. The former is subject to third party reporting 
and, in most cases, to source withholding, which makes this particular category of taxes 
less susceptible to tax evasion. The latter depends on the honesty of the tax payer as well 
as the vigilance of the tax authorities, and is thus much more prone to tax evasion. 
Other taxes like the value-added tax (VAT) depend on a detailed and sometimes 
complex invoice system. This system of self-policing and self-assessment is 
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advantageous in more ways than one. First, it tracks down almost all traders and/or 
producers, enlarging the tax base in the process. Second, traders and/or producers are able 
to claim refunds or tax off-sets on taxes paid on inputs, a feature that lowers or even 
eliminates tax cascading, thereby lowering the tax burden and as such enhancing the 
efficiency of this tax. Third, given that a huge proportion of the population in most 
developing countries is below the poverty line, the VAT can be made progressive through 
the exemption of necessities like food and medication, or via the selection of an 
appropriate threshold above which VAT can be levied on a trader or producer. All these 
features suggest that the VAT is not only less prone to tax evasion but could also be 
associated with lower tax burdens and consequently higher efficiency gains. The 
estimates of the size of the shadow economy (in percent of GDP) for the OECD and East 
African samples used in this essay are calculated using the Currency Demand and Model 
(DYMIMIC) approaches. See Appendix A for a brief description of these approaches, as 
well as their strengths and weaknesses. 
 Size of the foreign trade sector. It is hypothesized that taxable capacity is directly 
related to the size of the foreign trade sector. Bahl (1971) argues that a greater level of 
exports relative to income suggests both a greater degree of monetization and an 
industrial structure that is administratively amenable to taxation. Further, the ensuing 
larger imports can be taxed with minimal administrative difficulty. Favorable world 
market conditions for certain primary exports can create a relatively sizable taxable 
surplus in export earnings and subsequently a greater taxable capacity. Three alternative 
measures can be used to capture the impact of the foreign trade sector on taxable 
capacity: (1) the import ratio (value of imports as a percentage of GDP); (2) the export 
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ratio (value of exports as a percentage of GDP); and the ratio of imports plus exports to 
GDP, or the openness ratio. Use of the openness ratio to measure the influence of the 
foreign trade sector on taxable capacity is justified based on the assumption that a 
suitable measure of the foreign trade sector should reflect the total available trade tax 
base. The export ratio will be more appropriate if foreign trade is meant to reflect the size 
of the tax base that is amenable to corporate income or export taxation. Additionally, if it 
is more feasible, both administratively and politically, to tax large exporters relative to 
domestic producers, it is realistic to expect that the tax ratio will be higher where the 
export ratio is higher, everything else constant. Bahl (1971) further argues that using the 
import ratio to capture the size of the foreign trade sector reflects an attempt to quantify 
the variance among countries in the size of the import tax base. The simple correlations 
presented in Tables B3 (East African countries) and B4 (OECD countries) reveal that 
there is no significant difference between the import ratio and the openness ratio, as each 
appears to be related to the structure of the economy in approximately the same way. We 
use the export ratio as an indicator of inter-country variations in taxable capacity that 
result from variations in the size of the foreign trade sector since the export ratio is more 
closely associated with the tax ratio than is either the import or openness ratio.11 
 Stage of development. A prosperous society consumes more goods on average 
and engenders the production and provision of not only more but also a greater variety of 
goods and services. The latter also ensures that more workers are hired, a feature that 
points to increasing purchasing power and consequently increased consumption. All these 
factors solely or jointly increase the tax base, which increases the amount of tax revenues 
                                                 
11 We also used the openness ratio as an indicator of the size of the foreign trade sector. The empirical 
results were not affected in any significant way. 
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collected and thus increases the tax revenue shares. In addition, richer societies are 
characterized by higher demands on the public authorities to provide not only more but 
also higher quality public goods and services, which can only be possible via increased 
taxation. Also in some OECD countries like Sweden and Norway, higher taxes have to be 
collected to enable the government to provide the huge contingent of public services like 
welfare programs and unemployment insurance. All else constant, these factors seem to 
suggest that the amount of tax revenues collected and hence tax ratios will increase as the 
stage of development in a given society improves. Friedman et al. (2000) argue that 
countries with relatively higher per capita incomes have better-run administrations and 
also higher tax rates. Higher tax rates, all else constant, are likely to translate into higher 
tax revenues.  
We use GDP per capita as a measure of the stage of development in both the 
OECD and East African countries. Bahl (1971) argues that the percent of GDP 
originating from the agricultural sector is a better measure of the stage of development, 
especially for developing countries. This choice is driven largely by two shortcomings of 
the per capita income measure: per capita income differences may mask the important 
structural difference or the relative size of the non-monetized sector that affects taxable 
capacity, and the accuracy of inter-country comparisons is subject to error due to the 
conversion of local currencies into U.S. dollars (Bahl, 1971). It follows therefore that a 
higher level of activity in the agricultural sector will be associated with a sizeable 
subsistence sector, less commercialization and industrialization, and consequently, a 
lower per capita income. Further, to the extent that incomes of agricultural wage earners 
may be relatively low and that the agricultural sector is largely composed of many small 
  
30
 
farmers who are not as administratively amenable to taxation as enterprises in other 
sectors of the economy, value added in the agricultural sector will embody a lower 
taxable surplus. However, our options are rather limited in this case since we use the 
share of income originating for the agricultural sector as an instrument for the GDP share 
of the shadow economy. Using the GDP share of agriculture both as a regressor and 
instrumental variable will lead to perfect multicollinearity. As such, we use GDP per 
capita as a measure of the stage of development for both the East African and OCED 
countries. 
 Sectoral composition of the income produced. Bahl (1971) and Alm, Martinez-
Vazquez, and Schneider (2004) point out that the sectoral distribution of income exerts an 
effect on taxable capacity apart from that of the overall level of economic development 
and the size of the foreign trade sector. They argue that the mining sector generally 
produces a larger surplus relative to any other sector, and consequently, it is a positive 
determinant of taxable capacity. The heavy fixed investment associated with mining 
industries dictates that operations will be confined to a few large firms, subsequently 
making it administratively easier to levy income or export taxes. Further, to the extent 
that mining companies are often largely foreign owned, effective resistance to higher tax 
levels will be relatively less, suggesting that governments will be willing to levy higher 
levels of taxation since it is politically feasible to do so. Stated differently, the burden of a 
given level of taxes per dollar of income may be less when mining constitutes a relatively 
large share of total income, consequently making higher levels of taxation feasible and 
attractive to the fiscal authorities, all else constant. We use the mining share of total 
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income as an indicator of the sectoral composition of income produced in OECD and 
East African countries.  
 Corruption. Corruption is measured here using the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Index, ranging from 1-10, with a higher value indicating a lower level of 
corruption. The trustworthiness and honesty of the both taxpayers and tax authorities 
have a significant impact on the amount of tax revenues collected. In some societies, the 
social norms have come to embrace dishonesty and other unscrupulous ways on several 
horizons of daily life, horizons that extend beyond tax collection issues. As a result, in 
such societies individuals will invent and engage in various schemes to “beat” the system, 
a feature that has substantial adverse effects on the amounts of taxable incomes reported 
and collected. It is also true that in some societies, the central issue is not so much the 
embracing of unscrupulous ways by society that is a problem, but rather the failure of the 
taxpayers to make a connection between the taxes paid and the (public) services 
provided. This argument suggests that efforts to minimize corruption, to educate the 
public about their civic responsibilities (including paying taxes), and to try to link the 
taxes paid and the services provided will go a long way in ensuring higher tax revenue 
shares.     
Empirical Results  
 Tables B7-B11 present the estimation results for the OECD and East African 
samples (see Appendix B). Table B7 presents the first stage least squares results for both 
OECD and East African countries, while Tables 8 and 9 show the estimation results 
without accounting for the country fixed effects for the OECD and East African samples, 
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respectively.12 Tables B10 and B11 present the estimation results after the country fixed 
effects have been accounted for in the two sets of countries, respectively. OLS and GMM 
refer to Ordinary Least Squares and Generalized Method of Moments estimates, 
respectively.  Both OLS and GMM estimation results are reported for comparison, but 
our analysis is mainly based on the GMM or system of equations estimates since these 
parameter estimates account for the cross-equation correlation between the tax share 
equations.   
 Simultaneity between tax revenues and tax evasion. As alluded to earlier, an 
estimation concern here is the potential simultaneous determination of tax revenues and 
tax evasion. It is realistic to expect that higher tax rates (and consequently higher tax 
revenues) could increase the incentive to evade. Further, the tax authority may be forced 
to hike tax rates in response to increased tax evasion levels. This essay counters this 
reverse causality problem by using the share of income derived from agriculture as an 
instrument for tax evasion. The first stage least squares results in Table B7 (see Appendix 
B) reveal that an increase in the share of income derived from the agricultural sector by 
one percent leads to an increase in tax evasion by 0.75 percent and 0.69 percent for the 
OECD and East African countries, respectively. Both these estimates are statistically 
different from zero at the 1 percent level of significance.13 Further, the regression-based 
Hausman test shows evidence of endogeneity of the share of the shadow economy in 
GDP at the 10 percent level of significance for both the OECD and East African 
countries. In particular, the t-statistics for the OECD and East African countries are -1.85 
                                                 
12 We report both the no-fixed effects and fixed effects estimation results for comparison purposes.  
13 The identification restriction for instrumental variables requires that the instrumental variable be partially 
correlated with the variable for which it is instrumenting, once the other exogenous variables have been 
netted out. This is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the instrumental variable 
is statistically different from zero.  
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and -1.92, respectively. This implies that we reject the null hypothesis of no endogeniety 
at the 10 percent level of significance in both samples; consequently indicating that 
ordinary least squares (OLS) will not yield consistent estimates.14 
 OECD Countries. Table B8 shows that an increase in tax evasion by 1 percent 
reduces the GDP share of total taxes by 1.35 percent. This result is consistent with other 
studies. For instance, Alm et al. (2004) and Teera (2002) find an inverse relationship 
between the share of the shadow economy in GDP (our proxy for tax evasion) and the 
ratio of total tax revenues to GDP.  
Several explanations could be advanced for the inverse relationship between tax 
evasion and the total tax ratio. One explanation is that tax evasion reduces the tax 
capacity, especially as some taxpayers elude the tax net. All else constant, this lowers the 
total taxes collected, consequently reducing the total tax ratio. Another explanation for 
this negative relationship is that tax evasion has a differential impact on tax ratios. For 
instance, it is reasonable to expect that tax evasion will lower the total tax share of 
income taxes in GDP (we call this the “negative effect” of tax evasion), but that taxes on 
consumption as well as the international-import and export taxes may not be adversely 
affected (what we refer to as the “positive effect” of tax evasion). Thus, the observed 
negative relationship could be due to the “negative effect” of tax evasion outweighing the 
“positive effect.”  
                                                 
14 The regression-based Hausman test examines the correlation between the structural and reduced form 
error terms (Wooldridge, 2001). Our measure of tax evasion will be exogenous if and only if these errors 
are uncorrelated. This test proceeds by estimating the reduced form equation to obtain the (reduced form) 
residuals and then estimating the structural equation, with these residuals as one of the regressors. Thus, our 
measure of tax evasion is exogenous if and only if the coefficient on the reduced form residuals is not 
statistically different from zero. 
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To analyze further the differential impact of tax evasion on GDP tax shares, we 
categorize taxes into four broad categories: taxes on income, taxes on consumption, 
property taxes, and “other” taxes. We also include international trade (export and import) 
taxes for comparison purposes. “Other” taxes represent all the other tax revenues not 
otherwise classified under income, consumption, property, and international trade taxes.  
As mentioned earlier, the estimation of share equations necessitates imposing adding up 
constraints. Given NG-equations, this requires estimating only NG-1 equations. Our 
system of equations therefore includes GDP share equations for income, consumption, 
property, and international trade taxes. The GDP share of “other” taxes is our omitted 
equation. 
Table B8 reveals that tax evasion has a negative effect on the GDP shares of both 
income and property taxes but no effect on the GDP shares of consumption and 
international trade (export and import) taxes. Specifically, a one percent increase in the 
share of the shadow economy in GDP (tax evasion) lowers the GDP share of income and 
property taxes by 1.32 percent and 0.24 percent, respectively. A similar one percent 
increase in the share of the shadow economy in GDP has no statistically significant effect 
on the GDP share of consumption and international trade taxes.15 Intuitively, tax evasion 
alters the return to factors of production in favor of those factors employed in the 
informal sector, a feature that distorts labor choices leading to diversion of factors of 
production, especially labor to the informal sector. The upshot of this would be a 
                                                 
15 The effects of tax evasion on individual GDP tax shares are consistent with the effect of tax evasion on 
the GDP share of total taxes. In particular, a one percent increase in tax evasion lowers the GDP share of 
total taxes by 1.35 percent while a similar one percent increase in tax evasion lowers the GDP tax shares of 
income and property taxes by 1.32 percent and 0.24 percent, respectively. Further, a one percent increase in 
tax evasion raises the GDP tax shares of consumption and international trade taxes by 0.21 percent and 0.01 
percent, respectively. This suggests that a one percent increase in tax evasion will reduce the GDP share of 
other taxes by 0.01 percent. Since the omitted category “other taxes” consists of license fees and other 
small levies, it is logical to expect such a small effect of tax evasion on the GDP share of other taxes.  
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reduction of the share of taxes on income in GDP. Several studies have highlighted the 
vulnerability of social security contributions in particular and taxes on income in general 
especially in the presence of a sizeable informal sector. These studies note that income 
taxes and social security contributions are comparatively difficult to administer for 
people who are not formal sector employees. 
However, even in cases where taxpayers are driven into the underground sector, 
they still consume goods produced in the aboveground or formal sector of the economy 
on which taxes are levied and collected. Thus, consumption taxes may not be affected by 
tax evasion or reliance on consumption taxes may generally increase. Since VAT and 
excise taxes form the bulk of consumption taxes in our sample, this finding is therefore 
consistent with other studies that have called for the increased use of indirect taxes such 
as the VAT, so as to draw that part of the shadow economy or untaxed sector into the tax 
net. This is in addition to the other benefits of the VAT, such as being a self-policing tax, 
a feature that makes it less prone to tax evasion.  Bolnick and Haughton (1998) argue that 
the most compelling reason for the use of excise taxes is that they can potentially raise a 
great deal of revenue with little distorting effects on producers and consumers. However, 
they also note that this is only possible in cases where tax reforms ease the excise burden 
on the poor while increasing the burden on the well-to-do, as would be the case with ad-
valorem as opposed to specific excises. Significant equity gains can be achieved in this 
particular case. Though these studies are motivated by revenue adequacy, efficiency, and 
equity paradigms, their general conclusions are consistent with our findings. Further 
support for broad based consumption taxes comes from Gordon and Nielsen (1997) who 
argue that an alternative approach to taxing labor income is to tax the income when it is 
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spent rather than when it is earned as would be the case with a value-added tax. They 
argue that a tax authority’s inability to monitor transfer pricing used by multinationals is 
of no consequence for a VAT since the only price that matters for such a tax is the price 
paid by the final consumer. Similarly, government’s inability to monitor foreign source 
incomes does not matter for a VAT as long as the government can monitor consumption 
expenditures. 
Since in principle import and export taxes are collected at relatively fewer 
locations, particularly border crossings and specific entry points like ports and airports, it 
would appear that it is easier to enforce these taxes and thus they ought to be less prone to 
tax evasion.  However, it is important to note that detection of all imports at the border is 
an onerous and costly task, which often times compels governments to abandon any 
attempts at monitoring cross-border shopping by individuals. To the extent that property 
taxes are imposed on largely immobile bases, taxes on property are difficult to evade and 
as such it is reasonable to expect that they will not be negatively affected by tax evasion. 
A plausible explanation for the observed negative relationship between tax evasion and 
property taxes is that taxpayers who are driven into the underground or informal sector do 
not acquire or accumulate property so as to reduce the chances of being detected. This 
reduces the property tax base, and, all else constant, leads to a reduction in the property 
tax revenues collected.  
The other regressors in our model have the expected signs. For instance, an 
increase in the GDP share of mining incomes, export ratio, and control of corruption lead 
to an increase in the tax ratio as well as the GDP shares of income, consumption, 
property, and international trade taxes. An increase in GDP per capita on the other hand 
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lowers the tax ratio as well as the GDP shares of the taxes studied here. Our trend 
variable indicates that overall the tax ratio and the GDP shares of the taxes considered in 
this essay have been declining. 
 East African Countries. A similar analysis is done on the three East African 
countries. Due to the unavailability of comprehensive tax revenue data, we only consider 
income taxes (paid by both individuals and corporations), consumption (VAT, sales, and 
excise), international trade (import and export) taxes, and “other” taxes. We impose the 
adding up constraint by omitting the equation for the GDP share of “other” taxes from 
our system of equations. Our system of equations therefore comprises equations for the 
GDP shares of income, consumption and international trade taxes.  The estimation results 
for the sample of East African countries are presented in Table B9. 
The findings in Table B9 largely mimic those for the OECD countries shown in 
Table B8. Specifically, Table B9 reveals that a one percent increase in tax evasion lowers 
the total tax ratio and the income tax share of GDP by 0.15 percent and 0.09 percent, 
respectively. As in Table B8, a similar one percent increase in tax evasion has no 
statistically significant effect on the GDP shares of consumption and international trade 
taxes.16  These findings emphasize that, even when individuals evade their income taxes, 
they still purchase goods and services produced and/or traded in the aboveground sector 
on which taxes are imposed. To the extent that this is largely the case, we would expect 
                                                 
16 Similar to the OECD countries, the effects of tax evasion on individual GDP tax shares are consistent 
with the effects of tax evasion on the GDP share of total taxes for the East African countries. Specifically, a 
one percent increase in tax evasion lowers the GDP share of total taxes by 0.15 percent while a similar one 
percent increase in tax evasion lowers the GDP tax shares of income, consumption and international trade 
taxes by 0.094 percent, 0.034 percent, and 0.004 percent, respectively. This suggests that a one percent 
increase in tax evasion will reduce the GDP share of other taxes by 0.018 percent. Since the omitted 
category “other taxes” largely comprises license fees and other small fees and levies, it is logical to expect 
that the effect of tax evasion on the GDP share of other taxes will be of such magnitude.  
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tax evasion to have little effect on the share of consumption taxes in GDP. Further, as 
argued earlier, it is easier to enforce export and import taxes since in principle such taxes 
are administratively amenable to taxation. One concern with international trade taxes lies 
with smuggling and with corruption by the tax administrators. Smuggling severely erodes 
the tax base as imported and/or exported commodities are left out of the tax net.        
 Corruption of the tax administrators is also detrimental in more ways than one: it 
erodes the tax base, especially due to the underdeclaration of either the taxable quantities 
or values, and resources are expended to bribe the administrators leading to inefficient 
production. This is especially the case since resources are not channeled to their most 
valued sectors.  Table B9 reveals no statistically significant relationship between the 
control of corruption and the GDP share of international trade taxes for East African 
countries as opposed to the OECD countries where control of corruption leads to an 
increase in the share of international trade taxes.  
 Country fixed effects. The fixed-effects model is also utilized, and is deemed 
appropriate for our analysis for two reasons.  First, much of the variation in GDP tax 
shares is between countries rather than within countries overtime.  Although it would be 
difficult to specify all the institutional, economic, and demographic characteristics that 
determine the differences in GDP tax shares across countries, we can capture permanent 
differences between countries with country fixed-effects.17  Similarly, there are many 
factors that may affect GDP tax shares over time, and these differences are captured 
using the time trend variable.  Second, the fixed-effects model is a within-group estimator 
                                                 
17  Country fixed-effects capture any permanent differences across countries (for instance, tax incentives to 
attract foreign direct investment, elimination or reduction of customs and import tariffs due to customs 
unions and/or free trade areas) otherwise not captured by other explanatory variables.  Similarly, the time-
effects capture any variation in GDP tax shares over time that affects the whole country, such as changes in 
the tax code or changes in the tax administration. 
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that uses a weighted average of the within-country and the across-country variation to 
compute the parameter estimates.18  Therefore, our estimate of the effects of tax evasion 
measures how GDP tax shares change within the different countries in response to tax 
evasion.19 The fixed effects results are presented in Tables B10 and B11 for the OECD 
and East African samples, respectively.  
 OECD countries (country fixed effects). Table B10 shows that a one percent 
increase in tax evasion lowers the tax ratio by 1.69 percent.  Further, a one percent 
increase in tax evasion reduces the GDP share of income and property taxes by 1.59 
percent and 0.24 percent, respectively. As in Table B8, an increase in tax evasion does 
not have a statistically significant effect on the GDP share of consumption and 
international trade taxes.20 In summary, even after controlling for country specific time-
invariant unobservable factors, our results are still consistent with our earlier observation 
that tax evasion reduces the tax ratio, GDP share of income, and property taxes, but does 
not have a statistically significant effect on the GDP share of consumption and 
international trade taxes. 
 East African countries (country fixed effects). Table B11 shows that, after 
controlling for country specific time-invariant unobservable factors, tax evasion has no 
statistically significant effect on the tax ratio or on the GDP shares of income, 
consumption, and international trade taxes. However, these disparate results could be due 
                                                 
18 It is important to note that OLS also accommodates country fixed-effects but does not decompose the 
fixed effects into within and between-group estimators. 
19 Hsiao (1986) presents an excellent discussion of panel data estimation procedures. 
20As discussed in the no-fixed effects case, the effects of tax evasion on individual GDP tax shares are 
consistent with the effect of tax evasion on the GDP share of total taxes. Particularly, a one percent increase 
in tax evasion lowers the GDP share of total taxes by 1.69 percent while a similar one percent increase in 
tax evasion lowers the GDP tax shares of income and property taxes by 1.59 percent and 0.24 percent, 
respectively. Additionally, a one percent increase in tax evasion raises the GDP tax shares of consumption 
and international trade taxes by 0.12 percent and 0.022 percent, respectively. This therefore suggests that a 
one percent increase in tax evasion will reduce the GDP share of other taxes by 0.002 percent.  
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to the fact that our East African sample only has 33 observations, and, as such, 
controlling for country fixed effects reduces the degrees of freedom.21 This ultimately 
reduces the statistical significance of the relationship between tax evasion and the GDP 
tax shares, even when such a relationship is still economically significant. Further, it is 
also plausible that the observed relationship between the GDP tax shares and tax evasion 
in East African countries is due to country fixed effects, so that controlling for these fixed 
effects washes out any such relationship. Additional analysis to resolve this issue requires 
expanding the time dimension over which the responsiveness of GDP tax shares to tax 
evasion is examined. However, this is hampered by the fact that our tax evasion data for 
East African countries is only available for a period of ten years. 
To summarize, our findings reveal that tax evasion lowers the total tax ratio plus 
the GDP shares of income and property taxes for both the OECD and East African 
countries. The results further indicate that there exists no statistically significant 
relationship between tax evasion and the GDP shares of consumption and international 
trade taxes. The latter results are consistent across both samples as well. These results 
show that different tax instruments respond differently to tax evasion, and therefore tax 
evasion does affect the evolution of the structure or composition of the tax system.  
It is nonetheless noteworthy to point out that advent of e-commerce in general, 
and internet shopping in particular, may have affect the interpretation of our findings 
especially for the OECD countries. In some OECD countries like the United States, a 
number of online purchases may go taxed, a fact that could lower tax revenues from 
consumption taxes. This consequently suggests that we could observe reduced reliance on 
                                                 
21 Since our East African sample has only 33 observations, including six regressors, a constant and two 
country fixed effects as right hand side variables reduces the actual number of observations used to 
estimate the causal relationship between the left hand side variable and the covariates to only 24. 
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consumption taxes by the government when designing a revenue-maximizing tax 
structure. However, e-commerce is a more recent invention and it is therefore reasonable 
to assume that our findings still mirror the effect of tax evasion on tax structure in the 
OECD countries especially since our OECD data are drawn from the years 1989/1990-
2001/2002 (see Appendix B, Table B6). Our findings from the East African countries are 
also not affected by the potential effect of e-commerce on consumption tax revenues for 
two reasons: first, our East African data are drawn from the years 1991/1992-2001/2002 
(see Appendix B, Table B5), a period which was characterized by limited, if any, internet 
shopping in this set of countries. Second, computer literacy and usage is still very low in 
the East African countries, suggesting that very limited shopping takes place over the 
internet in these countries. 
Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Suggestions for Further Research 
This essay develops and tests a tax structure model within a government revenue-
maximization framework. This model attempts to capture the effects of tax evasion on tax 
structure previously neglected in traditional economic analysis. While traditional 
economic models are generally able to explain the choice of a tax structure as an 
endogenous outcome of constrained maximizing behavior of political agents, maximizing 
behavior in which agents choose a tax structure to minimize the political costs or the 
expected loss in votes associated with raising a budget of given size, they are less 
equipped to answer questions regarding the effect of several other factors like tax evasion 
on the structure of taxes. This essay contributes to the latter goal by developing and 
estimating a formal tax structure model in which the composition of taxes is influenced 
by the amount of tax revenues lost through tax evasion.  Additionally, this model 
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represents one of the first attempts to evaluate and compare the responsiveness of various 
tax instruments to tax evasion within a framework of government revenue-maximization.  
Our estimation methodology is plagued by the potential simultaneity between tax revenue 
shares and our proxy for tax evasion. We propose the GDP share of income from the 
agriculture sector as an instrument to correct for this simultaneity bias.  
  Our findings not only confirm the widely known fact that tax evasion reduces the 
GDP share of total taxes, but also reveal that the GDP shares of taxes on income and 
property decline with tax evasion. Further, our results indicate that tax evasion has no 
statistically significant effect on the GDP shares of consumption and international trade 
taxes. This is especially the case since we typically consider the ability of taxpayers to 
adjust to income taxes as being greater than for indirect taxes (particularly broad-based 
consumption taxes).  Broad-based consumption taxes have the advantage of pulling that 
informal portion of the economy into the tax net, and therefore increased reliance on such 
taxes will minimize the revenue effects of tax evasion. The basic premise here is that, 
even in cases where factors of production, especially labor, are driven into the 
underground sector, the owners of these factors still consume goods produced in the 
aboveground or formal sector. 
  The upshot of our findings is that tax evasion does indeed affect the composition 
of tax instruments. Consequently, the choice of a revenue-maximizing tax structure is 
closely influenced by the amount of tax revenue lost via tax evasion. This therefore 
implies that policy recommendations regarding the design of a revenue-maximizing tax 
structure ought to take into account the responsiveness of different tax instruments to tax 
evasion. In the presence of tax evasion, the choice of a revenue-maximizing tax structure 
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requires the taxing authority to adjust the tax structure such that the marginal effect on 
revenue from increased reliance on a given tax instrument exactly equals the marginal 
cost per dollar of additional revenue, net of the amount of revenue lost through tax 
evasion, across all tax instruments in use.  
  There are several directions in which this framework can be extended. The 
correction for measurement error is the most pertinent.  The public finance literature has 
highlighted several concerns regarding the measurement of the underground or shadow 
economy. Several authors argue that most measures of the shadow economy do not 
accurately quantify all aspects of this economy and are as such biased downward and/or 
upward. This measurement error problem is largely due to the various forms tax evasion 
can take on, which include underreporting of taxable income, the complete non-filing of 
individual tax returns, underreporting of unit value and taxable quantities, and the 
mislabeling of higher-taxed products as lower-taxed types. These difficulties are further 
compounded by the often thin dividing line between illegal tax evasion and legal tax 
avoidance.   
  One way of correcting for this measurement error is to construct instruments for 
our measure of tax evasion or the share of the shadow economy in GDP by exploiting 
functions of our model data. Given a linear regression model with measurement errors in 
the variables, simple functions of the model data can be used as instruments for two stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimation, taking advantage of third moments of the data. These 
instruments can be utilized when no other data are available, or they can even supplement 
outside instruments to improve efficiency. This procedure is advantageous in the sense 
that the distribution of the errors is not required to be normal or known and the method 
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can readily be extended to regressions containing more than one mis-measured regressor 
(Erickson & Whited, 2002).  
  However, the GMM estimator used in the estimation procedure described above 
has poor small sample properties, and as such, our initial attempts at its application 
yielded counter-intuitive and unfeasible results, especially given that our OECD and East 
African samples comprise 126 and 33 observations, respectively. Further exploration of 
this measurement error correction technique will necessitate increasing our sample size, 
which is currently constrained by the limited availability of the GDP share of the shadow 
economy data, which is our key regressor. 
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Essay Two: The Incidence of Tax Evasion 
 Introduction 
The portfolio approach to tax evasion postulates that individuals weigh the 
probability of getting caught and paying a penalty against the probability of being able to 
keep the evaded income, subsequently leading to the conclusion that the individual 
evader benefits by keeping the evaded income in its entirety.  However, conclusions 
drawn from the conventional portfolio approach regarding the incidence of tax evasion 
are quite unsatisfactory because this approach ignores the fact that in several situations, 
especially those in which the expected value of the evasion gamble is positive, tax 
evasion is similar to a tax advantage in the law. To the extent that there is an advantage at 
all, it is realistic to expect replication and competition, when possible, to work toward the 
elimination of this direct advantage. This process of adjustment generally should take 
place through changes in the relative prices of both commodities and factors of 
production (Martinez-Vazquez, 1996). The portfolio approach affords tax evasion 
incidence analysis only a partial equilibrium treatment and does not capture this general 
equilibrium effect. 
On the equity front, differences in opportunities for tax evasion may lead to 
horizontal or vertical inequities. If it were simpler to hide capital income as opposed to 
labor income, evasion would make the tax system less progressive, while if lower-income 
groups could evade taxes more easily, evasion would make the tax system more 
progressive (Skinner & Selmrod, 1986). However, such inferences may not be quite 
correct, if the advantage of evading by more easily hiding income from authorities gets 
capitalized or competed away by market processes. A case in point is tax evasion by 
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domestic help such as house cleaners, baby, and house sitters. Tax evasion in this case 
may actually benefit the higher-income households hiring these services since they can 
pay lower prices for their services (Martinez-Vazquez, 1996).  
Persson and Wissen (1984) analyze the relationship between the distribution of 
actual or true income (which includes evaded income) and the distribution of officially 
reported income. They conclude that government policies aimed at reducing inequalities 
in the distribution of reported income could be counterproductive as far as actual income 
distributions are concerned. However, to the extent that the distribution of reported 
income differs from actual income distribution, ignoring the final incidence of evasion 
could clearly lead to wrong policy conclusions about the true distribution of income 
(Martinez-Vazquez, 1996). This is especially true if the incidence of evasion is more 
indirect and intricate so that evaders do not benefit fully and exclusively from evaded 
income. The government could then stop redistribution efforts based on the belief that 
certain sections in society are already benefiting from tax evasion, when in actuality they 
are not.  
  In this essay we analyze the incidence of tax evasion in both the formal and 
informal sectors of the economy using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. 
The CGE model is considered appropriate since it allows evasion to alter product and 
factor prices via the interaction between different sectors of the economy, thereby 
identifying both winners and losers under a given policy change.  
Significant Previous Research 
Existing Literature  
  In their seminal work, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) consider the case of an 
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individual’s decision to evade income taxes.22 In their portfolio approach to tax evasion, 
individuals compare the probability of being detected and paying a penalty to the 
probability of being able to keep the evaded income. The conclusion about the incidence 
of tax evasion in this rather simplistic case is that the individual evader benefits 
exclusively by keeping the evaded income in its entirety. One major shortcoming of such 
a portfolio approach to tax evasion is that it ignores market forces that work toward the 
elimination of the tax advantage created by evasion opportunities via changes in both 
commodity and factor prices. This effect can more adequately be analyzed in a general 
equilibrium framework. 
  Watson (1985) analyses a model with two labor markets with differing evasion 
possibilities to examine changes in various tax parameters on evasion and labor market 
equilibrium. A distinction between markets could arise if, say, employers in only one 
market are subject to withholding requirements that could prevent their employees from 
successfully underreporting their income. He argues that the interaction between evasion 
and labor market equilibrium is crucial to the understanding of the ultimate effect of tax 
parameter changes on evasion and equilibrium in the labor market. Stated differently, the 
effects of tax rate changes on evasion and labor market equilibrium ought to be analyzed 
in a general equilibrium framework. His analysis of both proportional and progressive 
taxation reveals that the gains that might accrue to those who are more able to avoid 
detection are partially eliminated by wage declines in markets in which evasion is 
possible, so that market forces will tend to eliminate the value of any advantage created 
by the presence of evasion opportunities.  
  In perhaps the most complete analysis of these types of general equilibrium 
                                                 
22 See Essay I for a presentation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) basic model. 
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effects, Kesselman (1989) develops an intersectoral general equilibrium model of income 
tax evasion. Qualitative and quantitative assessments of the effects of tax rate changes on 
evasion activity, relative output prices, and real tax revenues yield an array of findings. 
On evasion activity, if government consumes goods from both the evading and compliant 
sectors in the same pattern as households and if higher tax rates do not affect evasion 
costs, then higher tax rates drive resources out of the compliant sector into the evading 
sector. However, if government purchases are biased toward output of the compliant 
sector and also if higher tax rates raise the evasion costs for individuals, say, via the 
structure of penalties for the apprehended evaders, higher taxes rates may actually lower 
tax evasion. Regarding relative price changes, the inducement toward more or less 
evasion requires changes in the relative prices of outputs from both the evading and 
compliant sectors. This therefore suggests that the gains from evasion may be shifted 
from the evaders to the consumers of their output via lower prices; that is, the evaders 
bear most of the evasion costs, but the marginal evader does not gain from evasion.        
Finally, the effects of evasion on the marginal revenue response to tax rate changes 
depend on consumers’ elasticity of substitution between sectoral outputs. This is 
especially the case as the income tax base may itself rise or fall when real resources exit 
the compliant sector, depending on the magnitude by which its output price rises. Further, 
the Laffer effect from reduced tax rates is undermined by the reduction in output prices in 
the compliant sector when resources are induced to return from the evading sector. 
Though this study utilizes a general equilibrium approach and thus accounts for the 
effects of evasion on the labor market equilibrium, the uncertainty of returns is not 
explicitly considered in an individual’s decision to evade.23  
                                                 
23 The next Section discusses the key elements needed to analyze the incidence of tax evasion. 
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  Thalmann (1992) studies the impact of factor taxes on employment in two 
production sectors, “reported” and “unreported.” In this general equilibrium framework, 
taxes are evaded when resources relocate from the “reported sector” to the “unreported 
sector.” The “unreported sector” differs from the “reported sector” only to the extent that 
its activities are not reported to the tax authority and therefore are not taxed. Thalmann 
(1992) uses a novel approach of relegating the uncertainty of returns associated with tax 
evasion to the budget constraint rather than the usual expected utility approach, and he 
finds this very powerful in untangling the multiple interactions between the reported and 
unreported sectors. His analysis gives rise to several results that are noteworthy. First, the 
dependence of the expected penalty on the tax rate and on the extent of evasion renders 
the response of labor supply to the unreported sector (due to an increase in the labor 
income tax) ambiguous. This is due to the fact that the higher tax also raises the expected 
penalty for evasion, suggesting that the general equilibrium effect of the higher tax on 
employment in the unreported sector will be indeterminate if the labor supply response 
also is indeterminate. Second, lower wage rates imply higher capital income, which 
reduces the total supply of labor by the representative household, consequently leading to 
a shift to the less labor-intensive reported sector. Third, participation of any agent, be it 
the worker, firm, or capitalist in the unreported sector, does not depend solely on their 
due tax payments. Thalmann (1992) argues that, even when firms have no direct 
incentive to escape to the unreported sector, some will still employ capital and labor that 
try to avoid taxes since these factors will be offered at a discount. Stated differently, 
factor holders surrender part of the savings from tax evasion as a way of “bribing” firms 
to offer them employment “off the books.”  
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  Finally, propensities to evade should be considered when allocating taxes across 
economic agents, especially since agents who face a large expected penalty from evasion 
will be less willing to pay other agents these “bribes.” Taxation of firms will be 
preferable to direct taxation when a firm’s propensity to evade is comparatively small or 
if it can be made smaller by cheaper enforcement.    Thalmann (1992) adds that an 
optimal tax system may thus necessitate the imposition of a tax on both sides of the factor 
market to keep taxes low, especially if higher rates encourage more evasion.  Differently 
stated, the presence of tax evasion invalidates the tax equivalence principle (or the 
principle that imposing a tax either on the demand or supply side does not affect the final 
incidence of the tax) since it makes a difference which side of the factor market is obliged 
to file the tax.   
What is missing in the Literature? 
           A survey of the literature reveals that no study has explicitly incorporated the 
general features a model should have in order to capture the fundamental aspects of the 
incidence of tax evasion. In Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) portfolio approach to tax 
evasion, individuals weigh the probability of getting caught and paying a penalty against 
the probability of being able to keep the evaded income. According to the portfolio 
approach therefore, the individual evader benefits by keeping the evaded income in its 
entirety. Martinez-Vazquez (1996) contends that the conclusions drawn from the 
conventional portfolio approach to tax evasion regarding the incidence of tax evasion are 
rather unsatisfactory. He argues that the portfolio approach ignores the fact that in 
numerous situations, particularly those in which the expected value is positive, tax 
evasion is comparable to a tax advantage in the law. Consequently, it would be rational to 
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expect replication and competition, when possible, to work toward the elimination of this 
direct advantage. Martinez-Vazquez (1996) argues that this process of adjustment should 
generally take place through changes in the relative prices of both commodities and 
factors of production.24 However, the portfolio approach affords tax evasion incidence 
analysis only a partial equilibrium treatment and does not capture this general equilibrium 
effect.   
  As argued by Martinez-Vazquez (1996), there are several desirable features for 
models of evasion incidence. First, the model should be able to capture the potential 
general equilibrium effects of tax evasion. The general equilibrium effects induce 
(potential) changes in the relative prices of both factors of production and goods and 
services brought about by market equilibrium forces. If there is an advantage in terms of 
expected factor income or firms’ expected profits, the (potential) mobility of resources 
will lead to the necessary price adjustments until this advantage is eliminated. 
Second, the model should incorporate the element of uncertainty in an 
individual’s decision to evade in at least one sector of the economy. This fundamental 
distinguishing characteristic of evasion incidence, as opposed to tax incidence, allows the 
excess burdens of evasion associated with uncertainty to be accounted for in the model. 
Third, the model should allow for varying degrees of competition or entry across 
sectors in the economy, including those in which tax evasion is prevalent. This includes 
mobility of factors, for instance labor in the case of income tax evasion; it also includes 
firm entry in several sectors, as in the case of sales tax or corporate income tax evasion. 
The element of mobility is critical to an understanding of how much of the tax advantage 
                                                 
24The advantage of tax evasion can also be dissipated away by direct means, for instance the bribing of 
corrupt officials (Shah & Whalley, 1990). 
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may be retained by the initial evaders and how much is shifted via factor and commodity 
price changes. 
This essay utilizes these guidelines to develop a framework for analyzing the 
incidence of tax evasion via a static Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model. The 
static CGE model has the advantage that it emphasizes the interaction among different 
industries and/or sectors, and so allows for product and factor mobility in response to 
changes in returns.  One obvious shortcoming of this type of model is that it fails to 
capture the effect of a policy change on the dynamic aspects of an economy. This 
shortfall can be remedied, however, by incorporating steady state effects, thereby 
allowing capital and investment to adjust to changes in policy directives, consistent with 
a long-run analysis.  
Static Computable General Equilibrium  Model 
We consider a closed economy composed of two broadly defined sectors: 
• Aboveground sector or taxed output (X). 
• Underground or tax evading sector, whose output (Y) is a substitute for taxed 
output. 
Assumptions 
(i) Two consumers are considered; a POOR evading (informal) household and a 
RICH conforming (formal) household.   
(ii) Spending and income of the government are disaggregated from that of the 
consumers and as such, the government is also treated as a consumer that 
collects taxes to provide a public good-public administration. 
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(iii) Labor and capital are fixed25 in total supply, imperfectly homogenous, and 
imperfectly mobile across sectors.26 
(iv) Labor and capital holders declare their activity in the aboveground sector 
(sector X) and comply with registration and tax laws. 
(v) Unreported sector productive activity is hidden from the authorities and thus 
escapes taxation. Firms in this sector are, however, constrained by 
concealment requirements.27 
(vi) The RICH consumer holds portfolios only in the formal or aboveground 
sector, while the POOR consumer only operates or works in the underground 
sector.28 
Producers maximize profits taking prices as given, and consumers maximize utility 
subject to a budget constraint that depends upon the value of their endowments. This 
implies that producers only earn normal profits and that consumers cannot increase 
consumption of all goods. 
Household Consumption and Labor Decisions 
The RICH and POOR consumers allocate their time to labor in the formal and 
informal sectors, respectively, and to leisure according to the following utility 
maximization problem:29 
                                                 
25 We also allow for flexibility in the supply of the labor input by introducing a labor-leisure choice. 
26 Alm (1985) argues that the presence of risk premia on factor returns in the underground sector will 
prevent complete equalization of net factor returns, even with complete mobility. It is important to note that 
it is factor returns adjusted for any such differentials that are equalized by mobility. To the extent that the 
pattern of risk premia is not affected by the presence of these taxes, the results remain unchanged.  
27 For instance, firms in the underground sector may opt to produce less than the profiting maximizing level 
of output to avoid detection in the evasion of sales taxes. 
28 As an extension, we allow the RICH or compliant household to hold portfolios in both the formal and 
informal sectors via the supply of labor to both these sectors. This is necessary to capture the changes in 
net-of-tax returns to factors of production, especially labor, when the compliant household decides to 
allocate some of her labor to the informal sector.  
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[23]U = Max ( ) yxjiLLHCU iyixiiji ,&2,1;, ==−−  
subject to: 
[24] ( ) ( )[ ] iiyyiyttiixxj ijj KLwtLaPLwtCP +−+−≤∑ = ,,112 1  
where: 
• ( )⋅U  is a twice continuously differentiable strictly quasi concave utility function.  
• jC is the consumption of the commodity produced by both sectors30. 
• jP  is the price of good j, ( yxj ,= ) 
• iH  is individual i’s total time endowment; ixL  and iyL are labor allocated to 
sectors X and Y, respectively, and xw and yw  are the corresponding real wage 
rates. 
• Labor and capital income taxes are proportional to gross income at rate t. 
• ( )⋅tiP  is individual i’s expected tax-plus-penalty rate (or expected penalty). It is a 
general function of labor supplied in sector Y, t, and the enforcement parameter 
ta . 
• iK  is individual i’s capital income. 
Wages need not be equal for a consumer to be active in both sectors. Labor and 
capital income are taxed in the aboveground sector, while unreported activity in sector Y 
entails the risk of detection and taxation at a penalty rate above the regular tax rate. 
Thalmann (1992) argues that this uncertainty is usually modeled by writing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 Following Thalmann (1992), we model the uncertainty associated with the tax evaders’ returns via first-
order certainty equivalence around unreported income, as discussed below.  
30 The elasticity of substitution between goods X and Y in final demand is assumed to be 1.  The informal 
sector good is, however, tainted by the lack certain attributes like return service, warranty, and after-sales-
service otherwise enjoyed by consumers of the formal sector good X.  
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optimization problem in expected utility. This approach, however, has the disadvantage 
that it rapidly becomes intractable when the representative consumer has more choice 
than that of underreporting fixed income. Few comparative statics can be signed without 
making even stronger assumptions on the income derivatives of the Arrow-Pratt 
coefficients of risk aversion. 
Thalmann (1992) adds that an alternative hypothesis is to use first-order certainty 
equivalence around the unreported income. The actual income from the unreported labor 
is; [ ] iyyti LweP +−1 , where e is a zero-expectation stochastic variable. Thalmann (1992) 
shows that the solution of the maximization of expected utility is the same (to the first-
order condition in e) as the solution to the problem in [23] and [24], where e is replaced 
by its expected value. The expected penalty in this case is the product of the probability 
of detection and the tax-plus-penalty rate charged on unreported income. It increases at 
an increasing rate with enforcement parameters ( ta ) such as the frequency of audits and 
the penalty coefficient on regular tax rates, with the unreported volume of activity, and 
with the regular tax rate. 
Using calculus to solve the consumer’s maximization problem given in [23] and 
[24] above, we have:31 
[25]
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+−+−= ,,11θ ; i= 1, 2; j=x, y. 
where ijθ are non-negative parameters. 
                                                 
31 For a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the utility maximization problem depicted by equations [23] and 
[24] yields the following demand function c for consumer i: pIc ii θ= , where iθ are non-negative 
parameters, I is the representative consumer’s disposable income and p is the consumer price. Equation 
[25] is obtained by replacing I with the consumers’ disposable income shown in the budget constraint in 
equation [24].  
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Firm’s Production Decisions 
Following Kehoe and Kehoe (1994), we assume that both goods have production 
functions that combine intermediate inputs in fixed proportions and labor and capital with 
substitution possibilities governed by a Cobb-Douglas production function of the 
form ααβ −1mm lk . Stated differently, goods are produced according to a nested Leontief–
Cobb Douglas technology, where intermediate inputs and aggregate value-added enter at 
the top level32. Value-added represents a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of labor and capital. 
The general form of the total production function is;  
[26] ( ) .,;,,min 1 yxmlkavavq mmymymxmxmm == −ααβ  
where 
• jmv is the intermediate input of good j used in the production of good m. 
• jma  is the amount of good j required to produce one unit of good m. 
• jma , mβ  and mα are parameters to be calibrated. 
It is reasonable to expect that not every good is used in the production of every 
other good. This is corrected by dropping the corresponding entry from the production 
function. Producers are assumed to minimize costs and to earn zero after-tax profits. 
Given that this assumption implies that producers never waste inputs, the production 
function in [26] can be written as: 
[27] ααβ −=== 1mmmymymxmxmm lkavavq  
Cost minimization further implies that mk  and ml  solve: 
                                                 
32 The labor/capital elasticity in value-added is assumed to be 1 while the elasticity of substitution between 
intermediate inputs is assumed to be zero. Our choice of both the Cobb-Douglas structure for value-added 
and the Leontief intermediate input demand is standard in applied general equilibrium modeling. 
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[28] mmmm krlw +min  
subject to: 
[29] mmmm qlk ≥−ααβ 1  
where mw  is the wage rate and mr  is the capital rental rate. 
The assumption of zero after-tax profits implies that 
[30] ( ) ,,,01 2
1
yxmrkwlqaPqP
j mmmjmjmmm
==−−−− ∑ =τ  
where mτ  is the indirect tax rate on the sales of good m. 
Computable General Equilibrium Modeling 
 Concept of equilibrium. Equilibrium is specified by listing values of all the 
endogenous variables in the model: a price for each of the produced goods mPˆ , a level of 
consumption for each good mCˆ , wage rates mwˆ , capital rental rates mrˆ and a production 
plan for each of the produced goods ( )mmymxmm lkvvq ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . Equilibrium must therefore 
satisfy the following properties: 
• The consumption vector ( )yx cc ˆ,ˆ  solves the utility maximization problem subject 
to the budget constraint described in equations [23] and [24]. 
• The production plan ( )mmymxmm lkvvq ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  minimizes costs subject to the feasibility 
constraints and earns zero after-tax profits as described in equations [28], [29], 
and [30]. 
• Supply equals demand for each produced good: 
[31] ∑ =+= 2 1 ˆˆˆ m jmjm vcq , for j =m = x, y. 
• Supply equals demand in each factor market: 
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• Total government revenues equal total tax receipts under full tax compliance: 
[34] ( ) ∑ = =++= 2 1 .,,ˆˆˆˆˆ m mmm yxmqPkrlwtT τ  
Imposing the condition that supply equals demand for each produced good, from 
equations [31] and [26], we have: 
∑ = ===+= 2 1 .2,1;,;ˆm jm
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where: ( ) ( )[ ] iiyyiyttiixxi KLwtLaPLwtI +−+−= ,,11  
Further, first order conditions of equations [23] and [24] yield the following condition: 
[36] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] yyyttiyyttix wLtLaPtLaPwt ,,,,11 −−=−  
where  ( )
y
ti
ti
y L
PP ∂
⋅∂= , for i=1, 2. 
Consumers will allocate labor to the informal sector Y until their wage net of the 
expected penalty (including the marginal change in the expected penalty that is 
attributable to the change in yL ) is equal to the wage in sector X net of taxes. 
 Equilibrium Conditions.  Mathiesen (1985) demonstrates that an Arrow-Debreu 
general economic equilibrium model can be formulated and solved as a complementarity 
problem. Mathiesen’s problem can be depicted in terms of three sets of “central 
variables”: 
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p = a non-negative n-vector of commodity prices including all final goods, intermediate 
goods and primary factors of production; 
y = a non-negative m-vector of activity levels for constant returns to scale production 
sectors in the economy; and 
M = an h-vector of income levels, one for each “household” in the model, including any 
government entities. 
Equilibrium in these variables satisfies a system of three classes of nonlinear inequalities: 
zero profit, market clearance, and income balance. 
 Zero profit. The first class of constraints requires that in equilibrium no producer 
earns an “excess” profit; that is, the value of inputs per unit activity must be equal to or 
greater than the value of outputs. This can be written in compact form as: 
[37] ( ) ( )pvenuepCost ii Re≥  iy⊥  
 
The corresponding complementary variable for a zero profit condition is output iy . All 
else constant, if output prices increase for commodity i, production activity increases 
until marginal cost equals marginal revenue. 
 Market clearance. The second class of equilibrium conditions is that, at 
equilibrium prices and activity levels, the supply of any commodity must balance or 
exceed excess demand by consumers and producers. This condition can be expressed as: 
[38] ∑ ++≥ i iiii GOVTRICHPOORy ip⊥  
The above inequality refers to produced commodities, and a similar constraint holds for 
endowed goods such as labor and capital. The corresponding dual or complementary 
variable is the price ip (price of both commodities and factors of production). Prices 
adjust until supply equals demand for a given commodity or factor. 
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 Income balance. The third condition is that in equilibrium the value of each 
agent’s income must equal the value of factor endowments: 
[39] KpLwM Ki i +≥∑                                                   for (POOR, RICH, and GOVT) 
Since we always work with utility functions that exhibit non-satiation, Walras’ law will 
always hold. In other words, complementary slackness, though not imposed as an 
equilibrium condition by itself, is a feature of the equilibrium allocation. This means that 
in equilibrium any production activity that is operated makes zero profit, while any 
production activity that earns a negative net return is idle. Similarly, any commodity that 
commands a positive price has a balance between aggregate supply and demand, and any 
commodity in excess supply has an equilibrium price of zero. 
Extensions to the Static CGE Model 
 Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production/consumption functions. 
Calibration of both consumers and producers in our static model utilizes either Cobb-
Douglas or fixed-proportions functions, and thus all elasticities of substitution are 
implicitly assumed to equal one or infinity. Elasticities of substitution that depict CES 
consumption and production choices can easily be incorporated into the calibration 
procedure. For instance, an elasticity of substitution in consumption or production of ½ 
necessitates calibration of the CES utility function as follows: 
[40] ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) .,;2,1;1, 1112
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where 21=σ  is the elasticity of substitution and l  is leisure. Working backward from 
the solution to the utility maximization problem yields: 
[41] ( ) ( )( )∑ = −= 2 1 1j jijjiijij ppIc σσσσ θθ ; i = 1,2; yxj ,= , 
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where ( ) ( )[ ] iiyyiyttiixxi KLwtLaPLwtI +−+−= ,,11  
Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions are widely used because they are 
globally regular, and can be defined by their zero, first, and second order properties. This 
implies that the location (price and quantity), slope (marginal rate of substitution), and 
curvature (convexity) completely characterize a CES production or consumption function 
(Light, 2004). The use of CES functions consequently allows us to adopt a higher level 
approach to the representation of production technology and consumer preferences in our 
framework.33  
 Consumer Welfare Changes. An informative result is how consumer welfare 
changes with respect to a policy change. A widely used measure of welfare change is 
how much income the consumer would require, when faced with base case prices, to 
achieve the same level of utility as in the simulation. Such changes in this measure of 
welfare are referred to as equivalent variation. We use this measure of consumer welfare 
changes to compare the welfare gains and/or losses accruing to the POOR and RICH 
households. 
 Market Imperfections. Market imperfections can be built into the static CGE 
model via the labor market. In this case, the real wage, specified in terms of an index of 
other prices, is typically modeled as being downwardly rigid, and thus the interpretation 
involves unemployment of labor (T. Kehoe & Serra-Puche, 1983). This question could be 
handled by presupposing that wages are rigid for economic, political, or sociological 
reasons, and then examining the impact of the possibility of unemployment on tax 
evasion incidence. Changes in demand for labor will in this case lead to varying rates of 
                                                 
33 Elasticities used in this essay are discussed in the next section. 
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unemployment. If the demand for labor rises substantially that full employment occurs, 
then the real wage rises to equilibrate supply and demand.  
Another way of modeling labor market imperfections is via the elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and leisure. For a Cobb-Douglas function with an 
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure equal to one, labor supply is 
completely inelastic with respect to the wage rate. However, when the elasticity of 
substitution is greater than one, an increase in the wage rate will imply an increase in 
labor supply, and an elasticity of substitution less than one will mean that labor supply 
falls with an increase in the wage rate, leading to a “backward bending” supply curve. 
Kesselman (1989) considers both demand and supply side factors that determine 
the allocation of resources between the aboveground and underground sectors. On the 
demand side, he argues that goods and services produced in these two sectors are 
generally imperfect substitutes. Goods and services produced in the aboveground sector 
will be preferred on account of better reputation, warranty, return policy, lower search 
costs, and so forth. Thus, the underground sector will inevitably have to sell at a lower 
price when competing with the aboveground sector on a closely similar product. Supply 
side factors could also limit entry to the underground sector. Kesselman (1989) argues 
that workers have differential “psychic costs”34 for engaging in tax evasion, self 
employment, or illegal activities in the underground sector. Efficiency in concealment as 
well as other skills needed to operate successfully in the underground sector also differs 
across workers. Beyond some margin, individuals with higher real and psychic costs of 
operating in the underground sector will opt to work in the aboveground sector. 
                                                 
34 “Psychic costs” reflect the distaste that individuals experience when working in each sector, which 
includes innate preferences for each type of work as well as the possible loss of status and fear of 
apprehension associated with working in the underground sector (Kesselman, 1989). 
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 Additionally, general equilibrium effects work to eliminate incentives for workers 
to enter the underground sector beyond some margin, via relative price and productivity 
changes. As more workers set up shop in the underground sector, their production pushes 
down the relative price of underground sector output and consequently the per unit or 
hourly returns of working in the underground sector. The movement of workers between 
the sectors may also change the relative productivity of workers in each sector. In 
equilibrium, therefore, the marginal entrant to the underground sector has his/her gains 
from evading tax fully offset by the relative price and productivity effects plus his real 
and psychic costs of operating in the underground sector (Kesselman, 1989).  
We model market imperfections via the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure. As mentioned earlier, for a Cobb-Douglas function with an 
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure equal to one, labor supply is 
completely inelastic with respect to the wage rate. When the elasticity of substitution is 
greater than one, an increase in the wage rate will lead to an increase in labor supply. An 
elasticity of substitution less than one implies that the labor supply curve is “backward 
bending,” falling with an increase in the wage rate. 
Data and Model Calibration 
 Full compliance in formal sector and tax evasion in the informal sector. This 
sub-section describes the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) constructed under the 
assumption that the consumers and/or producers in the formal sector meet their tax 
obligations while their counterparts in the informal sector fully evade taxes. Table B12 
presents a list of variable definitions, while Tables B13, B14, and B15 (see Appendix B) 
  
64
 
show the data for the two-good, two-factor, and two-consumer closed economy models 
considered in this essay.   
Table B13 summaries the salient features of the social accounting matrices used 
in this essay. These SAMs are constructed based on the assumptions we make about the 
structure and size of both the formal and informal sectors and the POOR and RICH 
households. In particular, we assume that the formal sector is more capital-intensive 
compared to the informal sector. We also assume that the formal sector is more efficient 
relative to the informal sector and that the informal sector utilizes part of the formal 
sector output (in addition to inputs of labor and capital) as an intermediate input in its 
production process, we assume further that the formal sector utilizes only capital and 
labor inputs in production. Finally, we assume that the POOR households’ endowment is 
less than that of the RICH household. Specifically, we assume that the POOR 
households’ endowment is 33 percent of the endowment enjoyed by the RICH household, 
and we verify the robustness of our counterfactual results by changing this proportion to 
25 and 50 percent. It is important to note that though it is feasible to use various 
parameters to reflect the input and output choices that are consistent with these 
assumptions, the choice of our input and output values is dictated by the need to maintain 
the internal consistency of our social accounting matrices or to preserve the zero profit, 
market clearing, and income balance conditions. Table B14 presents the data for the two-
good, two-factor, and two-consumer closed economy models considered in this essay.  
We now turn to a description of these data. 
In the economy represented in Table B14, we assume that no taxes are levied in 
the benchmark. The first counterfactual exercise introduces taxes in both sectors (with 
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full compliance), while the second counterfactual exercise sets the tax on informal sector 
inputs equal to zero (with tax evasion in the informal sector). The input data are presented 
in the form of a balanced matrix, in which the entries represent the value of economic 
transactions in a given period (typically one year).  The rectangular social accounting 
matrix (SAM) format adopted follows a sign convention wherein supplies or receipts are 
represented by positive numbers and demands or payments are represented by negative 
numbers. Internal consistency of a rectangular SAM implies that row sums and column 
sums are zero. With this interpretation, a row sum is zero if the total amount of 
commodity flowing into the economy equals the total amount of commodity flowing out 
of the economy. This is market clearance, and one such condition applies for each 
commodity in the model. Columns in this matrix correspond to production sectors or 
consumers. A production sector column sum is zero if the value of outputs equals the cost 
of inputs. A consumer column is balanced if the sum of primary factor sales equals the 
value of final demands. Zero column sums thus indicate zero profits (product exhaustion) 
or consumer income balance.   
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the numbers of the matrix are values or 
prices multiplied by quantities. The modeler has flexibility in interpreting these values as 
prices or quantities. A commonly followed practice is to choose units so that as many 
activities as possible are equal to unity initially. Prices can be chosen to be unity, and 
“representative quantities” for activities can be chosen such that activity levels are also 
equal to one (for instance, activity X run at level one produces 110 units of good X). 
However, in the presence of taxes, both consumer and producer prices generally cannot 
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equal one. In a rectangular SAM, we have one row for every market (traded commodity). 
In the present model, there are four markets, for goods X and Y and for factors L and K.  
There are two types of columns in a rectangular SAM, corresponding to production 
sectors and consumers. In the present model, there are two production sectors (X and Y) 
and three consumers (POOR, RICH, and GOVT). Tables B14 and B15 present the 
rectangular SAMs used in this essay (also see Appendix B). 
We assume that 110 units of output are produced in sector X using 50 units of 
labor and 60 units of capital (see Table B14). These units are chosen to reflect the fact 
that production in sector X is more efficient and capital-intensive relative to production in 
sector Y. We also assume that sector X (the aboveground sector) does not utilize 
intermediate inputs from sector Y (the underground sector). Sector Y produces 100 units 
of output using 30 units of intermediate inputs35 from sector X, 30 units of labor, and 40 
units of capital. These input/output choices are made to emphasize the fact that sector Y 
is less efficient and labor-intensive in production compared to sector X. It is important to 
note that the input/output parameterization adopted here is intended to basically highlight 
two things: efficient and capital-intensive production in sector X compared to sector Y. 
While it is possible to use diverse parameters to reflect these input and output choices, the 
choice of our input and output units is dictated by the need to maintain the internal 
consistency of our social accounting matrices or to preserve the zero profit, market 
clearing, and income balance conditions. Table B14 also shows the capital and labor 
endowments of the two consumers considered in this essay: the “POOR” or evading 
consumer/household and the “RICH” or compliant consumer/household. We assume that 
                                                 
35 An example of formal sector intermediate inputs used in the informal sector is a sweat shop producing 
ladies handbags or wallets that utilizes leather and thread from the formal sector. 
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the POOR consumer is endowed with 40 units of labor and 10 units of capital while the 
RICH consumer is endowed with 60 units of labor and 90 units of capital. We assume 
that the POOR consumers’ total endowment is one-third of the RICH consumers’ total 
endowment; hence the POOR and RICH consumers’ total endowments are chosen to 
reflect this assumption. 
Table B14 also introduces a labor-leisure choice, allowing labor to choose 
between leisure and labor supply with leisure entering into the workers utility function. In 
our formulation, we introduce additional activities TCONSP and TCONSR, which 
transform leisure (price PL) into labor supplied by the POOR and RICH households 
(price PLSP and PLSR, respectively).  We assume that the POOR consumer owns 40 
units of leisure, supplies 30 (PLSP) in the benchmark, and retains 10 as leisure. The 
RICH consumer is assumed to own 60 units of leisure, supplies 50 (PLSR) in the 
benchmark and retains 10 as leisure. In the presence of tax evasion, taxes are applied to 
both labor and capital supply to the formal sector market, the leisure margin is untaxed.  
These units are chosen to emphasize the fact that the POOR consumer supplies less labor 
in the benchmark and thus enjoys more leisure compared to the RICH consumer. 
Specifically, the POOR consumer supplies 75 percent of his/her leisure endowment and 
retains 25 percent as leisure. The RICH consumer supplies 83 percent of his/her total 
leisure endowment in the benchmark, and consumes the remaining 17 percent as leisure. 
Informal sector economic activity traditionally includes small plot-farming, street 
marketing plus other small-volume activities (Light, 2004), and as such it is practical to 
assume that the POOR consumer enjoys more leisure compared to the RICH consumer.   
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The government (GOVT) is also considered as a separate consumer, which 
collects or demands tax revenues to provide a government good referred to as “public 
administration.” Since no taxes are imposed and/or collected in the benchmark, the level 
of government activity is thus implicitly assumed to be zero in the benchmark. We 
assume that the government is the only consumer of this good, and consequently the 
RICH and POOR households do not enjoy any welfare from “public administration.” 
Stated differently, the government good does not enter the households’ utility functions, 
but the households earn wages and capital working for the government. Therefore, 
increased government activity (or increased provision of the government good) increases 
the demand for labor and capital. We assume here that production of the government 
good is labor-intensive. 
The consumer’s utility function is represented as a production activity. In other 
words, utility is a good that is produced from commodity inputs, including factor inputs 
such as leisure. Table B14 depicts a utility function W in which utility (good PW) is 
produced from inputs of X and Y. The activity level in sector W can also be referred to as 
a Hicksian welfare index. Specifically, utility for the POOR consumer (WP=50 units) is 
produced using 15 units of good X and 35 units of good Y. Likewise, the RICH 
consumer’s utility (WR=150 units) is produced using 85 units of good X and 65 units of 
good Y. This therefore implies that the POOR consumer’s utility is intensive in good Y, 
while the RICH consumer’s utility is intensive in good X. The consumer purchases this 
utility (good PW) using his/her endowment, which also reflects his/her income constraint. 
In other words, the consumer demands the utility good PW, and receives income from 
endowments of labor and capital. For instance, the POOR consumer demands 50 units of 
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utility good PWP, and receives 10 and 40 units of income from his/her endowments of 
labor and capital, respectively, to make this purchase. 
 Tax evasion in the formal or aboveground sector.  The rectangular SAM 
presented in Table B14 assumes that consumers and/or producers in the aboveground 
sector fulfill their tax obligations, which is equivalent to assuming that tax evasion only 
takes place in the underground sector Y. It is rational to expect that individuals who earn 
their income in the aboveground sector can still evade part of their due tax payments. 
Thus, effective analysis of the gains and/or losses from tax evasion requires modeling the 
tax evasion or compliance choices of workers in the aboveground sector.  
One way of modeling this aspect is to adjust the returns to labor in the 
aboveground sector, yielding a budget constraint: 
[41] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] iiyyiyttiixxixttij ijj KLwtLaPLwtLaPtCP +−+−−≤∑ = ,,1,,12 1  
Other relevant equations can also be adjusted accordingly so as to compute the 
equilibrium outcome. Table B15 presents the rectangular SAM that depicts evasion in 
both the formal and informal sectors. Table B15 shows consumption and production 
choices similar to those in Table B14, except that the RICH consumer now allocates only 
80 percent of his/her labor supply (40 units) to the formal sector and the rest (10 units of 
labor) is allocated to the informal sector.36   
 Sensitivity analysis. Since the choice of our parameters could have a sizable 
impact on the counterfactual results, sensitivity analyses are performed to verify the 
                                                 
36 We assume that the RICH consumer allocates only a fraction of his/ her labor supply to the informal 
sector, with the majority of his/ her labor being supplied to the formal sector. Though there are various 
ways of modeling this labor supply decision, we assume that 40 units (80 percent of RICH household labor 
supply) are allocated to the formal sector and 10 units (20 percent of RICH household labor supply) are 
allocated to the informal sector so as to maintain the internal consistency (or to preserve the zero profit, 
market clearing and income balance conditions) of our social accounting matrix as shown in Table B15. 
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consistency of our results. Tables B16 and B17 present SAMs where the total endowment 
of the POOR household is only 25 percent of the endowment enjoyed by RICH 
household, while Tables B18 and B19 show SAMs in which the POOR household’s total 
endowment is 50 percent of the RICH household’s total endowment. The other values in 
these SAMs are adjusted based on assumptions made for Tables B14 and B15. For 
instance, Table B16 shows that the POOR consumer has a total endowment of 40 units of 
labor in the benchmark, supplies 75 percent of this labor endowment (30 units) to be used 
in the production process and retains 25 percent (10 units) as leisure. The RICH 
household on the other hand has a total endowment of 85 units of labor in the benchmark, 
supplies approximately 82 percent of this labor endowment (70 units) to the production 
process and retains 18 percent (15 units) as leisure. We maintain the assumption that the 
inefficient nature of production the informal sector (sector Y) implies that the POOR 
household is able to devote a higher percentage of his/her labor endowment to leisure 
compared to the RICH household. The output units in Table B16 also reflect the fact that 
production is more efficient and capital-intensive in the formal sector relative to the 
informal sector. Particularly, 155 units of output are produced in the formal sector 
compared to 100 units of output produced in the informal sector. Additionally, Table B16 
maintains our earlier assumptions that the welfare of the POOR household is intensive in 
the informal sector commodity, while the RICH households’ welfare is intensive in the 
formal sector output. Table B17 presents production and consumption choices similar to 
those shown in Table B16, with the only difference being that the RICH consumer 
allocates 80 percent of his/her labor endowment (56 units) to the formal sector and the 
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rest (14 units) to the informal sector. The choice of parameters in this case is also 
consistent with our parameter choices discussed in Table B15.  
 Tables B18 and B19 show SAMs in which the POOR household’s total 
endowment is 50 percent of the RICH household’s total endowment. The production and 
consumption choices shown in Tables B18 and B19 are also consistent with the 
assumptions made in Tables B13-B17. For instance, Table B18 shows that the POOR 
household has a total labor endowment of 60 units; she/he allocates 75 percent of this 
endowment (45 units) to the production of the informal sector output and enjoys the 
remaining 25 percent (15 units) as leisure. Further, formal sector production is more 
efficient and capital-intensive compared to informal sector production, while POOR and 
RICH household welfare is intensive in commodity Y and commodity X, respectively. 
Consistent with the SAMs shown in Tables B15 and B17, Table B19 shows that the 
RICH household allocates 80 percent of his/her labor endowment (40 units) to formal 
sector production and the remaining 20 percent (10 units) is allocated to the informal 
sector production. 
 Elasticity choices. Another data requirement is to specify the curvature in various 
CES and Cobb-Douglas functions for production, consumption, and labor supply. The 
elasticities used in this essay are chosen based on past studies as well as conventional 
wisdom.  Table B20 (See Appendix B) lists the default elasticity choice for each 
parameter.  
Economists often make decisions based upon judgment and experience. Choosing 
appropriate parameter values for various elasticities is one of these exercises. We use 
values that have been previously accepted in other models in the literature (Light, 2004). 
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Value-added in production represents a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of labor and capital, 
hence the labor/capital elasticity in value-added of 1.  The choice for the Leontieff 
intermediate input demand is standard in CGE modeling (Light, 2004). The Cobb-
Douglas structure for value-added (in final demand) taken here has received some 
criticism especially in the development literature, with some economists arguing that the 
elasticity of substitution parameter is closer to zero for some goods. More elaborate 
formulations for consumption could include Stone-Geary preferences, especially if the 
focus is on poverty effects.37 Finally, unity is chosen to be the elasticity between labor 
and leisure, and 2 is the default elasticity between leisure and consumption. The choice 
for the elasticity between leisure and consumption is motivated by the need to model 
perfect competition in the informal sector of the economy. CGE models typically contain 
some form of sensitivity analysis especially since some parameter choices have a sizable 
impact on the counterfactual results. We also conduct sensitivity analyses to verify the 
consistency of our results. 
Counterfactuals and Simulations 
Analysis of the impact of a change in government policy with a static CGE model 
proceeds via the comparative statics methodology. The model is constructed so that its 
equilibrium replicates the benchmark data. Simulation of the policy change then follows 
by altering the relevant policy parameters (for instance a change in the ad valorem tax 
rate on good m or mτ ) and calculating the new equilibrium. In the base case equilibrium, 
prices mP , the wage w, and the capital rental rate r are all calibrated to equal one. The 
                                                 
37 Stone-Geary utility functions are simply Cobb-Douglas utility functions with the origin displaced from 
zero. These displacements, when positive, are typically referred to as “minimum consumption 
requirements”, indicating that the consumer gets no positive utility until these needs are met. 
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model is then used to evaluate the impact of changes in government policy on the welfare 
of the POOR and RICH households, on consumption, as well as on prices of produced 
goods and factors of production. The purpose of our counterfactual exercises is to 
compare the post-evasion and post-tax (where both POOR and RICH households fully 
comply with taxes) equilibria. We carry out simulations for each of the three tax regimes 
considered in this essay: a consumption and income tax regime, a consumption tax 
regime, and an income tax regime. This is done to compare the effects of tax evasion 
under the different tax regimes. Our “commodity” tax is an INPUT tax imposed on 
consumption (either final demand or intermediate demand), while our “income” tax is an 
OUTPUT tax levied upon producers (or suppliers). 
Our analysis focuses mainly on the welfare of the POOR and RICH households, 
on consumption, and on the prices of produced goods and factors of production. In 
summary, our approach consists of two counterfactual exercises: the first counterfactual 
exercise introduces taxes in both sectors (full compliance), while the second 
counterfactual exercise sets taxes in the informal sector equal to zero (tax evasion in the 
informal sector). We then contrast the effects of these two counterfactual exercises on the 
welfare of the POOR and RICH households, on consumption, and on prices of produced 
goods and factors of production. In particular, for each of the three tax regimes 
considered here, we compare percentage changes in post-evasion and post-tax: welfare, 
consumption, and prices of consumer goods and factors of production.  
We allow for varying degrees of competition or entry in the informal sector, by 
increasing the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption, to measure how 
much of the tax advantage is retained by the initial evaders and how much is competed 
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away via factor and commodity prices changes. Finally, we vary the expected penalty so 
as to account for the uncertainty of returns to the tax evader. To ease the interpretation of 
the simulation results, summary tables containing a synopsis of the key general 
equilibrium effects of tax evasion are included together with a detailed discussion of our 
simulation results.   
Full Compliance in the Formal Sector and Tax Evasion in the Informal Sector 
 In this section, we analyze the general equilibrium effects of full compliance in 
the formal sector and full evasion of taxes in the informal sector using benchmark data 
presented in Table B14. All counterfactual results presented here incorporate an equal-
yield tax constraint in the formal sector and a labor-leisure choice in both the formal and 
informal sectors. 
 Commodity and Income Taxes. Table B21 (see Appendix B) presents a summary 
of the general equilibrium effects resulting from the evasion of commodity and income 
taxes. Using changes in consumer welfare as an overall indicator of the gains and/or 
losses from tax evasion, Table B21 indicates that the POOR household benefits only 
slightly and this advantage declines with increased entry in the informal sector. 
Specifically, Table B21 shows that the POOR household retains 78.6 percent of the initial 
2.4 percent increase in its welfare, while 21.4 percent of this initial gain in welfare is 
wiped away as a result of increased competition and entry into the informal sector.38 
Conversely, the RICH households’ welfare initially falls by 0.6 percent, but increased 
competition in the informal sector reduces this loss to only -0.02 percent, which 
represents a 96.9 percent increase in welfare for the RICH household. The increase in the 
RICH households’ commodity X-intensive welfare is attributed to a reduction in the tax-
                                                 
38 The “initial” gain or loss refers to the percentage change between the post-evasion and post-tax welfare. 
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inclusive price of commodity X as competition in the informal sector increases. Table 
B21 shows that the tax-inclusive price of commodity X falls by 8.6 percent with 
increased competition in the informal sector, while the commodity price of good Y 
increases by 9.8 percent. The POOR households’ welfare is intensive in commodity Y, 
and as such, an increase in the commodity price of good Y will reduce the POOR 
households’ welfare. Further, increased entry and competition in the informal sector 
increases the amount of labor supplied in the informal and formal sectors by 59.8 percent 
and 122.6 percent, respectively, leading to a reduction in the net-of-tax wages by 12.6 
percent and 178.2 percent, respectively.  
Increasing the expected penalty rate only alters the size of these changes and not 
their direction. Table B21 (see Appendix B) shows that with increased expected penalty 
rates for evading consumption and income taxes, the initial increase in the POOR 
households’ welfare is only 1.08 percent. Table B21 further reveals that the POOR 
household keeps just 76.8 percent of this increase in welfare, while 23.2 percent is 
competed away. The RICH household experiences a 112 percent increase in welfare as 
the informal sector becomes increasingly competitive. Table B22 (see Appendix B) 
presents these counterfactual results in detail. A complete discussion of the counterfactual 
results follows.  
Table B22 (see Appendix B) reveals that when tax rates in the formal sector are 
constrained to yield the same amount of revenue even in the presence of tax evasion by 
sector Y inputs, the welfare of the POOR household rises while that of the RICH 
household falls. Particularly, with an elasticity of substitution equal to 2, and when the 
ad-valorem commodity tax is 0.1, the proportional income tax rate is 0.25, the expected 
  
76
 
penalty rate on commodity taxes is 0.07, and the expected penalty rate on income taxes is 
0.2, then evasion of commodity and income taxes in the informal sector raises the welfare 
of the POOR household by 2.4 percent but lowers the RICH household’s welfare by 0.6 
percent. This arises because an increase in the tax-inclusive price of sector X output and a 
fall in the commodity price of sector Y output lowers the rich household’s X-intensive 
welfare and increases the poor household’s Y-intensive welfare, respectively.  
Importantly, however, with increased entry and competition in the informal 
sector, as measured by an increase in the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
and leisure, the welfare of the POOR household increases only at a decreasing rate, while 
the RICH household’s welfare shows reduced declines and eventually turns positive. This 
is due to the declining rates at which sector X and sector Y commodity prices are 
increasing and decreasing, respectively. The declining rate of increase in the tax-inclusive 
price of commodity X eventually leads to an increase in the commodity X-intensive-
RICH household welfare. On the other hand, a reduction in the rate at which the 
commodity price of good Y is falling consequently lowers the gains in the commodity-Y-
intensive-POOR household welfare. 
Table B22 reveals that there is an increase in the tax-inclusive price of sector X 
output by 5.9 percent and a reduction in the commodity price of sector Y output by 6.3 
percent. These changes in commodity or consumer prices are due to a shift toward sector 
Y production. The commodity price of sector Y output continues to decline with 
increased entry and/or competition in the informal sector, while the tax-inclusive price of 
sector X output increases, albeit at a declining rate. Lower wages imply higher capital 
income, which reduces the total supply of labor by the RICH household causing a shift to 
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the less labor-intensive production in the formal sector. This leads to an increase in the 
production of sector X output, slightly offsetting the initial gain in the tax-inclusive price 
of formal sector output X. Additionally, the net-of-tax wage rate for labor supplied by the 
POOR household falls by 4.0 percent, while the net-of-tax wage for labor supplied by 
RICH household rises by 0.1 percent.  These disparate results arise from the fact that an 
increased tax rate in the formal sector (as a result of the equal-yield tax constraint) 
increases the supply of evading labor, which lowers wages in the informal sector. Higher 
tax rates on the other hand lower the relative price of leisure for the formal sector or 
RICH household, leading to increased consumption of leisure and a reduction in the 
supply of RICH household labor, subsequently raising the net-of-tax wages. However, as 
in the case of commodity prices, the net-of-tax wages for both the POOR and RICH 
household labor decline continuously with increased entry or competition in the informal 
sector.  
These results indicate therefore that tax evasion ultimately reduces the net-of-tax 
return to labor supplied by both POOR and RICH households. The eventual decline in the 
formal sector net-of-tax wage is due to the income effect of increased tax rates. A higher 
tax rate (due to the equal-yield tax constraint) lowers labor incomes in the formal sector, 
leading to an increase in the supply of formal sector labor (to offset or provide a cushion 
against falling income). This consequently neutralizes the initial increase in formal sector 
wages. The net-of-tax returns to capital for both POOR and RICH households39 fall by 
0.5 percent. The reduction in the net-of-tax price of capital follows from the assumption 
that the supply of capital is fixed (and fixed production technologies), while all markets 
                                                 
39 Under the assumption of homogenous capital in both the formal and informal sectors and also that the 
entire capital stock is utilized in production (capital has no alternative use and as such the entire stock of 
capital is utilized in production) the capital rental rate will be similar in both these sectors.  
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are cleared by factor movements and price adjustments. This therefore implies that a shift 
in production toward the production of the informal sector product Y reduces the amount 
of capital (and labor) required for production of the formal sector output X, consequently 
lowering the net-of-tax price of capital.  Consistent with the general equilibrium result 
that lower wages imply higher capital income, the continued decline in both formal and 
informal sector wages (due to increased competition in the informal sector) leads to an 
increase in the net-of-tax price of capital.  
The presence of an equal-yield tax constraint in our formulation shows that tax 
evasion does not affect tax revenues but rather the tax rates. With an equal-yield tax 
constraint, the ad-valorem commodity tax rate rises from 10.0 percent to 11.5 percent 
while the proportional income tax rate gains from 25.0 percent to 28.9 percent.  
An increase in the expected penalty for the evasion of both commodity and 
income taxes only reduces the magnitude of these percent changes and not their direction; 
that is, increased expected penalty rates for evasion (and increased entry or competition 
in the informal sector) work toward the elimination of the differences in factor as well as 
commodity prices and consumer welfare in the formal and informal sectors. We now turn 
to the discussion of our simulation results from the commodity tax regime. 
 Commodity Taxes. Table B23 (see Appendix B) shows the counterfactual results 
from commodity taxation. Commodity taxation affects welfare and commodity prices in 
ways similar to those discussed in the preceding section. Table B23 reveals that the 
POOR household keeps 82.6 percent of the initial 0.9 percent increase in its welfare, 
while 17.4 percent of this initial increase is dissipated away as a result of increased 
competition and entry into the informal sector. The RICH household experiences gains in 
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consumer welfare especially since the initial 0.3 percent fall in welfare reduces to -0.2 
percent, representing a 36 percent increase in welfare for the RICH household. These 
gains in welfare for the RICH household are due to increased competition and entry in 
the informal sector.   
Consistent with the findings in Table B22, Table B23 shows that the net-of-tax 
wage for labor supplied by the POOR household declines constantly as the elasticity of 
substitution between leisure and consumption (our measure of competition in the 
informal sector) increases. As mentioned above, this results from the fact that an 
increased tax rate in the formal sector increases the supply of evading labor, which 
lowers wages in the informal sector. Stated differently, the higher tax rate makes evasion 
more profitable to the POOR household at the margin, thereby leading to an increase in 
the supply of informal sector labor, a fact that depress the net-of-tax wage for labor 
supplied by the POOR household.  However, Table B23 reveals that the net-of-tax wage 
for labor supplied by the RICH household increases, albeit at a decreasing rate, with an 
increase in the level of competition in the informal sector. These positive gains in the net-
of-tax wage for RICH household labor are possible if the direct effect of the higher tax 
rate in the formal sector is to encourage formal sector workers to consume more leisure. 
This reduces the supply of formal sector labor, and consequently leads to an increase in 
the net-of-tax wage for the RICH household.40 A discussion of our simulation results 
from the income tax regime follows. 
                                                 
40 Analogously, if the average remuneration of informal sector labor increases, the RICH household will 
have higher income by simply re-allocating some of her labor from the formal to the informal sector; if 
leisure is a normal good, then these two effects will combine to reduce the amount of formal sector labor 
supplied leading to an increase in the net-of-tax wage for RICH household labor.  Section IV.2 discusses 
findings from our simulations that allow the RICH household to allocate some of her labor to the informal 
sector. 
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 Income Taxes. Table B24 (see Appendix B) shows the counterfactual results 
from income taxation. The effects of income taxation on commodity prices, factor 
returns, and welfare for both POOR and RICH households are comparable to those 
discussed in Tables B22 and B23. Table B24 reveals that the POOR household retains 
81.5 percent of the initial 2.0 percent increase in its welfare, while 18.5 percent of this 
initial gain in welfare is wiped away due to increased competition and entry into the 
informal sector. The RICH consumers’ welfare initially falls by 0.5 percent, but increased 
competition in the informal sector reduces this loss in the RICH households’ welfare to -
0.2 percent, which represents a 54.4 percent increase in welfare for the RICH household. 
Consistent with our earlier findings, these results indicate that the POOR household 
benefits only slightly and this benefit falls with increased entry into the informal sector. 
Table B24 also indicates that the net-of-tax wage for labor supplied by the POOR 
household declines continuously as more evaders set up shop in the informal sector (as 
entry or competition increases in the informal sector). Additionally and also consistent 
with the earlier findings, the net-of-tax wages for labor supplied by the RICH household 
increase but at a decreasing rate. The initial increase in the net-of-tax wage accruing to 
the RICH household can be explained by the fall in the amount of labor supplied by the 
RICH household. RICH household labor responds to the increased tax rate by consuming 
more leisure, consequently leading to a fall in the amount of labor supplied, a feature that 
leads to an increase in the net-of-tax wage for RICH household labor. However, the 
higher income tax rates (and increased entry into the informal sector) eventually lead to 
an increase in the amount of labor supplied by the RICH household, consequently 
reducing the initial gains in the net-of-tax wages to RICH household labor. As argued 
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earlier, the RICH household responds to higher income tax rates by supplying more labor 
so as to mitigate the drop in income or purchasing power, which eventually lowers the 
initial growth in the net-of- tax wage for RICH household labor.  
To summarize, Tables B21-B24 show that the net-of-tax wage to informal sector 
labor falls continuously in response to increased competition and increased expected 
penalty rates in this sector. Formal sector net-of-tax wages increase initially, due to 
increased consumption of leisure, but decline eventually as the level of competition and 
entry increases in the informal sector. The ultimate decline in the formal sector net-of-tax 
wages is attributed to an increased supply of labor in the formal sector. This is especially 
true since formal sector labor responds to the increasing tax rates (due to the equal-yield 
constraint) by supplying more labor to offset declining incomes or purchasing power. 
Tables B21-B24 indicate that the POOR households’ post-evasion welfare is only 0.68-
2.43 percent higher than the post-tax welfare if it had fully complied with taxes. The 
simulation results shown in Tables B21-B24 further reveal that the POOR household 
keeps between 78.6-82.6 percent of this initial increase in welfare, while 17.4-21.4 
percent of this initial gain is dissipated away as a result of increased competition and 
entry in the informal sector. The RICH households’ welfare falls initially due to an 
increase in the tax-inclusive price of the formal sector good X. However, the increased 
supply of formal sector labor and the subsequent increase in the production of commodity 
X lead to an increase in the commodity X-intensive RICH households’ welfare by 36.0-
96.9 percent. Thus, if changes in consumer welfare are interpreted as an overall measure 
of the gains and/or losses from tax evasion, then the POOR household only benefits 
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slightly from tax evasion and this gain lessens with increased entry and competition in the 
informal sector. 
Partial Compliance in the Formal Sector and Tax Evasion in the Informal Sector 
 We also allow for the possibility of evasion in the formal sector. The RICH 
household allocates her labor between the formal and informal sectors by comparing the 
statutory tax rate with the expected penalty for evasion, respectively (or the relative 
wages in these two sectors). All counterfactual results presented here incorporate an 
equal-yield tax constraint in the formal sector and a labor-leisure choice in both formal 
and informal sectors. 
 Commodity and income taxes. The counterfactual results are presented in Table 
B25 in Appendix B. The effects on commodity prices, price of capital, and welfare for 
both the POOR and RICH household mimic those shown in Table B22. However, Table 
B25 reveals that, unlike in Table B22, the net-of-tax wage for RICH household labor falls 
continually with increased entry into the informal sector. One possible explanation for 
this finding is the shift of RICH household labor from the informal sector back to the 
formal sector. Declining wages (due to increased supply of evading labor to the informal 
sector) reduce the incentive to RICH household labor from working in the informal 
sector, which feeds back positively on labor supply (and negatively on net-of-tax wages) 
in the formal sector. The increase in formal sector labor supply leads to a reduction in 
formal sector wages. Lower formal sector wages could also result from the income effect 
of higher taxes due to the equal-yield tax constraint. The RICH household will supply 
more labor (and enjoy less leisure) in the formal sector to lessen the effects of reduced 
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incomes, consequently leading to a drop in formal sector wages. Our simulation results 
from the commodity tax regime reveal similar trends as discussed in the next section. 
 Commodity taxes.  Unlike in Table B23, Table B26 (see Appendix B) indicates 
that the net-of-tax wage for RICH household labor drops repeatedly with increased entry 
into the informal sector. This therefore indicates that the increase in formal sector labor 
(to provide a cushion against falling purchasing power of income) resulting from a 
reduction in net-of-tax wages for RICH household labor more than offsets any other 
effects such as increased consumption of leisure (due to a reduced relative price of 
leisure, a result of higher equal-yield tax rates) that would reduce formal sector labor 
supply. Other commodity and factor prices as well as welfare for both the POOR and 
RICH households depict trends similar to those in Table B23. These findings are also 
consistent with our simulations results from an income tax regime as the next section 
reveals.  
 Income Taxes. Tables B24 and B27 (see Appendix B) indicate that allocation of 
some of the RICH households’ labor to the informal sector does not alter the general 
equilibrium effects on commodity and factor prices plus the POOR and RICH 
households’ welfare in any significant way. In particular, the net-of-tax wage for POOR 
household labor declines continuously with increased competition in the informal sector, 
while the net-of-tax wage for the RICH household labor increases but at a decreasing 
rate. The former is due to the increase in the supply of evading labor as entry and/or 
competition increase in the informal sector, while the latter results from relocation of 
RICH household labor from the informal sector back to the formal sector. This leads to 
an increase in formal sector labor supply, consequently resulting in an eventual reduction 
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in the initial gains in the net-of-tax wage to RICH household labor. Additionally, Table 
B27 reveals that the RICH household labor allocated to the informal sector starts 
relocating back to the formal sector when the amount of labor supplied to the informal 
sector is 5.3 percent over and above the pre-evasion levels. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Since the choice of our parameters could have a significant influence on our 
simulation results, we verify the consistency of our results by performing several 
sensitivity analyses. The sensitivity analyses are based on SAMs shown in Tables B16-
B19 and the results are presented in Tables B28-B41 (see Appendix B). Overall, the 
sensitivity results show that variations in the proportion of the POOR households’ 
endowment to that of the RICH household does not affect our simulation results in any 
significant way. For instance, Table B28 reveals that the POOR households’ post-evasion 
welfare is only 3.01 percent higher than the post-tax welfare if it had fully complied with 
taxes. The simulation results further reveal that the POOR household keeps 77.1 percent 
of this initial increase in welfare, while 22.9 percent of this initial gain is competed away 
as a result of increased competition and entry into the informal sector. The RICH 
households’ welfare initially falls by 0.5 percent, but increased competition in the 
informal sector results in a 0.1 percent increase in the RICH households’ welfare, 
representing a gain of 101.7 percent.  The increase in the RICH households’ commodity 
X-intensive welfare is attributed to a reduction in the tax-inclusive price of commodity X 
as competition in the informal sector increases. Table B28 shows that the tax-inclusive 
price of commodity X falls by 8.5 percent with increased competition in the informal 
sector, while the commodity price of good Y increases by 10.3 percent. The POOR 
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households’ welfare is intensive in commodity Y, and as such, an increase in the 
commodity price of good Y leads to a reduction in the POOR households’ welfare. 
Further, increased competition in the informal sector leads to an increase in the amount of 
labor supplied in the informal and formal sectors by 61.8 percent and 159.6 percent, 
respectively, leading to a reduction in the net-of-tax wages by 15.1 percent and 140.7 
percent, respectively. Therefore, if changes in consumer welfare are taken to represent an 
overall measure of the gains and/or losses from tax evasion, then the POOR household 
only benefits marginally from tax evasion and this advantage diminishes with increased 
entry and competition in the informal sector.  
Increasing the expected penalty rate for evasion only alters the size of these 
changes and not their trend. Table B28 (see Appendix B) shows that with increased 
expected penalty rates for evading consumption and income taxes, the initial increase in 
the POOR households’ welfare is only 1.31 percent. Table B28 also reveals that the 
POOR household keeps merely 75.6 percent of this initial increase in welfare, while 24.4 
percent is competed away as the informal sector becomes increasingly competitive. The 
RICH household experiences a 121.7 percent increase in welfare due to increased 
competitiveness in the informal sector. Table B29 (see Appendix B) presents these 
counterfactual results in detail. We now turn to a comprehensive discussion of the 
counterfactual results.  
Table B29 shows that with an elasticity of substitution equal to 2, and when ad-
valorem commodity tax is 0.1, the proportional income tax rate is 0.25, the expected 
penalty rate on commodity taxes is 0.07, and when the expected penalty rate on income 
taxes is 0.2, evasion of commodity and income taxes in the informal sector raises the 
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welfare of the POOR household by 3.01 percent but lowers the RICH household’s 
welfare by 0.58 percent. This arises because an increase in the tax-inclusive price of 
sector X output and a fall in the commodity price of sector Y output lowers the RICH 
household’s X-intensive welfare and increases the POOR household’s Y-intensive 
welfare, respectively. However, with increased entry or competition in the informal 
sector  (as measured by an increase in the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
and leisure), the welfare of the POOR household increases only at an decreasing rate, 
while the RICH household’s welfare posts reduced declines and eventually turns positive. 
This is due to the declining rates at which sector X and sector Y commodity prices are 
increasing and decreasing, respectively. The declining rate of increase in the net-of-tax 
price of commodity X eventually leads to an increase in the commodity X-intensive-
RICH household welfare. On the other hand, a reduction in the rate at which the net-of-
tax price of commodity Y is falling consequently lowers the gains in the commodity-Y-
intensive-POOR household welfare.  
Table B29 reveals that evasion of both commodity and income taxes in the 
informal sector leads to an increase in the tax-inclusive price of commodity X and a 
reduction in the commodity price of sector Y output. Particularly, the tax- inclusive price 
of sector X output increases by 4.10 percent while the commodity price of sector Y 
output by falls by 6.89 percent. These changes in commodity or consumer prices are due 
to a shift toward sector Y production. The commodity price of sector Y output continues 
to decline with increased entry and/or competition in the informal sector while the tax-
inclusive price of sector X output increases, albeit at a declining rate. Lower wages imply 
higher capital income, which reduces the total supply of labor by the RICH household 
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causing a shift to the less labor-intensive production in the formal sector. This leads to an 
increase in the production of sector X output, slightly offsetting the initial gain in the tax-
inclusive price of formal sector output X. Additionally, the net-of-tax wage rates for labor 
supplied by the POOR and RICH households decline by 3.89 and 0.20 percent, 
respectively.   
These results arise from the fact that increased tax rates in the formal sector (as a 
result of the equal-yield tax constraint) increase the supply of evading labor, which 
lowers wages in the informal sector. Higher tax rates induce the RICH household to 
supply more labor to mitigate the reduction in purchasing power of income, subsequently 
reducing the net-of-tax wages to the RICH household. Further, as in the case of 
commodity prices, the net-of-tax wages for both the POOR and RICH household labor 
decline continuously with increased entry or competition in the informal sector. This 
indicates therefore that tax evasion reduces the net-of-tax return to labor supplied by both 
POOR and RICH households. The net-of-tax returns to capital for both POOR and RICH 
households fall by 0.41 percent. The reduction in the net-of-tax price of capital follows 
from the assumption that the supply of capital is fixed (and fixed production 
technologies), while all markets are cleared by factor movements and price adjustments. 
 This therefore implies that a shift in production toward the production of the 
informal sector product Y reduces the amount of capital (and labor) required for 
production of the formal sector output X, consequently lowering the net-of-tax price of 
capital.  However, consistent with the general equilibrium result that lower wages imply 
higher capital income, the continued decline in both formal and informal sector wages 
due to increased competition in the informal sector, leads to an increase in the net-of-tax 
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price of capital. With an equal-yield tax constraint, the ad-valorem commodity tax rate 
rises from 10.0 percent to 11.1 percent while the proportional income tax rate gains from 
25.0 percent to 27.8 percent. An increase in the expected penalty for the evasion of both 
commodity and income taxes only reduces the magnitude of these percent changes and 
not their direction. In other words, an increase in the  expected penalty for evasion and 
increased entry or competition in the informal sector work toward the elimination of the 
differences in factor as well as commodity prices and consumer welfare in the formal and 
informal sectors.  
To summarize, the sensitivity results shown in Tables B28-B34, where the POOR 
households’ endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ endowment, are 
consistent with the simulation results presented in Table B21-B27 where the POOR 
households’ endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ endowment. Further, our 
sensitivity results in Tables B35-B41, where the rectangular SAMs are constructed under 
the assumption that the POOR households’ endowment is 50 percent of the RICH 
households’ endowment, are also consistent with simulation results in Tables B21-B27 
and in Tables B28-B34.  
Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Suggestions for Further Research 
The portfolio approach to tax evasion postulates that individuals weigh the probability of 
getting caught and paying a penalty against the probability of being able to keep the 
evaded income, subsequently leading to the conclusion that the individual evader benefits 
by keeping the evaded income in its entirety. However, conclusions drawn from the 
conventional portfolio approach regarding the incidence of tax evasion are quite 
unsatisfactory because the portfolio approach ignores the fact that in numerous situations, 
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especially those in which the expected value is positive, tax evasion is comparable to a 
tax advantage in the law. Consequently, it would be rational to expect replication and 
competition, when possible, to work toward the elimination of this direct advantage. This 
process of adjustment generally should take place through changes in the relative prices 
of both commodities and factors of production. The portfolio approach affords tax 
evasion incidence analysis only a partial equilibrium treatment and does not capture this 
general equilibrium effect. 
Our novel approach counters this drawback by utilizing a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the incidence of tax evasion in two broadly defined 
sectors of the economy; the formal and informal sectors. This essay incorporates the 
element of uncertainty in an individual’s decision to evade so as account for the 
uncertainty of returns to the tax evader. We also allow for varying degrees of competition 
or entry across sectors in the economy to examine how much of the tax advantage is 
retained by the initial evaders and how much is shifted via factor and commodity price 
changes.  
The counterfactual experiments reveal that, though the post-evasion welfare of the 
POOR or evading household is positive, it falls with increased competition in the 
informal sector. The RICH (or compliant) household’s post-evasion welfare, while 
negative, increases and eventually turns positive with increased competition in the 
informal sector. The shift in production toward the informal sector output subsequently 
leads to a fall in the consumer price of the informal sector output and to an increase in the 
tax-inclusive price of formal sector output, while the increase in the supply of evading 
labor reduces the net-of-tax wage for labor supplied by the POOR household.  
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Higher tax rates due to the equal-yield tax constraint have two distinct effects on 
the net-of-tax wage for labor supplied by the RICH household. Higher tax rates change 
the relative price of leisure, leading to increased consumption of leisure and subsequently 
a reduction in the amount of labor supplied in the formal sector. This raises the net-of-tax 
wage for the RICH household, albeit at a decreasing rate as the informal sector becomes 
increasingly competitive. On the other hand, if the direct effect of the higher tax rates is 
increased supply of formal sector labor (to offset the reduction in income due to the 
higher taxes), the net-of-tax wage for RICH household labor declines. However, the 
decline in the net-of-tax wage for RICH household labor in this latter scenario is just a 
fraction of the decline in the net-of-tax wage for the POOR household labor. Consistent 
with the general equilibrium result that lower wages imply higher capital income, the 
continued decline in both formal and informal sector wages (as competition in the 
informal sector increases) leads to an increase in the net-of-tax price of capital. Further, 
our results verify the notion that tax evasion does not affect government revenues but 
rather tax rates, particularly in the presence of an equal-yield tax constraint.  
Our results indicate that the tax evader does not benefit exclusively and that this 
advantage diminishes with an increase in both the expected penalty associated with tax 
evasion and degree of competition or entry in the informal sector.  In particular, our 
simulation results reveal that the POOR households’ post-evasion welfare is only 0.6-3.4 
percent higher than the post-tax welfare if it had fully complied with taxes. The 
simulation results further show that the POOR household retains between 77.1-83.2 
percent of this initial increase in welfare, while 16.8-22.9 percent of this initial gain is 
competed away as a result of increased competition and entry into the informal sector. 
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The RICH households’ welfare increases by 58.8-101.7 percent with increased 
competition and entry in the informal sector. Therefore, if we construe the changes in 
consumer welfare as an overall indicator of the gains and/or losses from tax evasion, then 
the POOR household only benefits marginally from tax evasion and this advantage 
shrinks with increased entry and competition in the informal sector. Additionally, both 
the net-of-tax wage for informal sector labor and the consumer price of the informal 
sector output decline continually.  
This consequently indicates that the gains from evasion are shifted from the 
evaders to the consumers of their output via lower prices. This essay therefore 
demonstrates that the general equilibrium effects work to eliminate the incentive for 
workers to enter the underground or informal sector beyond some margin, via relative 
price and productivity changes. As more workers set up shop in the underground sector, 
their production pushes down the relative price of the informal sector output and 
consequently the per-unit or hourly returns of working in the informal sector. The 
movement of workers between the sectors may also change the relative productivity of 
workers in each sector. In equilibrium, therefore, the marginal entrant to the informal 
sector has his/her gains from evading taxes offset by the relative price and productivity 
effects plus his real (and any “psychic”) costs of operating in the underground sector.  
 Our findings have several implications for tax policy in particular and government 
policy in general. For instance, government redistribution programs that ignore informal 
market participants may worsen actual income distribution especially if such programs 
are implemented with the belief that the informal sector is already benefiting 
(exclusively) from not paying taxes. A case in point here is the federal earned income tax 
  
92
 
credit (EITC) in the United States, whose original intent was to offset the FICA (social 
security) payroll tax for low-income workers. Since its introduction in 1975, the EITC 
has expanded beyond the purpose of offsetting the FICA tax and now provides actual 
cash assistance to low-income working families. The EITC provides a tax credit equal to 
a certain percentage of earned income (wages, salaries, tips, and self-employment) up to a 
limit41. Further, the EITC is a fully refundable tax credit, implying that if a taxpayer is 
eligible for the EITC and has no taxable income, the government gives a tax refund for 
the credit nevertheless.  In cases where the credit exceeds the taxpayer’s tax liability, he 
or she receives the amount of the credit that exceeds the tax liability as a refund. To the 
extent that informal sector workers (tax evaders) do not file tax returns, the otherwise 
eligible informal sector workers are thus not accounted for in this government 
redistribution program. Our findings therefore indicate that any effective government 
redistribution program ought to account for the fact that evaded taxes are capitalized in 
the relative prices of both commodities and factors of production, in which case the tax 
evader does not benefit exclusively.  
Another tax policy implication concerns tax administration and enforcement. 
Given that the beneficiaries from tax evasion are not the tax evaders themselves but 
rather the consumers of the goods and services sold by the tax evaders, tax authorities 
could find it more feasible and even desirable to tax those services more heavily to 
compensate for the evaded taxes.  
Finally, it is noteworthy to point out that the strength of static CGE models lies in 
their ability to emphasize the interaction among different industries and/or sectors of the 
                                                 
41 For instance, a taxpayer with two children gets a tax credit of 40 cents on every $1 of earned income up 
to a limit of $9,540 in 1999, (Bruce, 2001). 
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economy. Since they stress the impact of reallocation of resources across sectors of an 
economy, these models are excellent tools for identifying both winners and losers under a 
policy change. However, these models fail to capture the effect of a policy change on the 
dynamic facets of an economy. Such a drawback could be remedied in part via the 
incorporation of a steady-state formulation as discussed below.  
 Our static CGE model can be extended in several directions. First, precise 
amounts of informal sector labor together with service sectors that operate only in the 
informal sector need to be identified and included in the production processes. The social 
accounting matrices used in this essay are constructed based on the assumptions we make 
about the structure and size of the both the formal and informal sectors as well as the 
RICH and POOR households.  Traditionally, informal sector economic activity includes 
small-scale farming, street marketing plus other small-volume activities. A typical 
modeling exercise therefore is to identify this portion of the economy as the “informal 
sector” (Light, 2004). This represents a portion of employment and output that is not 
subject to taxation, either legally or illegally. However, identification of the nature and 
size of these activities requires a survey of both individuals and firms.  
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, such survey data or even indicators 
related to the scope of informal sector activities are not readily available. If such 
information was available, the precise amounts of informal labor would be included in 
the production process, enabling us to identify the extent to which changes in labor taxes 
encourage workers to substitute informal for formal sector activities. Additionally, the 
precise magnitude of service sectors that operate exclusively in informal economy would 
also be included. 
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The second extension of our static CGE model would entail the modeling of 
dynamic phenomena in the economy. As mentioned above, our static model fails to 
capture the intertemporal aspects of an economy, something that can be remedied by 
incorporating steady-state aspects in the CGE model presented earlier. One way of 
modeling these steady-state features is via the introduction of endogenous supply of 
capital. Given that intertemporal models focus on capital-stock accumulation, the labor-
leisure choice is not relevant in such models and may not be considered here. The steady-
state model allows capital and investment to adjust to changes in policy directives, 
consistent with a long-run analysis. The long-run equilibrium condition links the cost of 
capital with the return to capital in the following way: 
                                              kinv rp =               k⊥  
The capital scale factor k  equilibrates this investment arbitrage condition to ensure that 
the cost of capital always equals the return to capital. When the return to capital rises 
relative to the price or cost of investment: invk pr f , k increases to scale up investment to 
reflect this arbitrage condition. Therefore, in the steady-state equilibrium, k  adjusts 
investment so that the cost of capital is consistent with the return to capital (Light, 2004).  
It is important to note however that, since we choose the model parameters for the steady 
state, this formulation is a little less flexible than allowing a full dynamic model. 
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Appendix A: Measures of the Shadow economy42 
The Currency Demand Approach 
The currency demand approach was first used by Cagan (1958), who calculated a 
correlation of the currency demand and the tax pressure (as one cause of the shadow 
economy) for the United States over the period 1919 to 1955. Twenty years later, 
Gutmann (1977) used the same approach, but did not use any statistical procedures; 
instead he only looked at the ratio between currency and demand deposits over the years 
1937 to 1976. Cagan’s (1958) approach was further developed by Tanzi (1980; , 1983) 
who econometrically estimated a currency demand function for the United States for the 
period 1929 to 1980 in order to calculate the shadow economy. His approach assumes 
that shadow (or hidden) transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as 
to leave no observable traces for the authorities. An increase in the size of the shadow 
economy will therefore increase the demand for currency.  
To isolate the resulting “excess” demand for currency, an equation for currency 
demand is econometrically estimated over time, while controlling for all the conventional 
factors that affect currency demand such as the development of income, payment habits 
and interest rates. Additionally, such variables as the direct and indirect tax burden, 
government regulation and the complexity of the tax system, which are assumed to be the 
major factors causing people to work in the shadow economy, are included in the 
estimation equation. The “excess” increase in currency, which is the amount unexplained 
by the conventional or normal factors mentioned above, is then attributed to the rising tax 
burden and the other reasons leading people to work in the shadow economy. Figures for 
                                                 
42 Note. From "The Value Added of Underground Activities: Size and Measurement of the Shadow 
Economies of 110 Countries All Over the World," by F. Schneider, 2002, p. 38-40 and p. 43-46. Copyright 
2002 by Schneider, Friedrich. Adapted with permission. 
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the size and development of the shadow economy can be calculated in a first step by 
comparing the difference between the development of currency when the direct and 
indirect tax burden (and government regulations) are held at their lowest value, and the 
development of currency with the current (much higher) burden of taxation and 
government regulations. Assuming in a second step the same income velocity for 
currency used in the shadow economy as for legal M1 in the official economy, the size of 
the shadow can be computed and compared to the official GDP. 
The currency demand approach is one of the most commonly used approaches. It 
has been applied to many OECD countries, but has nevertheless been criticized on 
various grounds. First, not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid in cash. 
Isachsen and Strom (1985) used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 1980, 
roughly 80 percent of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of 
the total shadow economy (including barter) may thus be even larger than previously 
estimated. Second, most studies consider only one particular factor, the tax burden, as a 
cause of the shadow economy. But others (such as the impact of regulation, taxpayers’ 
attitudes toward the state, “tax morality” and so on) are not considered, because reliable 
data for most countries is not available. If, as seems likely, these other factors also have 
an impact on the extent of the hidden economy, its size might again be bigger than 
reported in most studies. Third, a further weakness of this approach, at least when applied 
to the United States, is discussed by Garcia (1978), Park (1979), and Feige (1996), who 
point out that increases in currency demand deposits are due largely to a slowdown in 
demand deposits rather than to an increase in currency caused by activities in the shadow 
economy. Fourth, Blades (1982) and Feige (1986; , 1996), criticize Tanzi’s studies on the 
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grounds that the U.S. dollar is used as an international currency. They argue that Tanzi 
should have considered (and even controlled for) the US dollars, which are used as an 
international currency and held in cash abroad. Moreover, Frey and Pommerehne (1984) 
and Thomas (1986; , 1999; , 1992) claim that Tanzi’s parameter estimates are not very 
stable. Fifth, another weakness of this procedure, in most studies, is the assumption of the 
same velocity of money in both types of economies. As Hill and Kabir (1996) for Canada 
and Klovland (1984) for the Scandinavian countries argue, there is already considerable 
uncertainty about the velocity of money in the official economy; the velocity of money in 
the hidden sector is even more difficult to estimate. Without knowledge about the 
velocity of currency in the shadow economy, one has to accept the assumption of “equal” 
money velocity in both sectors. Finally, the assumption of no shadow economy in a base 
year is open to criticism. Relaxing this assumption would again imply an upward 
adjustment of the figures attained in the bulk of the studies already undertaken.  
The Model Approach 
The currency demand approach is designed to estimate the size and development 
of the shadow economy but considers just one indicator that “must” capture all effects of 
the shadow economy. However, it is obvious that its effects show up simultaneously in 
the production, labor, and money markets. An even more important critique is that the 
causes which determine the size of the hidden economy are taken into account only in 
some of the monetary approach studies which usually consider one cause, the burden of 
taxation. The model approach explicitly considers multiple causes leading to the 
existence and growth as well as the multiple effects of the shadow economy over time. 
The empirical method used is quite different. It is based on the statistical theory of 
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unobserved variables, which considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the 
phenomenon to be measured. 
For the estimation, a factor-analytic approach is used to measure the hidden 
economy as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown coefficients are estimated in 
a set of structural equations within which the “unobserved” variable cannot be measured 
directly. The DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model consists in 
general of two parts; the measurement model links the unobserved variables to observed 
indicators while the structural equations model specifies causal relationships among the 
unobserved variables. In this case, there is one unobserved variable, the size of the 
shadow economy. It is assumed to be influenced by a set of indicators, thus capturing the 
structural dependence of the shadow economy on variables that may be useful in 
predicting its movement and size in the future. The interaction over time between the 
causes Zit (i = 1, 2, ..., k), the size of the shadow economy Xt, and the indicators Yjt (j = 1, 
2, ..., p) is shown in the Figure A1 below.43 
Figure A1: Development of the Shadow Economy 
 Causes                                  Xt-1                              Indicators 
     
 Z1t Development of the Shadow Y1t 
 .                    Economy over time                                   . 
                          .                                      Xt                . 
                          .                                                                                      . 
                         
                        Zkt                                                                                                                                             Ypt 
  
 
                                                 
43 Note. From "The Value Added of Underground Activities: Size and Measurement of the Shadow 
Economies of 110 Countries All Over the World," by F. Schneider, 2002, p. 44. Copyright 2002 by 
Schneider, Friedrich. Reprinted with permission. 
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There is a large body of literature on the possible causes and indicators of the 
shadow economy, in which the following three types of causes are distinguished. First, 
the burden of direct and indirect taxation, both actual and perceived: a rising burden of 
taxation provides a strong incentive to work in the shadow economy. Second, the burden 
of regulation as proxy for all other state activities: it is assumed that increases in the 
burden of regulation gives a strong incentive to enter the shadow economy. Finally, the 
“tax morality” (citizens’ attitudes toward the state), which describes the readiness of 
individuals (at least partly) to leave their official occupations and enter the shadow 
economy: it is assumed that a declining tax morality tends to increase the size of the 
shadow economy. A change in the size of the shadow economy may be reflected in the 
following indicators. First, development of monetary indicators: if activities in the 
shadow economy rise, additional monetary transactions are required. Second, 
development of the labor market: increasing participation of workers in the hidden sector 
results in a decrease in participation in the official economy. Similarly, increased 
activities in the hidden sector may be expected to be reflected in shorter working hours in 
the official economy. Finally, development of the production market: an increase in the 
shadow economy means that inputs (especially labor) move out of the official economy 
(at least partly); this displacement might have a depressing effect on the official growth 
rate of the economy. 
The most recent use of the model approach has been undertaken by Giles (1999a; 
, 1999b) and by Giles, Tedds, and Gupsa (1999), and Giles and Tedds (2002). They 
basically estimate a comprehensive (dynamic) MIMIC model to get a time series index of 
the hidden/measured output of New Zealand or Canada, and then estimate a separate 
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“cash-demand model” to obtain a benchmark for converting this index into percentage 
units. Unlike earlier empirical studies of the hidden economy, they pay proper attention 
to the non-stationary, and possible co-integration of time serious data in both models. 
Again this DYMIMIC model treats hidden output as a latent variable, and uses several 
(measurable) causal variables and indicator variables. The former include measures of the 
average and marginal tax rates, inflation, real income and the degree of regulation in the 
economy. The latter include changes in the (male) labor force participation rate and in the 
cash/money supply ratio. In their cash-demand equation they allow for different 
velocities of currency circulation in the hidden and recorded economies.  
The cash-demand equation here is used not as an input to determine the variation 
in the hidden economy over time, but rather to obtain the long-run average value of 
hidden/measured output, so that the index for this ratio predicted by the DYMIMIC 
model can be used to calculate level and percentage units of the shadow economy. Giles 
latest combination of the currency demand and DYMIMIC approach clearly shows that 
some progress in the estimation technique of the shadow economy has been achieved and 
a number of critical limitations have been overcome. 
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
Table B1. Descriptive Statistics: East African Countries 
 
Variable Observations Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SDWGDP (Shadow Economy, 
 % of GDP) 
33 
45.13 10.68 32.00 62.30 
CORRUPTION 33 2.22 0.22 1.90 2.70 
GDP Per Capita (U.S$) 33 276.09 71.01 176.23 354.82 
Agriculture income (% of GDP) 33 38.40 10.40 16.40 51.50 
Mining income (% of GDP) 33 0.32 0.12 0.21 0.60 
Openness(value of exports & 
 Imports, % of GDP)  
33 48.10 14.50 22.20 70.50 
Export ratio (value of exports,  
% of GDP) 
33 7.20 2.30 3.80 12.40 
Import ratio (value of imports,  
% of GDP) 
33 11.10 3.30 6.60 19.50 
Exchange Rate (LCU per US$) 33 547.97 479.63 22.92 1644.48 
Real GDP (US$ Billions)  33 21.30 9.60 11.20 37.40 
Real GNP (US$ Billions) 33 20.00 9.50 9.60 39.10 
POPULATION (Millions) 33 25.30 5.00 16.30 33.70 
TAX RATIOS 
Total Tax ratio (Total taxes,  
% of GDP) 
33 6.2 1.9 2.9 10.9 
Income taxes (% of GDP) 33 1.8 1.0 0.4 4.4 
Consumption taxes  
(VAT + Sales + Excises,% of GDP) 
33 2.8 1.0 1.0 4.8 
International taxes  
(export and import  taxes, % of GDP) 
33 1.3 0.6 0.3 2.7 
Value Added Taxes (VAT, % of GDP) 33 1.3 1.1 0 3.5 
Sales taxes (% of GDP) 33 0.4 0.6 0 1.9 
Excise taxes (% of GDP) 33 1.1 0.4 0.3 2.0 
Other taxes (% of GDP) 33 0.36 0.34 0 1.4 
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Table B2. Descriptive Statistics: OECD Countries 
 
 
aIncome taxes refer to the sum of personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, social security 
contributions, and taxes on payroll and workforce. 
Variable Observations Mean    Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SDWGDP (Shadow  
Economy in %of GDP) 126 15.6 5.5 6.7 29 
POPN (Population, millions) 105 39.1 59 3.4 274 
CRPT (Corruption Index; higher  
value indicates  lower corruption) 
126 7.732 1.627 2.99 10.00 
Real GDP ($ Billions) 126 1,120 1,910 50.8 9,010 
Real GNP ($ Billions) 126 1,110 1,910 46 9,000 
GDPC (GDP per capita, in 
 constant U.S.$) 
126 25338.920 9049.661 9710.45 46183.19 
Agriculture income (% of GDP) 126 3.6 2.1 1.0 10.7 
Openness(value of exports & 
 Imports, % of GDP) 
126 70.9 34.4 17.9 186.0 
Mining income (% of GDP) 126 4.5 7.7 0.1 30.2 
Export ratio (value of exports, 
 % of GDP) 
126 36.6 20.9 8.5 95.5 
Import ratio (value of imports,  
% of GDP) 
126 35.0 17.7 6.6 96.2 
TAX RATIOS 
Total Tax ratio (Total taxes,  
% of GDP)  
126 25.1 7.1 7.4 45.0 
Income taxesa (% of GDP)  126 12.9 4.9 3.5 27.1 
Consumption taxes  
(VAT + Sales + Excises, 
% of GDP)  
126 8.6 3.1 0.0 13.8 
Property Taxes (% of GDP)  126 1.8 1.0 0.4 4.7 
International taxes 
 (export and import  taxes,  
% of GDP)  
126 0.2 0.2 0 1.0 
Value Added Taxes (VAT,  
% of GDP)  
126 5.4 2.7 0 10.0 
Sales taxes (% of GDP)  126 0.4 0.9 0 3.0 
Excise taxes (% of GDP)  126 2.8 1.2 0 5.5 
Other taxes (% of GDP) 126 1.6 0.9 0 3.5 
  
103
 
Table B3. Simple Correlations: East African Countries 
 
 yg yi yc yn yv ys ye sgdp crpt gdpc agric eratio iratio 
yi 0.9             
yc 0.7 0.6            
yn 0.4 0.3 -0.2           
yv 0.6 0.6 0.9 -0.2          
ys -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.8         
ye 0.3 0.2 0.7 -0.5 0.6 -0.6        
sgdp 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.5 -0.3       
crpt -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.3      
gdpc -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.9 -0.3     
agric -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 0.3 -0.6 0.6 -0.5 0.7 0.5 -0.7    
eratio 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.7 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.5   
iratio 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.4 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.8 0.1 -0.7 0.3 0.2  
ming -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.1 
 
yg Total Tax ratio 
yi Income taxes (% of GDP) 
yc Consumption taxes (VAT + Sales + Excises, % of GDP) 
yn International taxes (export and import  taxes, % of GDP) 
yv Value Added Taxes (% of GDP) 
ys Sales taxes (% of GDP) 
ye Excise taxes (% of GDP) 
sgdp Shadow Economy, % of GDP 
crpt Corruption 
gdpc GDP Per Capita (U.S$) 
agric Agriculture income (% of GDP) 
eratio Export ratio (value of exports, % of GDP) 
iratio Import ratio (value of imports, % of GDP) 
ming Mining income (% of GDP) 
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Table B4. Simple Correlations: OECD Countries 
 
 yg yi yc yw yn yv ys ye sgdp crpt gdpc agric open ming eratio 
yi 0.9               
yc 0.6 0.3              
yw 0.3 0.3 - 
0.2 
            
yn 0.2 0.2 - 
0.1 
0.2            
yv 0.5 0.2 0.9 - 
0.4 
- 
0.2 
          
ys 0.1 0.2 - 
0.4 
0.6 0.4 - 
0.7 
         
ye 0.6 0.4 0.8 - 
0.1 
- 
0.1 
0.6 - 
0.3 
        
sgdp 0.2 0.0 0.5 - 
0.3 
- 
0.3 
0.4 - 
0.3 
0.4        
crpt 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 - 
0.5 
      
gdpc - 
0.2 
0.1 - 
0.4 
- 
0.1 
- 
0.3 
- 
0.3 
0.0 - 
0.3 
- 
0.4 
0.3      
agric 0.1 - 
0.1 
0.3 - 
0.2 
0.3 0.3 - 
0.1 
0.2 0.3 - 
0.2 
- 
0.6 
    
open 0.2 0.1 0.3 - 
0.2 
- 
0.1 
0.3 - 
0.2 
0.2 0.1 0.2 - 
0.0 
- 
0.0 
   
ming 0.0 - 
0.1 
0.2 - 
0.2 
0.1 0.1 - 
0.1 
0.4 0.1 0.0 - 
0.3 
0.2 0.4   
eratio 0.2 0.2 0.2 - 
0.2 
- 
0.2 
0.2 - 
0.2 
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 - 
0.1 
0.9 0.5  
iratio 0.2 0.1 0.3 - 
0.2 
- 
0.2 
0.3 - 
0.2 
0.2 0.2 0.1 - 
0.1 
0.0 0.9 0.5 0.9 
 
yg Total Tax ratio (Total taxes as % of GDP) 
yi Income taxes (% of GDP) 
 yc Consumption taxes (VAT + Sales + Excises, % of GDP) 
yw  Property taxes (% of GDP) 
yn International taxes (export and import  taxes, % of GDP) 
yv Value Added Taxes (% of GDP) 
ys Sales taxes (% of GDP) 
ye Excise taxes (% of GDP) 
sgdp Shadow Economy, % of GDP 
crpt Corruption 
gdpc GDP Per Capita (U.S$) 
agric Agriculture income (% of GDP) 
eratio Export ratio (value of exports, % of GDP) 
iratio Import ratio (value of imports, % of GDP) 
ming  Mining income (% of GDP) 
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Table B5. Tax Burden and the Size of the Shadow Economy in East African Countries 
 
% of GDP  
Country 
  
 Year 
Direct  
Taxes 
Indirect 
 Taxes 
Customs & 
Import duties 
Overall 
Tax burden 
Shadow economy 
1991/92 0.9 2.4 3 6.3 38.4 
1992/93 1.1 2.6 3.4 7.1 38.8 
1993/94 1.3 3.3 3.7 8.3 39.2 
1994/95 1.6 4.1 3.6 9.3 40.1 
1995/96 1.5 7.1 1.3 9.9 40.7 
1996/97 1.6 8.1 1.1 10.8 41.2 
1997/98 1.8 8.4 1.1 11.3 42.1 
1998/99 1.9 8.8 1.0 11.7 42.6 
1999/00 2.1 8.4 1.1 11.7 43.1 
2000/01 2.1 8.0 1.1 11.3 43.0 
Uganda 
2001/02 2.3 8.5 1.0 11.8 43.1 
1991/92 7 10.4 2.1 19.0 32.1 
1992/93 6.7 10 2.4 19.1 33.4 
1993/94 10 11 4 25.0 37.3 
1994/95 10.1 10.5 4.3 24.9 37.1 
1995/96 9.9 10.7 4.4 25.0 37.2 
1996/97 8.6 9.6 4 22.2 35.9 
1997/98 8.5 9.9 3.7 22.1 35.6 
1998/99 7.7 9.7 4 21.3 34.9 
1999/00 7.1 9.2 3.7 20.0 34.3 
2000/01 6.6 9.4 3.4 19.4 34.0 
Kenya 
2001/02 6.1 9.1 2.4 17.6 32.0 
1991/92 3.3 4.7 3.1 11.1 62.3 
1992/93 2.9 3 2 7.9 58.0 
1993/94 2.9 3.5 2.5 8.9 58.2 
1994/95 3.3 2.7 3.4 10.4 60.5 
1995/96 3.3 3.1 3.6 10.0 59.8 
1996/97 3.2 3.3 4.1 10.6 60.2 
1997/98 3 4.7 1.7 9.4 59.4 
1998/99 2.7 4.9 1.5 9.1 58.6 
1999/00 3 4.6 1.3 8.9 58.3 
2000/01 2.5 5.9 1.2 9.6 58.9 
Tanzania 
2001/02 2.7 6.2 1 9.9 59.1 
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Table B6. The Size of the Shadow Economy in OECD Countries 
 
Size of the Shadow Economy (in % of GDP) using the Currency Demand Method 
OECD-Countries Average 
1989/90 
Average 
1991/92 
Average 
1994/95 
Average 
1997/98 
Average 
1999/2000 
Average 
2001/20021) 
1. Australia 10.1 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.3 14.1 
2. Belgium 19.3 20.8 21.5 22.5 22.2 22.0 
3. Canada 12.8 13.5 14.8 16.2 16.0 15.8 
4. Denmark 10.8 15.0 17.8 18.3 18.0 17.9 
5. Germany 11.8 12.5 13.5 14.9 16.0 16.3 
6. Finland 13.4 16.1 18.2 18.9 18.1 18.0 
7. France 9.0 13.8 14.5 14.9 15.2 15.0 
8. Greece 22.6 24.9 28.6 29.0 28.7 28.5 
9. Great Britain 9.6 11.2 12.5 13.0 12.7 12.5 
10. Ireland 11.0 14.2 15.4 16.2 15.9 15.7 
11. Italy 22.8 24.0 26.0 27.3 27.1 27.0 
12. Japan 8.8 9.5 10.6 11.1 11.2 11.1 
13. Netherlands 11.9 12.7 13.7 13.5 13.1 13.0 
14. New Zealand2) 9.2 9.0 11.3 11.9 12.8 12.6 
15. Norway 14.8 16.7 18.2 19.6 19.1 19.0 
16. Austria 6.9 7.1 8.6 9.0 9.8 10.6 
17. Portugal 15.9 17.2 22.1 23.1 22.7 22.5 
18. Sweden 15.8 17.0 19.5 19.9 19.2 19.1 
19. Switzerland 6.7 6.9 7.8 8.1 8.6 9.4 
20. Spain 3) 16.1 17.3 22.4 23.1 22.7 22.5 
21. USA 6.7 8.2 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.7 
Unweighted 
Average over 21 
OECD countries 
13.2 14.3 15.7 16.7 16.8 16.7 
 
Note. From "The Value Added of Underground Activities: Size and Measurement of the Shadow 
Economies of 110 Countries All Over the World," by F. Schneider, 2002, p. 21. Copyright 2002 by 
Schneider, Friedrich. Reprinted with permission. 
The DYMIMIC and Currency demand approaches were used to calculate the Shares of the Shadow 
economy for the East African and OECD countries, respectively (Schneider, 2002; Schneider & Enste, 
2000): 
1) Preliminary values. 
2) The figures are calculated using the MIMIC-method and Currency demand approach. Source: Giles 
(1999b). 
3) The figures have been calculated for 1989/90, 1990/93 and 1994/95 from Mauleon (1998) and for 
1997/98 and 1999 figures are from Schneider (2002).
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Table B7. First Stage Least Squares Estimates (OECD and East African Countries) 
 OECD East Africa 
 Dependent variable: Tax evasion 
Constant 12.902 18.690 
Agriculture(% 
of  GDP) 
0.747*** 
(0.001) 
0.689*** 
(0.000) 
Corruption -1.634*** 
(0.000) 
2.253 
(0.401) 
Mining 0.348** 
(0.022) 
3.646*** 
(0.000) 
GDPC -0.214*** 
(0.000) 
-1.751*** 
(0.000) 
Export ratio 0.045** 
(0.017) 
0.778*** 
(0.007) 
Trend 0.983*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.933) 
R-squared 0.497 0.448 
Durbin-Watson 1.909 2.218 
Observations 126 33 
 
Note. P-values in parenthesis. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table B8. OLS and GMM Estimates with no Fixed Effects (OECD Countries) 
 
  OLS OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
 Tax ratio Income Consumption Property International trade 
 
Constant 51.059 
 
38.068 
 
38.068 
 
4.447 
 
4.447 
 
5.527 
 
5.527 
 
0.169 
 
0.169 
 
Tax evasion 
  
-1.351*** 
(0.008) 
-1.320*** 
(0.000) 
-1.320*** 
(0.000) 
0.216 
(0.278) 
0.216 
(0.264) 
-0.243*** 
(0.000) 
-0.243*** 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.410) 
0.010 
(0.396) 
Corruption 
  
1.144*** 
(0.008) 
0.654** 
(0.038) 
0.654** 
(0.032) 
0.380** 
(0.025) 
0.380** 
(0.021) 
0.194*** 
(0.001) 
0.194*** 
(0.000) 
0.043*** 
(0.000) 
0.043*** 
(0.000) 
Mining 
  
0.128 
(0.611) 
-0.110 
(0.553) 
-0.110 
(0.541) 
0.178* 
(0.075) 
0.178* 
(0.067) 
0.006 
(0.859) 
0.006 
(0.854) 
0.012** 
(0.048) 
0.012** 
(0.042) 
 GDP per capita -0.293*** 
(0.002) 
-0.067 
(0.314) 
-0.067 
(0.300) 
-0.137*** 
(0.000) 
-0.137*** 
(0.000) 
-0.046*** 
(0.000) 
-0.046*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
0.000) 
Export ratio 
  
0.075** 
(0.017) 
0.044* 
(0.054) 
0.044* 
(0.047) 
0.029** 
(0.018) 
0.029** 
(0.015) 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.203) 
-0.001 
(0.189) 
Trend 
  
-0.109 
(0.771) 
-0.178 
(0.517) 
-0.178 
(0.504) 
-0.004 
(0.981) 
-0.004 
(0.980) 
0.065 
(0.186) 
0.065 
(0.174) 
-0.060*** 
(0.000) 
-0.060*** 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.185 
 
0.190 
 
0.190 
 
0.282 
 
0.282 
 
0.225 
 
0.225 
 
0.484 0.484 
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
 
Note. P-values in parenthesis. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table B9. OLS and GMM Estimates with no Fixed Effects (East African Countries) 
 
  OLS OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
 Tax ratio Income Consumption International trade 
 
Constant 13.951 
 
6.462 
 
6.462 
 
0.039 
 
0.039 
 
5.088 
 
5.088 
 
Tax evasion 
  
-0.159** 
(0.032) 
-0.094*** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.094*** 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.530) 
 
-0.034 
(0.497) 
-0.004 
(0.887) 
 
-0.004 
(0.872) 
Corruption 
  
0.607 
(0.565) 
0.075 
(0.857) 
 
0.075 
(0.839) 
0.960 
(0.241) 
 
0.960 
(0.188) 
-0.583 
(0.179) 
 
-0.583 
(0.132) 
GDP per capita -1.641*** 
(0.002) 
-0.606*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.606*** 
(0.001) 
0.034 
(0.927) 
 
0.034 
(0.918) 
-0.534** 
(0.012) 
 
-0.534*** 
(0.005) 
Mining 
  
-0.016 
(0.995) 
-0.214 
(0.825) 
 
-0.214 
(0.803) 
0.350 
(0.852) 
 
0.350 
(0.833) 
-1.574 
(0.120) 
 
-1.574* 
(0.081) 
Export ratio 
  
0.508*** 
(0.000) 
0.249*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.249*** 
(0.000) 
0.253*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.253*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008 
(0.854) 
-0.008 
(0.835) 
Trend 
  
-0.180** 
(0.052) 
-0.110*** 
(0.004) 
-0.110*** 
(0.001) 
0.022 
(0.748) 
0.022 
(0.717) 
-0.054 
(0.143) 
-0.054* 
(0.100) 
R-squared 0.750 
 
0.852 
 
0.852 
 
0.480 
 
0.480 
 
0.609 
 
0.609 
 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
Note. P-values in parenthesis. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table B10. OLS and GMM Estimates with Fixed Effects (OECD Countries) 
  
  OLS OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
 Tax ratio Income Consumption Property International trade 
 
Constant -0.034 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
0.056 
 
0.056 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
Tax evasion 
  
-1.692*** 
(0.003) 
-1.597*** 
(0.000) 
-1.597*** 
(0.000) 
0.129 
(0.561) 
0.129 
 (0.549) 
-0.247*** 
(0.001) 
-0.247*** 
(0.001) 
0.022 
(0.195) 
0.022 
 (0.182) 
Corruption 
  
1.034** 
(0.015) 
0.464 
(0.148) 
0.464 
 (0.136) 
0.304* 
(0.071) 
0.304** 
(0.063) 
0.223*** 
(0.000) 
0.223*** 
(0.000) 
0.042*** 
(0.000) 
0.042*** 
(0.000) 
Mining 
  
0.137 
(0.568) 
-0.102 
(0.577) 
-0.102 
(0.566) 
0.208** 
(0.032) 
0.208** 
(0.027) 
0.023 
(0.484) 
0.023 
 (0.470) 
0.008 
(0.146) 
0.008 
(0.134) 
 GDP per capita -0.228*** 
(0.009) 
-0.043 
(0.515) 
-0.043 
 (0.502) 
-0.128*** 
(0.000) 
-0.128*** 
(0.000) 
-0.050*** 
(0.000) 
-0.050*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Export ratio 
  
0.065** 
(0.027) 
0.047** 
(0.036) 
0.047** 
(0.031) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
0.033*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.050) 
-0.001**  
(0.043) 
Trend 
  
0.010 
(0.976) 
0.023 
(0.924) 
0.023  
(0.921) 
0.001 
(0.994) 
0.001 
 (0.993) 
-0.016 
(0.709) 
-0.016 
 (0.700) 
0.002 
(0.829) 
0.002 
(0.824) 
R-squared 0.175 
 
0.202 
 
0.202 
 
0.267 
 
0.267 
 
0.236 
 
0.236 
 
0.288 
 
0.288 
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
                         
                        Note. P-values in parenthesis. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table B11. OLS and GMM Estimates with Fixed Effects (East African Countries) 
  
  OLS OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
 Tax ratio Income Consumption International trade 
 
Constant 0.267 
 
0.117 
 
0.117 
 
0.061 
 
0.061 
 
0.063 
 
0.063 
 
Tax evasion 
  
-0.052 
(0.483) 
-0.035 
(0.220) 
 
-0.035 
(0.168) 
-0.005 
(0.928) 
 
-0.005 
(0.918) 
0.006 
(0.816) 
 
0.006 
(0.793) 
Corruption 
  
0.593 
(0.610) 
0.057 
(0.897) 
 
0.057 
(0.884) 
1.058 
(0.223) 
 
1.058 
(0.171) 
-0.645 
(0.141) 
 
-0.645* 
(0.099) 
GDP per capita -0.174*** 
(0.004) 
-0.067*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.067*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.919) 
 
-0.004 
(0.909) 
-0.049** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.049*** 
(0.011) 
Mining 
  
0.306 
(0.908) 
0.115 
(0.909) 
 
0.115 
(0.897) 
0.785 
(0.688) 
 
0.785 
(0.650) 
-1.880* 
(0.063) 
 
-1.880** 
(0.037) 
Export ratio 
  
0.180*** 
(0.001) 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
0.079** 
(0.027) 
 
0.079*** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.901) 
0.002 
(0.883) 
Trend 
  
-0.045** 
(0.498) 
-0.019 
(0.439) 
-0.019 
 (0.383) 
-0.010 
(0.832) 
-0.010 
(0.811) 
-0.010 
(0.666) 
-0.010 
(0.627) 
R-squared 0.691 
 
0.829 
 
0.829 
 
0.384 
 
0.384 
 
0.542 
 
0.542 
 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
Note. P-values in parenthesis. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table B12. List of Variable Definitions 
X Activity level for sector X 
Y Activity level for sector Y 
TX Ad-valorem tax rate for X sector inputs 
TY Ad-valorem tax rate for Y sector inputs 
TXI Proportional tax rate on X sector inputs 
TYI Proportional tax rate on Y sector inputs 
POOR Evading (informal) household 
RICH Conforming (formal) household  
WP Hicksian welfare function for Informal (POOR) household  
WR Hicksian welfare function for Formal (RICH) household  
G Government activity level (zero in benchmark) 
TCONSR Labor supply for Formal (RICH) household 
TCONSP Labor supply for Informal (POOR) household 
PX Price index for commodity X 
PY Price index for commodity Y 
PL Price index for primary factor L 
PK Price index for primary factor K 
PWP Price index for POOR household welfare 
PWR Price index for RICH household welfare 
PG Price index for the government good (cost of administration)
PLSP Price index for POOR household labor supply 
PLSR Price index for RICH household labor supply 
GOVT Government - tax collector 
esub Elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption 
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Table B13. Social Accounting Matrix: Summary of Salient Features 
 
 Production  Sectors Consumers’ Endowment 
Markets Sector X                         Sector Y POOR           RICH 
Good X o X is more capital-intensive o POOR has 25 percent of 
 o Y is more labor-intensive       RICHs’ endowment 
Good Y o X uses only inputs of capital and labor  
 
o Y uses K and L inputs plus intermediate  
inputs from sector X o POOR has 33 percent of 
Capital (K) o POORs’ welfare is commodity Y-intensive       RICHs’ endowment 
 o RICHs’ welfare is commodity X-intensive  
Labor (L) o POOR enjoys more leisure compared to o POOR has 50 percent of 
       RICH       RICHs’ endowment 
 
Note. The actual values in the Social Accounting Matrix reflect three internal consistence 
conditions: zero profit, market clearing, and income balance. 
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Table B14. Social Accounting Matrix: Labor-leisure choice and intermediate inputs in 
production with full compliance in the formal sector and full evasion in the informal 
sector (the POOR households’ endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
 Production Sectors Consumers 
Markets X Y WP WR TCONSP TCONSR POOR RICH 
PX 110 -30 -5 -75     
PY  100 -35 -65     
PWP   50    -50  
PWR    150    -150 
PLSP  -30   30    
PLSR -50     50   
PL   -10 -10 -30 -50 40 60 
PK -60 -40     10 90 
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Table B15. Social Accounting Matrix: Labor-leisure choice and intermediate inputs in 
production with partial compliance in the formal sector and tax evasion in the informal 
sector (the POOR households’ endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ 
endowment) 
 Production Sectors Consumers 
Markets X Y WP WR TCONSP TCONSR POOR RICH 
PX 110 -30 -5 -75     
PY  100 -35 -65     
PWP   50    -50  
PWR    150    -150 
PLSP  -30   30    
PLSR -40 -10    50   
PL   -10 -10 -30 -50 40 60 
PK -70 -30     10 90 
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Table B16. Social Accounting Matrix: Labor-leisure choice and intermediate inputs in 
production with full compliance in the formal sector and full evasion in the informal 
sector (the POOR households’ endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ 
endowment) 
 Production Sectors Consumers 
Markets X Y WP WR TCONSP TCONSR POOR RICH 
PX 155 -30 -5 -120     
PY  100 -35 -65     
PWP   50    -50  
PWR    200    -200 
PLSP  -30   30    
PLSR -70     70   
PL   -10 -15 -30 -70 40 85 
PK -85 -40     10 115 
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Table B17. Social Accounting Matrix: Labor-leisure choice and intermediate inputs in 
production with partial compliance in the formal sector and full evasion in the informal 
sector (the POOR households’ endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ 
endowment) 
 Production Sectors Consumers 
Markets X Y WP WR TCONSP TCONSR POOR RICH 
PX 155 -30 -5 -120     
PY  100 -35 -65     
PWP   50    -50  
PWR    200    -200 
PLSP  -30   30    
PLSR -56 -14    70   
PL   -10 -15 -30 -70 40 85 
PK -99 -26     10 115 
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Table B18. Social Accounting Matrix: Labor-leisure choice and intermediate inputs in 
production with full compliance in the formal sector and full evasion in the informal 
sector (the POOR households’ endowment is 50 percent of the RICH households’ 
endowment) 
 Production Sectors Consumers 
Markets X Y WP WR TCONSP TCONSR POOR RICH 
PX 110 -10 -25 -75     
PY  100 -35 -65     
PWP   50    -75  
PWR    150    -150 
PLSP  -45   45    
PLSR -50     50   
PL   -15 -10 -45 -50 60 60 
PK -60 -45     15 90 
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Table B19. Social Accounting Matrix: Labor-leisure choice and intermediate inputs in 
production with partial compliance in the formal sector and full evasion in the informal 
sector (the POOR households’ endowment is 50 percent of the RICH households’ 
endowment) 
 Production Sectors Consumers 
Markets X Y WP WR TCONSP TCONSR POOR RICH 
PX 110 -10 -25 -75     
PY  100 -35 -65     
PWP   75    -75  
PWR    150    -150 
PLSP  -45   45    
PLSR -40 10    50   
PL   -15 -10 -45 -50 60 60 
PK -70 -35     15 90 
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Table B20. Elasticity Choices 
Labor/Capital elasticity in value-added 1 
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs 0 
Elasticity of substitution between goods X and Y in final demand 1 
Labor-leisure elasticity 1 
Elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption (esub) 2 
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Table B21. Summary of the General Equilibrium Effects from the Evasion of Consumption and 
Income Taxes in the Informal Sector (POOR households’ endowment is 33 percent of the RICH 
households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 POOR Household RICH Household 
 Magnitude (%) Percent  
change (%) 
Magnitude (%) Percent  
change (%) 
Initial Post-Evasion Welfare 2.43 -0.64 
Final Post-Evasion Welfare 1.90 
 
-21.8 -0.02 
 
96.9 
Initial Price of good X 5.99 5.99 
Final Price of good X 5.47 
 
-8.6 5.47 
 
-8.6 
Initial Price of good Y -6.30 -6.30 
Final Price of good Y -5.68 
 
9.8 -5.68 
 
9.8 
Initial Post-Evasion Rental rate -0.49 -0.49 
Final Post-Evasion Rental rate 2.36 
 
131.2 2.36 
 
131.2 
Initial Post-Evasion Net-Wage -4.02 0.05 
Final Post-Evasion Net-Wage -4.56 
 
-12.6 -0.87 
 
-178.2 
Initial Post-Evasion Labor supply 6.43 -2.74 
Final Post-Evasion Labor supply 10.28 
 
59.8 0.62 
 
122.6 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225 
Initial Post-Evasion Welfare 1.08 -0.25 
Final Post-Evasion Welfare 0.83 
 
-23.2 0.03 
 
112 
Initial Price of good X 2.56 2.56 
Final Price of good X 2.32 
 
-9.4 2.32 
 
-9.4 
Initial Price of good Y -2.79 -2.79 
Final Price of good Y -2.49 
 
-10.8 -2.49 
 
-10.8 
Initial Post-Evasion Rental rate -0.17 -0.17 
Final Post-Evasion Rental rate 1.13 
 
147.6 1.13 
 
147.6 
Initial Post-Evasion Net-Wage -0.99 0.06 
Final Post-Evasion Net-Wage -1.24 
 
-24.2 -0.36 
 
-142.8 
Initial Post-Evasion Labor supply 2.80 -1.18 
Final Post-Evasion Labor supply 4.47 
 
59.6 0.36 
 
130.5 
 
Note. “Initial” refers outcome with limited competition and/or entry in the informal sector. “Final” refers 
outcome with increased competition and/or entry in the informal sector. “Magnitude” refers to percentage 
difference between the post-evasion and post-tax outcome if both POOR and RICH households complied 
with taxes. “Percent change” refers to the percentage change between the magnitude for the “initial” and 
“final” outcome. 
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Table B22. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity and Income Taxes (the 
POOR households’ endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 5.99 5.79 5.62 5.47 
Price of Y -6.30 -6.06 -5.86 -5.68 
Price of capital -0.49 0.56 1.53 2.36 
Labor Supply_Poor 6.43 7.84 9.15 10.28 
Labor Supply_Rich -2.74 -1.49 -0.35 0.62 
Price of labor_Poor -4.02 -4.22 -4.40 -4.56 
Price of labor_Rich 0.05 -0.28 -0.60 -0.87 
Welfare_Poor 2.43 2.22 2.05 1.91 
Welfare_Rich -0.64 -0.40 -0.19 -0.02 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.115 0.114 0.113 0.111 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.289 0.285 0.282 0.279 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.085, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.215
Price of X 3.92 3.79 3.67 3.56 
Price of Y -4.21 -4.05 -3.90 -3.78 
Price of capital -0.28 0.44 1.09 1.66 
Labor Supply_Poor 4.26 5.20 6.06 6.81 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.81 -0.95 -0.17 0.49 
Price of labor_Poor -2.19 -2.33 -2.46 -2.57 
Price of labor_Rich 0.07 -0.16 -0.37 -0.56 
Welfare_Poor 1.63 1.48 1.36 1.27 
Welfare_Rich -0.39 -0.23 -0.09 0.02 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.110 0.109 0.108 0.107 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.276 0.273 0.271 0.269 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225
Price of X 2.56 2.47 2.39 2.32 
Price of Y -2.79 -2.68 -2.58 -2.49 
Price of capital -0.17 0.32 0.76 1.13 
Labor Supply_Poor 2.80 3.42 3.98 4.47 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.18 -0.60 -0.08 0.36 
Price of labor_Poor -0.99 -1.08 -1.17 -1.24 
Price of labor_Rich 0.06 -0.09 -0.23 -0.36 
Welfare_Poor 1.08 0.98 0.90 0.83 
Welfare_Rich -0.25 -0.14 -0.04 0.03 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.107 0.106 0.105 0.105 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.267 0.265 0.263 0.262 
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Table B23. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity Taxes (the POOR 
households’ endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 2.20 2.17 2.15 2.14 
Price of Y -2.40 -2.35 -2.32 -2.29 
Price of capital -0.30 -0.09 0.08 0.23 
Labor Supply_Poor 2.24 2.59 2.89 3.15 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.11 -0.83 -0.58 -0.36 
Price of labor_Poor -4.52 -4.61 -4.69 -4.77 
Price of labor_Rich 2.06 1.87 1.70 1.55 
Welfare_Poor 0.98 0.91 0.86 0.81 
Welfare_Rich -0.33 -0.29 -0.24 -0.21 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.283 0.282 0.281 0.280 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.215 
Price of X 1.53 1.51 1.49 1.48 
Price of Y -1.68 -1.65 -1.62 -1.60 
Price of capital -0.20 -0.06 0.06 0.17 
Labor Supply_Poor 1.56 1.81 2.02 2.20 
Labor Supply_Rich -0.77 -0.57 -0.40 -0.24 
Price of labor_Poor -3.16 -3.23 -3.29 -3.34 
Price of labor_Rich 1.43 1.30 1.18 1.07 
Welfare_Poor 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.57 
Welfare_Rich -0.23 -0.19 -0.17 -0.14 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.273 0.272 0.271 0.271 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.225 
Price of X 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.06 
Price of Y -1.20 -1.18 -1.16 -1.14 
Price of capital -0.14 -0.04 0.05 0.13 
Labor Supply_Poor 1.11 1.29 1.44 1.57 
Labor Supply_Rich -0.55 -0.40 -0.28 -0.17 
Price of labor_Poor -2.26 -2.30 -2.35 -2.38 
Price of labor_Rich 1.02 0.92 0.83 0.76 
Welfare_Poor 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.41 
Welfare_Rich -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 0.10 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.266 0.266 0.265 0.265 
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Table B24. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Income Taxes (the POOR households’ 
endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.15 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 4.51 4.45 4.39 4.34 
Price of Y -4.82 -4.72 -4.63 -4.55 
Price of capital -0.48 0.02 0.47 0.86 
Labor Supply_Poor 4.76 5.58 6.33 6.97 
Labor Supply_Rich -2.20 -1.53 -0.93 -0.42 
Price of labor_Poor -6.78 -7.07 -7.25 -8.32 
Price of labor_Rich 4.26 3.67 3.32 1.87 
Welfare_Poor 2.00 1.85 1.73 1.63 
Welfare_Rich -0.57 -0.45 -0.35 -0.26 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.240 0.238 0.237 0.235 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.165 
Price of X 3.16 3.11 3.07 3.03 
Price of Y -3.42 -3.35 -3.28 -3.22 
Price of capital -0.31 0.05 0.37 0.65 
Labor Supply_Poor 3.36 3.94 4.47 4.92 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.54 -1.06 -0.63 -0.26 
Price of labor_Poor -4.80 -5.00 -5.19 -5.28 
Price of labor_Rich 2.97 2.63 2.28 2.16 
Welfare_Poor 1.42 1.31 1.22 1.15 
Welfare_Rich -0.39 -0.30 -0.23 -0.16 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.228 0.227 0.226 0.225 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.175 
Price of X 2.26 2.22 2.19 2.17 
Price of Y -2.47 -2.42 -2.37 -2.33 
Price of capital -0.14 0.05 0.29 0.49 
Labor Supply_Poor 2.41 2.83 3.21 3.54 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.10 -0.75 -0.44 -0.17 
Price of labor_Poor -3.44 -3.64 -3.74 -3.83 
Price of labor_Rich 2.13 1.79 1.56 1.46 
Welfare_Poor 1.02 0.95 0.88 0.83 
Welfare_Rich -0.27 -0.21 -0.15 -0.11 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.220 0.219 0.218 0.218 
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Table B25. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity and Income Taxes (the 
POOR households’ endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 6.24 6.09 5.95 5.83 
Price of Y -6.65 -6.45 -6.27 -6.11 
Price of capital -1.68 -0.28 1.03 2.18 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 6.02 7.76 9.42 10.90 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -2.05 -0.32 1.30 2.73 
Price of labor_Poor -3.37 -3.67 -3.96 -4.20 
Price of labor_Rich -0.67 -0.97 -1.26 -1.52 
Welfare_Poor 2.81 2.56 2.34 2.17 
Welfare_Rich -0.76 -0.45 -0.17 0.05 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.117 0.115 0.113 0.111 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.293 0.287 0.282 0.278 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.085, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.215
Price of X 4.07 3.97 3.87 3.79 
Price of Y -4.44 -4.30 -4.17 -4.06 
Price of capital -1.06 -0.10 0.78 1.56 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 3.99 5.14 6.24 7.21 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -1.35 -0.17 0.94 1.90 
Price of labor_Poor -1.75 -1.96 -2.15 -2.32 
Price of labor_Rich -0.39 -0.60 -0.80 -0.97 
Welfare_Poor 1.87 1.69 1.54 1.42 
Welfare_Rich -0.47 -0.26 -0.07 0.08 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.111 0.110 0.108 0.107 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.278 0.274 0.271 0.268 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225
Price of X 2.64 2.57 2.51 2.45 
Price of Y -2.93 -2.83 -2.74 -2.66 
Price of capital -0.67 -0.03 0.56 1.07 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 2.62 3.37 4.09 4.72 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.88 -0.09 0.64 1.28 
Price of labor_Poor -0.69 -0.83 -0.96 -1.08 
Price of labor_Rich -0.24 -0.38 -0.51 -0.62 
Welfare_Poor 1.23 1.11 1.01 0.93 
Welfare_Rich -0.29 -0.15 -0.02 0.07 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.107 0.106 0.105 0.105 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.268 0.266 0.264 0.262 
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Table B26. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity Taxes (the POOR 
households’ endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax  = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 2.25 2.26 2.26 2.26 
Price of Y -2.50 -2.48 -2.46 -2.44 
Price of capital -0.69 -0.42 -0.18 0.02 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 2.07 2.51 2.91 3.26 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.83 -0.42 -0.06 0.25 
Price of labor_Poor -4.23 -4.36 -4.48 -4.58 
Price of labor_Rich -0.24 -0.38 -0.50 -0.61 
Welfare_Poor 1.15 1.07 1.01 0.95 
Welfare_Rich -0.38 -0.32 -0.27 -0.22 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.285 0.283 0.282 0.28 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.215 
Price of X 1.56 1.57 1.57 1.57 
Price of Y -1.75 -1.74 -1.72 -1.71 
Price of capital -0.48 -0.29 -0.11 0.03 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 1.45 1.75 2.03 2.28 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.58 -0.29 -0.03 0.19 
Price of labor_Poor -2.96 -3.05 -3.13 -3.21 
Price of labor_Rich -0.16 -0.26 -0.34 -0.42 
Welfare_Poor 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.66 
Welfare_Rich -0.26 -0.22 -0.18 -0.15 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.274 0.273 0.272 0.271 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.225 
Price of X 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.11 
Price of Y -1.25 -1.24 -1.23 -1.22 
Price of capital -0.34 -0.20 -0.07 0.03 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 1.03 1.25 1.45 1.62 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.41 -0.20 -0.02 0.14 
Price of labor_Poor -2.11 -2.18 -2.24 -2.29 
Price of labor_Rich -0.11 -0.18 -0.24 -0.30 
Welfare_Poor 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.47 
Welfare_Rich -0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.10 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.267 0.266 0.266 0.265 
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Table B27. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Income Taxes (the POOR households’ 
endowment is 33 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.15 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 4.55 4.53 4.51 4.49 
Price of Y -4.94 -4.88 -4.82 -4.77 
Price of capital -1.27 -0.63 -0.03 0.48 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 4.33 5.34 6.27 7.11 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -1.62 -0.70 0.15 0.90 
Price of labor_Poor -6.28 -6.47 -6.76 -6.94 
Price of labor_Rich 5.10 4.61 3.88 3.40 
Welfare_Poor 2.28 2.11 1.96 1.84 
Welfare_Rich -0.66 -0.51 -0.38 -0.26 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.242 0.240 0.237 0.235 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.165 
Price of X 3.18 3.17 3.15 3.14 
Price of Y -3.51 -3.46 -3.42 -3.38 
Price of capital -0.87 -0.40 0.02 0.39 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 3.06 3.77 4.44 5.03 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -1.14 -0.47 0.13 0.67 
Price of labor_Poor -4.39 -4.59 -4.88 -4.98 
Price of labor_Rich 3.68 3.20 2.61 2.38 
Welfare_Poor 1.62 1.49 1.38 1.30 
Welfare_Rich 0.45 -0.34 -0.24 -0.16 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.230 0.228 0.226 0.225 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.175 
Price of X 2.27 2.26 2.25 2.24 
Price of Y -2.53 -2.50 -2.46 -2.44 
Price of capital -0.61 -0.27 0.03 0.31 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 2.20 2.71 3.19 3.62 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.81 -0.33 0.11 0.50 
Price of labor_Poor -3.13 -3.33 -3.53 -3.63 
Price of labor_Rich 2.59 2.24 1.90 1.67 
Welfare_Poor 1.16 1.07 0.99 0.93 
Welfare_Rich -0.31 -0.23 -0.16 -0.10 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.221 0.220 0.219 0.218 
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Table B28. Summary of the General Equilibrium Effects from the Evasion of Consumption and 
Income Taxes in the Informal Sector (POOR households’ endowment is 25 percent of the RICH 
households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 POOR Household RICH Household 
 Magnitude (%) Percent  
change (%) 
Magnitude (%) Percent  
change (%) 
Initial Post-Evasion Welfare 3.01 -0.58 
Final Post-Evasion Welfare 2.32 
 
-22.9 0.01 
 
101.7 
Initial Price of good X 4.10 4.10 
Final Price of good X 3.75 
 
-8.5 3.75 
 
-8.5 
Initial Price of good Y -6.89 -6.89 
Final Price of good Y -6.18 
 
10.3 -6.18 
 
10.3 
Initial Post-Evasion Rental rate -0.41 -0.41 
Final Post-Evasion Rental rate 2.56 
 
144.7 2.56 
 
144.7 
Initial Post-Evasion Net-Wage -3.89 -0.20 
Final Post-Evasion Net-Wage -4.48 
 
-15.1 -1.15 
 
-140.7 
Initial Post-Evasion Labor supply 7.27 -2.13 
Final Post-Evasion Labor supply 11.77 
 
61.8 1.27 
 
159.6 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225 
Initial Post-Evasion Welfare 1.31 -0.23 
Final Post-Evasion Welfare 0.99 
 
-24.4 0.05 
 
121.7 
Initial Price of good X 1.75 1.75 
Final Price of good X 1.59 
 
-9.1 1.59 
 
-9.1 
Initial Price of good Y -3.05 -3.05 
Final Price of good Y -2.71 
 
-11.2 -2.71 
 
-11.2 
Initial Post-Evasion Rental rate -0.13 -0.13 
Final Post-Evasion Rental rate 1.21 
 
161.1 1.21 
 
161.1 
Initial Post-Evasion Net-Wage -0.94 -0.05 
Final Post-Evasion Net-Wage -1.20 
 
-27.6 -0.48 
 
-162.3 
Initial Post-Evasion Labor supply 3.14 -0.91 
Final Post-Evasion Labor supply 5.08 
 
61.7 0.64 
 
170.3 
 
Note. “Initial” refers outcome with limited competition and/or entry in the informal sector. “Final” refers 
outcome with increased competition and/or entry in the informal sector. “Magnitude” refers to percentage 
difference between the post-evasion and post-tax outcome if both POOR and RICH households complied 
with taxes. “Percent change” refers to the percentage change between the magnitude for the “initial” and 
“final” outcome. 
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Table B29. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity and Income Taxes (the 
POOR households’ endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 4.10 3.97 3.85 3.75 
Price of Y -6.89 -6.63 -6.40 -6.18 
Price of capital -0.41 0.65 1.66 2.56 
Labor Supply_Poor 7.27 8.86 10.39 11.77 
Labor Supply_Rich -2.13 -0.90 0.25 1.27 
Price of labor_Poor -3.89 -4.10 -4.30 -4.48 
Price of labor_Rich -0.20 -0.54 -0.86 -1.15 
Welfare_Poor 3.01 2.74 2.51 2.32 
Welfare_Rich -0.58 -0.36 -0.15 0.01 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.111 0.110 0.108 0.107 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.278 0.274 0.271 0.268 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.085, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.215
Price of X 2.69 2.60 2.52 2.45 
Price of Y -4.61 -4.43 -4.26 -4.11 
Price of capital -0.23 0.49 1.17 1.78 
Labor Supply_Poor 4.80 5.84 6.85 7.76 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.40 -0.56 0.22 0.92 
Price of labor_Poor -2.11 -2.26 -2.39 -2.51 
Price of labor_Rich -0.10 -0.33 -0.55 -0.75 
Welfare_Poor 2.00 1.81 1.65 1.52 
Welfare_Rich -0.36 -0.21 -0.07 0.04 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.107 0.106 0.105 0.105 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.268 0.266 0.264 0.262 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225
Price of X 1.75 1.70 1.64 1.59 
Price of Y -3.05 -2.93 -2.81 -2.71 
Price of capital -0.13 0.34 0.80 1.21 
Labor Supply_Poor 3.14 3.83 4.49 5.08 
Labor Supply_Rich -0.91 -0.35 0.17 0.64 
Price of labor_Poor -0.94 -1.03 -0.67 -1.20 
Price of labor_Rich -0.05 -0.21 -0.35 -0.48 
Welfare_Poor 1.31 1.19 1.08 0.99 
Welfare_Rich -0.23 -0.12 -0.03 0.05 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.105 0.104 0.104 0.103 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.262 0.260 0.259 0.257 
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Table B30. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity Taxes (the POOR 
households’ endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 1.49 1.47 1.46 1.45 
Price of Y -2.58 -2.53 -2.49 -2.45 
Price of capital -0.26 -0.05 0.13 0.30 
Labor Supply_Poor 2.50 2.89 3.24 3.56 
Labor Supply_Rich -0.87 -0.59 -0.34 -0.12 
Price of labor_Poor -4.46 -4.56 -4.65 -4.72 
Price of labor_Rich 1.36 1.18 1.01 0.86 
Welfare_Poor 1.20 1.12 1.06 1.00 
Welfare_Rich -0.30 -0.25 -0.22 -0.18 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.273 0.272 0.271 0.270 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.215 
Price of X 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 
Price of Y -1.81 -1.77 -1.74 -1.72 
Price of capital -0.17 -0.03 0.10 0.21 
Labor Supply_Poor 1.74 2.01 2.264 2.48 
Labor Supply_Rich -0.60 -0.40 -0.23 -0.07 
Price of labor_Poor -3.12 -3.19 -3.25 -3.31 
Price of labor_Rich 0.95 0.82 0.70 0.59 
Welfare_Poor 0.84 0.78 0.74 0.70 
Welfare_Rich -0.20 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.266 0.265 0.265 0.26 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.225 
Price of X 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.71 
Price of Y -1.29 -1.26 -1.24 -1.22 
Price of capital -0.12 -0.02 0.07 0.16 
Labor Supply_Poor 1.24 1.43 1.61 1.77 
Labor Supply_Rich -0.43 -0.29 -0.16 -0.05 
Price of labor_Poor -2.23 -2.28 -2.32 -2.36 
Price of labor_Rich 0.67 0.58 0.49 0.42 
Welfare_Poor 0.59 0.56 0.52 0.50 
Welfare_Rich -0.14 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.261 0.261 0.260 0.260 
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Table B31. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Income Taxes (the POOR households’ 
endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.15 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 3.08 3.04 3.00 2.97 
Price of Y -5.24 -5.13 -5.03 -4.94 
Price of capital -0.41 0.09 0.56 0.99 
Labor Supply_Poor 5.35 6.29 7.17 7.97 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.71 -1.06 -0.45 0.08 
Price of labor_Poor -6.68 -6.87 -7.06 -7.25 
Price of labor_Rich 4.37 3.89 3.54 3.06 
Welfare_Poor 2.46 2.28 2.13 2.00 
Welfare_Rich -0.52 -0.41 -0.31 -0.23 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.229 0.227 0.226 0.224 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.165 
Price of X 2.10 2.13 2.10 2.08 
Price of Y -3.73 -3.64 -3.57 -3.50 
Price of capital -0.27 0.09 0.43 0.74 
Labor Supply_Poor 3.76 4.43 5.05 5.61 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.20 -0.73 -0.29 0.09 
Price of labor_Poor -4.70 -4.89 -4.99 -5.18 
Price of labor_Rich 3.08 2.73 2.50 2.16 
Welfare_Poor 1.73 1.61 1.50 1.40 
Welfare_Rich -0.35 -0.27 -0.20 -0.14 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.220 0.219 0.218 0.217 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.175 
Price of X 1.54 1.52 1.50 1.48 
Price of Y -2.69 -2.63 -2.57 -2.52 
Price of capital -0.18 0.08 0.32 0.55 
Labor Supply_Poor 2.70 3.17 3.62 4.03 
Labor Supply_Rich -0.85 -0.51 -0.19 0.08 
Price of labor_Poor -3.44 -3.54 -3.64 -3.73 
Price of labor_Rich 2.13 1.90 1.66 1.56 
Welfare_Poor 1.24 1.15 1.07 1.00 
Welfare_Rich -0.24 -0.19 -0.13 -0.09 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.215 0.214 0.213 0.212 
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Table B32. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity and Income Taxes (the 
POOR households’ endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 4.19 4.136 4.08 4.03 
Price of Y -7.23 -7.07 -6.91 -6.76 
Price of capital -1.91 -0.45 1.00 2.32 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 6.84 8.84 0.93 12.89 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -1.44 0.34 2.14 3.79 
Price of labor_Poor -3.03 -0.34 -3.66 -3.95 
Price of labor_Rich -0.31 -0.63 -0.96 -1.25 
Welfare_Poor 3.40 3.08 2.80 2.56 
Welfare_Rich -0.69 -0.38 -0.09 0.15 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.113 0.111 0.109 0.107 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.282 0.277 0.272 0.267 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.085, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.215
Price of X 2.73 2.69 2.66 2.62 
Price of Y -4.82 -4.71 -4.59 -4.49 
Price of capital -1.21 -0.22 0.76 1.65 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 4.51 5.83 7.19 8.46 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.94 0.27 1.49 2.59 
Price of labor_Poor -1.53 -1.74 -1.96 -2.15 
Price of labor_Rich -0.17 -0.39 -0.61 -0.80 
Welfare_Poor 2.24 2.02 -1.82 1.66 
Welfare_Rich -0.43 -0.22 -0.02 0.14 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.104 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.271 0.267 0.264 0.261 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225
Price of X 1.77 1.75 1.72 1.70 
Price of Y -3.18 -3.10 -3.02 -2.94 
Price of capital -0.77 -0.11 0.54 1.13 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 2.94 3.80 4.69 5.51 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.61 0.19 1.00 1.73 
Price of labor_Poor -0.55 -0.69 -0.84 -0.96 
Price of labor_Rich -0.09 -0.24 -0.38 -0.51 
Welfare_Poor 1.46 1.31 1.18 1.07 
Welfare_Rich -0.26 -0.12 0.00 0.11 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.105 0.104 0.104 0.103 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.263 0.261 0.259 0.257 
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Table B33. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity Taxes (the POOR 
households’ endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax  = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 1.55 1.56 1.56 1.56 
Price of Y -2.74 -2.72 -2.71 -2.69 
Price of capital -0.68 -0.46 -0.27 -0.10 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 2.41 2.79 3.13 3.43 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.60 -0.30 -0.03 0.19 
Price of labor_Poor -4.26 -4.35 -4.42 -4.48 
Price of labor_Rich -0.28 -0.36 -0.44 -0.50 
Welfare_Poor 1.41 1.37 1.34 1.32 
Welfare_Rich -0.36 -0.32 -0.29 -0.26 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.276 0.275 0.274 0.273 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.215 
Price of X 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 
Price of Y -1.92 -1.90 -1.89 -1.88 
Price of capital -0.46 -0.31 -0.17 -0.05 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 1.68 1.95 2.19 2.40 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.41 -0.20 -0.01 0.14 
Price of labor_Poor -2.98 -3.04 -3.09 -3.14 
Price of labor_Rich -0.19 -0.25 -0.30 -0.35 
Welfare_Poor 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.92 
Welfare_Rich -0.24 -0.22 -0.19 -0.17 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.268 0.267 0.267 0.266 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.225 
Price of X 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77 
Price of Y -1.37 -1.36 -1.35 -1.34 
Price of capital -0.33 -0.22 -0.12 -0.03 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 1.19 1.39 1.56 1.71 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.29 -0.14 -0.01 0.11 
Price of labor_Poor -2.13 2.17 -2.21 -2.24 
Price of labor_Rich -0.13 -0.17 -0.21 -0.25 
Welfare_Poor 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.65 
Welfare_Rich -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.263 0.262 0.262 0.261 
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Table B34. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Income Taxes (the POOR households’ 
endowment is 25 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.15 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 3.02 3.04 3.05 3.07 
Price of Y -5.32 -5.29 -5.25 -5.22 
Price of capital -1.40 -0.75 0.11 0.48 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 4.88 6.03 7.19 8.30 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -1.15 -0.22 0.70 1.56 
Price of labor_Poor -5.98 -6.27 -6.46 -6.75 
Price of labor_Rich 5.43 4.83 4.20 3.61 
Welfare_Poor 2.74 2.55 2.38 2.23 
Welfare_Rich -0.60 -0.46 -0.32 -0.20 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.231 0.226 0.226 0.224 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.165 
Price of X 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 
Price of Y -3.78 -3.75 -3.73 -3.70 
Price of capital -0.96 -0.49 -0.03 0.39 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 3.44 4.25 5.07 5.85 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.81 -0.14 0.52 1.15 
Price of labor_Poor -4.19 -4.49 -0.59 -4.78 
Price of labor_Rich 3.90 3.30 2.93 2.59 
Welfare_Poor 1.93 1.79 1.67 1.56 
Welfare_Rich -0.40 -0.30 -0.21 -0.12 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.222 0.220 0.218 0.217 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.175 
Price of X 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.53 
Price of Y -2.73 -2.710 -2.69 -2.67 
Price of capital -0.68 -0.34 -0.00 0.314 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 2.46 3.05 3.64 4.20 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -0.58 -0.09 0.39 0.84 
Price of labor_Poor -3.03 -3.23 -3.33 -3.53 
Price of labor_Rich 2.70 2.35 2.12 1.78 
Welfare_Poor 1.39 1.28 1.19 1.11 
Welfare_Rich -0.28 -0.21 -0.14 -0.07 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.216 0.214 0.213 0.212 
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Table B35. Summary of the General Equilibrium Effects from the Evasion of Consumption and 
Income Taxes in the Informal Sector (POOR households’ endowment is 50 percent of the RICH 
households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 POOR Household RICH Household 
 Magnitude (%) Percent  
change (%) 
Magnitude (%) Percent  
change (%) 
Initial Post-Evasion Welfare 0.77 -0.51 
Final Post-Evasion Welfare 0.64 
 
-16.8 -0.21 
 
58.8 
Initial Price of good X 7.75 7.75 
Final Price of good X 7.43 
 
-4.1 7.43 
 
-4.1 
Initial Price of good Y -8.17 -8.17 
Final Price of good Y -7.81 
 
4.4 -7.81 
 
4.4 
Initial Post-Evasion Rental rate -0.93 -0.93 
Final Post-Evasion Rental rate 0.32 
 
134.4 0.32 
 
134.4 
Initial Post-Evasion Net-Wage -3.31 1.11 
Final Post-Evasion Net-Wage -3.55 
 
-7.2 0.68 
 
-38.7 
Initial Post-Evasion Labor supply 8.06 -6.55 
Final Post-Evasion Labor supply 9.42 
 
16.8 -4.85 
 
25.9 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225 
Initial Post-Evasion Welfare 0.36 -0.15 
Final Post-Evasion Welfare 0.29 
 
-19.4 -0.02 
 
86.6 
Initial Price of good X 3.09 3.09 
Final Price of good X 2.95 
 
-4.5 2.95 
 
-4.5 
Initial Price of good Y -3.43 -3.43 
Final Price of good Y -3.26 
 
4.9 -3.26 
 
4.9 
Initial Post-Evasion Rental rate -0.29 -0.29 
Final Post-Evasion Rental rate 0.27 
 
193.1 0.27 
 
193.1 
Initial Post-Evasion Net-Wage -0.63 0.52 
Final Post-Evasion Net-Wage -0.75 
 
-19.0 0.31 
 
-40.3 
Initial Post-Evasion Labor supply 3.31 -2.67 
Final Post-Evasion Labor supply 3.91 
 
18.1 -1.86 
 
81.0 
 
Note. “Initial” refers outcome with limited competition and/or entry in the informal sector. “Final” refers 
outcome with increased competition and/or entry in the informal sector. “Magnitude” refers to percentage 
difference between the post-evasion and post-tax outcome if both POOR and RICH households complied 
with taxes.  “Percent change” refers to the percentage change between the magnitude for the “initial” and 
“final” outcome. 
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Table B36. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity and Income Taxes (the 
POOR households’ endowment is 50 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 7.75 7.63 7.52 7.43 
Price of Y -8.17 -8.04 -7.92 -7.81 
Price of capital -0.93 -0.47 -0.04 0.32 
Labor Supply_Poor 8.06 8.55 9.02 9.42 
Labor Supply_Rich -6.55 -5.93 -5.35 -4.85 
Price of labor_Poor -3.31 -3.40 -3.48 -3.55 
Price of labor_Rich 1.11 0.95 0.80 0.68 
Welfare_Poor 0.77 0.72 0.68 0.64 
Welfare_Rich -0.51 -0.39 -0.29 -0.21 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.119 0.118 0.118 0.117 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.298 0.296 0.294 0.293 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.085, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.215
Price of X 4.92 4.84 4.77 4.70 
Price of Y -5.34 -5.25 -5.17 -5.09 
Price of capital -0.52 -0.20 0.09 0.34 
Labor Supply_Poor 5.21 5.55 5.86 6.12 
Labor Supply_Rich -4.21 -3.77 -3.36 -3.01 
Price of labor_Poor -1.68 -1.74 -1.81 -1.86 
Price of labor_Rich 0.77 0.66 0.56 0.46 
Welfare_Poor 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.45 
Welfare_Rich -0.28 -0.20 -0.13 0.08 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.112 0.112 0.111 0.111 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.280 0.279 0.278 0.277 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225
Price of X 3.09 3.04 2.99 2.95 
Price of Y -3.43 -3.36 -3.31 -3.26 
Price of capital -0.29 -0.08 0.11 0.27 
Labor Supply_Poor 3.31 3.53 3.73 3.91 
Labor Supply_Rich -2.67 -2.37 -2.09 -1.86 
Price of labor_Poor -0.63 -0.67 -0.72 -0.75 
Price of labor_Rich 0.52 0.44 0.37 0.31 
Welfare_Poor 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.29 
Welfare_Rich -0.15 -0.10 -0.06 -0.02 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.108 1.07 0.107 0.107 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.269 0.268 0.268 0.267 
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Table B37. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity Taxes (the POOR 
households’ endowment is 50 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 3.20 3.18 3.17 3.15 
Price of Y -3.54 -3.51 -3.49 -3.47 
Price of capital -0.37 -0.25 -0.14 -0.05 
Labor Supply_Poor 3.34 3.51 3.66 3.78 
Labor Supply_Rich -2.82 -2.63 -2.46 -2.32 
Price of labor_Poor -4.20 -0.26 -4.30 -4.34 
Price of labor_Rich 3.29 -4.25 3.07 2.98 
Welfare_Poor 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.31 
Welfare_Rich -0.23 -0.20 -0.17 -0.15 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.294 0.293 0.292 0.292 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.215 
Price of X 2.21 2.20 2.18 2.17 
Price of Y -2.47 -2.45 -2.43 -2.42 
Price of capital -0.24 -0.16 -0.08 -0.01 
Labor Supply_Poor 2.32 2.44 2.55 2.63 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.95 -1.82 -1.70 -1.59 
Price of labor_Poor -2.93 -2.97 -3.00 -3.03 
Price of labor_Rich 2.27 2.19 2.11 2.05 
Welfare_Poor 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.22 
Welfare_Rich -0.15 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.280 0.280 0.279 0.279 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.225 
Price of X 1.56 1.55 1.54 1.54 
Price of Y -1.76 -1.74 -1.73 -1.72 
Price of capital -0.17 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 
Labor Supply_Poor 1.65 1.73 1.81 1.87 
Labor Supply_Rich -1.38 -1.29 -1.20 -1.12 
Price of labor_Poor -2.09 -2.11 -2.14 -2.16 
Price of labor_Rich 1.61 1.54 1.49 1.45 
Welfare_Poor 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 
Welfare_Rich -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.270 
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Table B38. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Full Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Income Taxes (the POOR households’ 
endowment is 50 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.15 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 5.24 5.21 5.18 5.15 
Price of Y -5.67 -5.63 -5.58 -5.55 
Price of capital -0.59 -0.38 -0.20 -0.04 
Labor Supply_Poor 5.49 5.77 6.03 6.24 
Labor Supply_Rich -4.51 -4.20 -3.92 -3.69 
Price of labor_Poor -6.19 -6.28 -6.38 -6.48 
Price of labor_Rich 4.92 4.54 4.29 3.92 
Welfare_Poor 0.62 0.57 0.54 0.51 
Welfare_Rich -0.37 -0.32 -0.27 -0.23 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.244 0.243 0.242 0.241 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.165 
Price of X 3.65 3.62 3.60 3.59 
Price of Y -4.02 -3.98 -3.95 -3.93 
Price of capital -0.38 -0.23 -0.09 0.01 
Labor Supply_Poor 3.86 4.07 4.25 4.40 
Labor Supply_Rich -3.17 -2.93 -2.73 -2.55 
Price of labor_Poor -4.40 -4.40 -4.60 -4.59 
Price of labor_Rich 3.40 3.27 2.92 2.79 
Welfare_Poor 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.37 
Welfare_Rich -0.24 -0.20 -0.16 -0.13 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.231 0.230 0.229 0.229 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.175 
Price of X 2.60 2.58 2.56 2.55 
Price of Y -2.89 -2.87 -2.84 -2.82 
Price of capital -0.26 -0.14 -0.04 0.03 
Labor Supply_Poor 2.77 2.92 3.05 3.16 
Labor Supply_Rich -2.26 -2.09 -1.94 -1.81 
Price of labor_Poor -3.13 -3.13 -3.34 -3.34 
Price of labor_Rich 2.45 2.32 1.98 1.98 
Welfare_Poor 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.27 
Welfare_Rich -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.222 0.221 0.221 0.221 
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Table B39. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity and Income Taxes (the 
POOR households’ endowment is 50 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.07, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 7.71 7.59 7.49 7.40 
Price of Y -8.27 -8.12 -7.99 -7.88 
Price of capital -2.53 -1.66 -0.87 -0.19 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 7.34 8.25 9.08 9.79 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -5.00 -3.87 -2.85 -1.97 
Price of labor_Poor -2.32 -2.54 -2.74 -2.90 
Price of labor_Rich 0.40 0.18 -0.01 -0.18 
Welfare_Poor 1.19 1.08 1.00 0.93 
Welfare_Rich -0.66 -0.45 -0.27 -0.13 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.120 0.119 0.118 0.117 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.301 0.298 0.295 0.292 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.085, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.215
Price of X 4.88 4.81 4.74 4.68 
Price of Y -5.40 -5.30 -5.21 -5.13 
Price of capital -1.54 -0.95 -0.42 0.02 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 4.75 5.35 5.90 6.36 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -3.21 -2.44 -1.74 -1.14 
Price of labor_Poor -1.03 -1.18 -1.32 -1.44 
Price of labor_Rich 0.33 0.18 0.04 -0.07 
Welfare_Poor 0.81 0.74 0.68 0.63 
Welfare_Rich -0.37 -0.23 -0.11 -0.02 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.113 0.112 0.111 0.111 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.283 0.280 0.278 0.277 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.1, Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.095, Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.225
Price of X 3.06 3.01 2.97 2.94 
Price of Y -3.46 -3.39 -3.33 -3.28 
Price of capital -0.94 -0.56 -0.21 0.08 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 3.02 3.41 3.76 4.05 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -2.03 -1.52 -1.06 -0.67 
Price of labor_Poor -0.21 -0.31 -0.41 -0.48 
Price of labor_Rich 0.24 0.13 0.04 -0.03 
Welfare_Poor 0.53 0.48 0.44 0.41 
Welfare_Rich -0.21 -0.12 -0.04 0.01 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.108 0.108 0.107 0.107 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.271 0.269 0.268 0.267 
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Table B40. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Commodity Taxes (the POOR 
households’ endowment is 50 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax  = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.2 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12 
Price of Y -3.52 -3.51 -3.49 -3.48 
Price of capital -0.99 -0.76 -0.55 -0.38 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 3.00 3.31 3.58 3.82 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -2.12 -1.77 -1.46 -1.20 
Price of labor_Poor -3.74 -3.85 -3.94 -4.02 
Price of labor_Rich 0.26 0.15 0.05 -0.02 
Welfare_Poor 0.58 0.53 0.49 0.45 
Welfare_Rich -0.32 -0.26 -0.20 -0.16 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.296 0.295 0.293 0.292 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.215 
Price of X 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 
Price of Y -2.46 -2.44 -2.43 -2.42 
Price of capital -0.67 -0.51 -0.36 -0.24 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 2.08 2.30 2.49 2.66 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -1.47 -1.22 -1.00 -0.82 
Price of labor_Poor -2.60 -2.68 -2.75 -2.80 
Price of labor_Rich 0.19 0.11 0.04 -0.01 
Welfare_Poor 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.32 
Welfare_Rich -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.282 0.281 0.280 0.279 
Statutory ad-valorem commodity tax = 0.25 
Expected penalty rate (commodity taxes) = 0.225 
Price of X 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 
Price of Y -1.75 -1.74 -1.73 -1.73 
Price of capital -0.47 -0.35 -0.25 -0.16 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 1.48 1.64 1.77 1.89 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -1.04 -0.86 -0.71 -0.57 
Price of labor_Poor -1.85 -1.91 -1.96 -2.00 
Price of labor_Rich 0.14 0.08 0.03 -0.00 
Welfare_Poor 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.23 
Welfare_Rich -0.14 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 
Equal-yield  commodity tax rate 0.272 0.272 0.271 0.270 
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Table B41. Percentage Changes in Product and Factor Prices with Partial Compliance in the 
Formal Sector and Full Evasion in the Informal Sector: Income Taxes (the POOR households’ 
endowment is 50 percent of the RICH households’ endowment) 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.15 
 esub = 2 esub = 4 esub = 6 esub = 8 
Price of X 5.09 5.09 5.08 5.07 
Price of Y -5.63 -5.60 -5.57 -5.55 
Price of capital -1.60 -1.21 -0.86 -0.57 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 4.90 5.42 5.88 6.27 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -3.41 -2.83 -2.32 -1.89 
Price of labor_Poor -5.48 -5.68 -5.78 -5.88 
Price of labor_Rich 5.99 5.49 4.96 4.58 
Welfare_Poor 0.93 0.85 0.78 0.73 
Welfare_Rich -0.50 -0.40 -0.31 -0.24 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.245 0.244 0.243 0.242 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.165 
Price of X 3.55 3.54 3.54 3.53 
Price of Y -3.99 -3.96 -3.94 -3.93 
Price of capital -1.09 -0.80 -0.56 -0.35 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 3.45 3.82 4.15 4.43 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -2.39 -1.97 -1.60 -1.29 
Price of labor_Poor -3.88 -3.99 -4.09 -4.19 
Price of labor_Rich 4.23 3.85 3.47 3.23 
Welfare_Poor 0.67 0.61 0.57 0.53 
Welfare_Rich -0.33 -0.25 -0.19 -0.14 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.232 0.231 0.230 0.229 
Statutory proportional income tax rate = 0.20 
Expected penalty rate (income taxes) = 0.175 
Price of X 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.51 
Price of Y -2.87 -2.85 -2.84 -2.82 
Price of capital -0.76 -0.56 -0.37 -0.22 
Labor Supply_Informal Sector 2.47 2.74 2.98 3.18 
Labor Supply_Formal Sector -1.71 -1.40 -1.13 -0.90 
Price of labor_Poor -2.82 -2.82 -3.03 -3.03 
Price of labor_Rich 2.92 2.78 2.43 2.30 
Welfare_Poor 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.38 
Welfare_Rich -0.22 -0.17 -0.12 -0.09 
Equal-yield income tax rate 0.223 0.222 0.221 0.221 
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